

Administrative Problems in Pakistan

EDITED BY

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Foreword

The more we learn about the process of "development," the greater becomes our interest in public administration. "Development" comprises many interrelated, mutually determining variables and forces. Debating relative importance is less than useful, but clearly public administration ranks high, along with capital formation, foreign exchange, distribution of income, and power structure. Indeed, no significant aspect of the development process can be understood without serious attention to the nature of administration.

There are many reasons why this is the case. In most developing countries, government—including administration—has played an aggressive role. This has meant dominance in economic and social affairs, in contrast with the myth of *laissez faire* in other areas of the world. Reliance on government often parallels fear and distrust of the same government, a curious and amusing paradox we do not fully understand. Other factors, however, strengthen the influence of government and frequently that of administration in particular:

1. The development process necessitates shifts in power, and government is of the essence of power and power change
2. Capital formation, including allocation of scarce resources, is a major governmental function, particularly where markets are insufficiently developed.
3. The need for social and economic overhead (with its great costs, long-range returns, and monopolistic character) inevitably enlarges government's role in capital formation.

Public administration is necessarily dynamic. (Even in a hypothetical country where society, polity, and economy were static,

public administration would have to be dynamic to keep things static!) Thus students of public administration in a developing country must examine a process in which change is a preeminent and continuing component. Social scientists have developed many techniques for studying dynamic processes, but most of these require types of information not yet available in the developing world. Among research techniques known today, system analysis will probably turn out to be the best way of analyzing the place of public administration in development. Of course our present ability to investigate nations, development, or administration as systems is minimal. Descriptive analysis is the most available technique, and the essays in this book provide examples of both the advantages and limitations of this method.

The volume comes from five years of participation by faculty and students of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, with the Administrative Staff College, Henley-on-Thames, England, in the work of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College in Lahore. Professors Gorvine, Ziring, and Birkhead served as consultants there in the training program for upper level administrators. Professors Fritschler, Platt, and Miller were graduate students who spent three or more months at the Staff College collecting information for their doctoral dissertations. The work in Pakistan was financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Insights from the study of public administration in Pakistan should be of significant use in studying the development process in other countries. Although this country has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world today, it is well along in the development process. Obviously it is not argued that Pakistan is a "typical" country (if such exists at all). There are in fact several characteristics of Pakistan that must be kept in mind:

1. There is a well-organized administrative structure with a substantial corps of experienced administrators.
2. The economy is anything but primitive. There is a large market network and several major market areas with modern transport and communication facilities.
3. There is a well-established and sophisticated planning system, with a number of experienced planners and a web of relationships for plan implementation.

4. Problems of economic development have been emphasized and often given overriding importance by the political leadership.

Evidence to support these assertions is not difficult to find. Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan, ending June 30, 1965, was a major success. Principal goals were met or exceeded, with but few exceptions. Total investment exceeded planned investment by about 10 per cent, and national income went up 29 per cent in the five years. Exports increased 35 per cent, far more than the planned 15 per cent. Food production, usually a deeply disappointing sector, increased 27 per cent as compared with the plan for 21 per cent. Industrial production, planned for 47 per cent, achieved a 64 per cent rise.

Such achievements are significant and encouraging, but of course they are not the entire story. Pakistan faces many difficulties in continuing the present rate of economic development, difficulties that may be increasing with development. For example, the role of foreign borrowing is becoming more critical as the country moves into investment for capital goods industries. Doubtless, administration itself is becoming a more critical consideration. One hopes this last point will be recognized. Hence the occasion for this book.

June 30, 1966

IRVING SWERDLOW

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Acknowledgments

Too many Pakistani administrators to name gave freely of their time and hospitality in replying to questioning by the authors. Nearly every time we tried we gained good access to the administrative process. This access was related to the generous introductions Principals A. K. Malik and N. M. Khan and Vice Principal Abdul Qayyum gave us to individuals and agencies throughout the public and private sectors during the years 1960 to 1964. Maxwell School personnel have continued to have pleasant relationships with the Pakistan Administrative Staff College under the present Principal, M. W. Abbasi. Members of the directing staff at the College in numerous conversations have helped us refine our thinking, among them are Hassan Habib, U. Kramet, Satnam Mahmood, Syed Manzoor Hussain, Mir Naseem Mahmood and Khalil-ur-Rahman. To all of these persons and others we express our thanks and the hope that some of them may be partially repaid with ideas that occur in our writing about their work.

Our two colleagues from Henley-on-Thames, Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones and Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Tobin, were friendly critics. They will find reflections of their ideas at several points in this volume. The authors have also profited from the advice and assistance of Dean Stephen K. Bailey, Associate Dean Irving Swerdlow, and Professors Jay B. Westcott and Karl M. Schmidt. Professors Ralph Braibanti, Faqir Muhammad, and Isma'il Ragi al Faruqi read all or portions of the manuscript and helped us to improve it. Mrs. Eileen James prepared the excellent maps.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the forbearance of all the authors with my crotchety editorial ways. But each of us, in final analysis, willingly accepts responsibility for his own writing.

G. S. B.

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
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
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WEST PAKISTAN





Administrative Problems in Pakistan

I. Introduction

Public administration in Pakistan is shaped fundamentally by the physical and cultural environment, as is the case in every nation. The culture of the late twentieth century has been fabricated in the course of a varied history: Harappan, Mauryan, Greek, Arab, Afghan, Mogul, Hindu, and other strands compose it. During thousands of years civilizations and peoples have come and gone. If the components of today's culture could be weighted, however, Islam would surely rank as the single most influential element. Writers on Pakistan's administration have hesitated to consider this point, although it probably needs proof less than it needs elucidation. Village and rural life has placed its stamp on the ways these people think and act, even in fact on many urban dwellers. A lesser part of the culture is the result of two centuries of British rule. That heritage is, however, still dominant in many phases of government and administration. These and other cultural factors, moreover, have long been exposed to the modernizing influence of Western technology and ideas.

To understand Pakistan and its administration one also must understand the hardships imposed by the aridity of the West Wing, by the moisture of the East Wing, and by the heat in both provinces. Equally important is the separation of the two by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Thus physical burdens are imposed by the climate and the land. Those burdens are, however, no more immediate and relevant to the subject here than are the cultural distinctions between the Bengalis and the residents of the West Wing. Languages, temperaments, and living habits are among these variations, although to characterize the differences exactly is a

task beyond the scope of this book. Geographic division of the country does somehow sharpen the social and economic contrasts, and the resulting tensions appear in administration, politics, and the feelings of nationalism or patriotism. The national integration and the federal problems the Pakistanis face are perhaps as difficult as any in recent times.

The polity of this new nation is developing slowly. Political parties are as yet weak.¹ Only recently have they begun to recover the meager portion of ground gained during the early fifties but lost in the 1958 Revolution. Communication on national and even regional matters remains rudimentary, and a responsible press has not emerged. Strong and responsible political leadership is difficult to find, with the single exception of President Muhammad Ayub Khan. Historians will surely interpret the 1958 Revolution as a step forward in Pakistan's political development, since it brought to the country leadership that had been lacking since the death of the Qaid-i-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

Administrative development is of course related to political development, in ways that scholars generally are only beginning to comprehend. In this book the work of the Pakistan government since 1958 is outlined in terms of efforts at structural reform, use of public corporations, relations with business, and trial and error in agricultural programs. Each is a chapter in the struggle to develop the political resources and institutions, as well as the economic capacity of Pakistan. The relevance is perhaps plainest in the Basic Democracies, which comprise the chief effort by President Ayub at mobilization by reforming old and establishing new political organizations. They are closely related to the ongoing administrative process, via the councils which operate in conjunction with planners and other administrators, from union council to provincial assembly.

Activities by the Basic Democracies have proceeded with greater vigor if less discipline since replacement of the martial law regime by the new constitutional government in 1962. That occasion was obviously a landmark in the political modernization of Pakistan. So also were the 1964-65 elections, which revealed definite but confused differences of opinion in the electorate and

¹ Karl Von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), in chapters 9-12 describes political problems since 1958.

among Basic Democrats. The dominant political issue by 1965, however, was obsession with the Kashmir issue and other border problems with India. Thus the war that autumn undoubtedly was a strong integrating factor, even though the uncertain nature of the subsequent peace leaves open the question of agreement on a posture toward India.

Pakistan's economic growth in the 1960's has been more rapid than political modernization. Scarcely had it been realized, however, that agricultural and industrial income was expanding at a very encouraging rate, than the war with India began. Budgetary cuts for other than military purposes in the winter of 1965-66 seemed to insure that economic growth along the previous lines was going to be inhibited. In any event life continued to be extremely hard for all but the select few in Pakistan. Poverty, hunger, disease, and death are always close at hand.

ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The essays in this volume concern diverse aspects of public administration in a developing or modernizing country. Those two concepts of "development" and "modernization" are used more or less interchangeably by the authors. Whether there are stages of growth or whether Western models of administration should be urged on nations like Pakistan are questions that are confronted herein in a few instances. The authors have been content, however, to concentrate their attention on Pakistan's conditions in the 1960's. From time to time comparisons are employed, with the United States, England, France, Mexico, and other countries. Comparing is not, however, the main purpose of the book.²

In these pages public administration is assumed to be a sub-

² The authors are not defying the current, very useful attempts at systematic theorizing in the fields of comparative administration and comparative politics. We are familiar with the works of the members of the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, as well as the efforts of other scholars in the United States and abroad. There is far from complete agreement among them on a broad theory or even on middle-range problems. Nevertheless there are many references to their ideas herein, and a degree of congruity with the mainstream of that body of thought is present here in terms of sensing the need to state and verify generalizations and to join a search for theory.

system of the political system. In view of all the attention recently paid to political and administrative development and at the end of two decades of worldwide concentration on economic development, this is scarcely the occasion to define "administration" or to dwell on the relation of administration to economic and political development. In essence, the entire book is about these problems. "Administration" is the process by which an organization's (in this case, governmental) policies are implemented and organizational goals are sought. The authors hold that the quality of administration is directly related to the speed and direction of change in the whole society, including social, political, and economic realms. This is particularly apparent in Pakistan, where the bureaucracy and the public administration are dominant elements in the society.

A desire for better implementing development plans has long been evident in administrative circles in Pakistan. Under the British Raj there was, after all, almost a habit of asking special commissions from time to time to examine and recommend concerning important administrative problems. That habit has lingered after partition. Today members of several of the services by training and tradition pay close attention to the timeworn aspects of "practical" public administration, such as formal organization, personnel difficulties, budgeting, and the like. During nineteen years of independence, an unusually large number of high-level commissions of public servants and important public figures have studied aspects of traditional administrative and administrative-policy problems.³ Each of three Five-Year Plans has also incorporated thoughtful comments on administrative questions.

³ Some of these groups and their report dates are: Pay Commission, 1949 and 1950, Committee on Organization, Structure and Level of Expenditure, 1950, 1951, and 1953 (Administrative Enquiry Committee), Agricultural Committee, 1951 and 1952, Rowland Egger, 1953 (report not released to public), Bernard Gladieux, 1955 (report not released), Electoral Reforms Commission, 1956, Credit Enquiry Commission, 1959, Law Reforms Commission, 1959, Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan, 1959, Press Commission, 1959, Report on Provincial Taxation, 1959, Commission on National Education, 1960, Provincial Reorganization Commission, 1960, Food and Agriculture Commission, 1960; Report of ILO Experts on a Social Security Scheme, 1960, Land Reforms Commission, 1961, Finance Commission, 1962, Taxation Enquiry Committee, 1962, Pay and Services Commission, 1962 (report not released), Franchise Commission, 1963, Administrative Reorganization Committee (Standing Organization Committee), still functioning, 1964.

In his chapter of this volume Professor Albert Gorvine comments on what he considers the essential ineffectiveness of such critiques and recommendations where sea changes in bureaucratic attitudes and configurations and in public opinion are involved. The popular, current formulation of Pakistan's administrative dilemma is this: public officials and people alike must shift from a colonial, law-and-order mentality to a new democratic growth mentality. The saying has become so banal that it hides what is a call for radical changes. Gorvine concludes that when such changes have occurred in public administration in Pakistan they have most often been the result and not the cause of further national integration and modernization, or of revolutionary changes in regime. The substance of a proposed administrative reform therefore is not so much a key to its probable effects as is the backing it receives from influential groups and individuals in and out of the government.

One major instance of organizational reform is used by several of these writers. Dissatisfaction with the regular machinery of government has evoked from President Ayub's government since 1958 more and more reliance upon public corporations. Among the largest of these today are the well-known Pakistan International Airlines, industrial development corporations (PIDC) in either wing, two water and power development authorities (WAPDA), and two agricultural development corporations (ADC). Fifty-five per cent of development expenditures outlined for the Third Five-Year Plan, before the September, 1965, hostilities, were to be made by such corporations. That proportion is more or less the obvious extension of previous trends. Whether at the President's initiative or not, a policy decision has been made to throw the weight of the government behind this organizational form and on the shoulders of the relatively few individuals who serve as corporations managers.

Perhaps the largest of all these semiautonomous enterprises, the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, is described in Chapter V. West Pakistan WAPDA is charged with the grave responsibility of maintaining much of the old and building the new physical infrastructure in the fields of water and power. In this semiarid land, such functions endow the agency's otherwise mundane administrative activities with high political and economic implications.

The Karachi Port Trust, analyzed in Chapter VI, manages one

of the major centers of the surface transport infrastructure, which was created chiefly before independence. Professor Raymond Miller illustrates the daily frustrations of many corporation executives, as exemplified in KPT's labor relations, traffic problems, and interagency links. His chapter on a very old corporation contrasts interestingly with the description of the new authority, West Pakistan WAPDA. Time has gathered to the operations of KPT many ongoing conflicts and arguments, like barnacles on the hull of an old ship. Mr. Miller still interprets favorably the record of the Trust and attributes that performance in great part to the contacts the Trust has with the outside world. Unlike domestically oriented organizations, it competes with the port facilities in India and elsewhere in the East, at least in the minds and impressions of foreign shippers.

Professor George M. Platt indicates in Chapter IV that he finds no such record of accomplishment in the case of the agricultural development corporations or indeed other kinds of structural reforms that have been attempted in that most important of fields. Higher productivity has apparently followed from recent changes in agricultural practices in both wings of Pakistan. Mr. Platt feels that certain of the primary political moves the government has made since about 1960—the establishment of Basic Democracies, the patterns of cooperatives and local governments emerging from rural experimentation at Comilla and elsewhere in East Pakistan, and the rural public works program—show promise of important results. Likely as not, this promise has been increased by the weight the President and his political and career aides have given to these movements.

In Chapter II Professor Lawrence Ziring confronts directly the friction where administrators and villagers come together. In his account of the rise of Basic Democracies, Mr. Ziring is most concerned with a phase of political modernization, enlisting the support of the rural people in the political process. He is very optimistic about the story thus far and about prospects for the immediate future. Basic Democracies have apparently relieved the bureaucracy of some detailed work in the village. Doubtless Basic Democracies are bringing a feeling of responsibility to the lower levels of the political and administrative structure. This new-found responsibility has been especially apparent in the case of the rural

public works program, in operation since 1962, using United States Public Law 480 rupees. What has not really struck home to administrators, however, is that a demand for wider participation by popular representatives will inevitably generate a need for more administrative apparatus and more trained administrators.

Professor Fritschler in Chapter II holds up to light the separation of the more modernized industrial managers and their organizations from what the government and administration are actually doing. He examines the relations between government and industrial concerns, and he deplores what he finds. The legislatures seem to play little part today in the administrative process, even with regard to business, which has been the source of most rapid economic expansion in recent years. The courts have acted somewhat more aggressively in this matter, yet they do not satisfy the criteria Fritschler suggests.

The street between business and government today is a one-way street. Government attempts to regulate business closely, but business (as typified by industry) has not organized to represent its interests before the regulators. Private organizations may be influencing the administration, but the process is not visible to the public. Thus Professor Fritschler is committed to the idea of democratizing the regulatory relationship. He wants to see bureaucratic authority and power debated openly and directly by organized interest groups. He would strengthen the courts. And, as I read Mr. Fritschler, he views these changes as important to modernize the political processes. He is not particularly worried about strengthening industry because of his belief in any economic philosophy.

Professor Ziring is encouraged by the mobilization of sentiment behind the regime through the operations of the Basic Democracies he has observed. He is more optimistic about the rural situation than about that in the large cities. This trend of events may or may not eventually involve the sharing of power by the government with the rural or, less likely, the urban population. On the other hand, Professor Fritschler has found only a slight amount of actual participation by modernizing elites in one part of the administrative process. In addition the difference in findings stems from the fact that Professor Ziring is dealing in plans and potentialities that have yet to mature, while Professor Fritschler is

writing of conditions as they are now. With exceptions, both the fields of agriculture and business have been typified by more traditional devices and ideas to date.

The Basic Democracies are frankly political in nature and tied in with individual local opinion leaders. Students around the world are watching with interest the course of this nation-building device, which calls for strengthening local political and administrative functions. In some ways it may be said that the Basic Democracies experiment is founded on the knowledge derived from disappointing experience. The Comilla enterprise particularly has tried to capitalize on such experience. It is an interesting question whether the holders of power, including the bureaucratic elite, can depend so heavily as they do on the vast areas in Pakistan outside the cities for mobilizing support and understanding of their actions.

In sum, these essays concern the place of administration and administrators in the development of Pakistan. They are focused upon limited problem areas, and they omit background information of a general nature which readers not familiar with Pakistan must know if they are to appreciate the essays. Among these factors underlying administration and administrative behavior are: certain historical features; the complex culture, including the dominant religion; the economy, and the 1962 Constitution, which had not made its full impact by 1965. The remainder of this chapter sketches these factors very briefly.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The environment of administration in Pakistan is rich with the Muslim heritage of the subcontinent, as it has been altered by the British presence over more than three centuries and by the absorptive powers of Hinduism for more than twelve centuries. Islam was first brought to Sind in A.D. 712, and Muslim power grew by fits and starts until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Thereafter it grew more rapidly, especially after the Mogul Empire was established in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The British supplanted the Moguls as rulers of most of the subcontinent in the eighteenth century, and their rule continued until partition in 1947. That long history necessarily means that many cultural traits of Pakistan's population today are also shared with the rest of the subcontinent. It has become a cliché to speak of

the absorption of alien religions and cultures by the Hindu culture. Yet in Pakistan Islam was not absorbed, however much it may have been influenced

Subsequently we will examine the influence of Islam on Pakistani administration and administrators. Here should be mentioned the vestiges of Mogul administration which may still be glimpsed in this country. The systems of land tenure, of revenue collection, and of local government display relics of the Mogul and other civilizations in the nomenclature and the geographic areas still extant. These very minor examples underline the existence of longstanding governmental and administrative traditions in a new country. The Pakistani is proud of his historical roots.

Continuing British influence is easier to see, because it is both alien and more specific. The East India Company came to India for trade in 1608, but in the next century and a half it developed other ambitions. The Mogul Empire was decadent by the time the "John Company" substituted rule for trade, and the last Emperor was dethroned effortlessly at the end of the 1857 uprising. Slowly but surely during almost two centuries the British rulers built forms and content of government and administration that were exceedingly well adapted to ruling a great colonial empire. With notable exceptions the foreign bureaucracy deemed their responsibilities had been acquitted when law and order reigned and the taxes were collected. Indeed the administrative system created for imperial purposes lasted almost intact through the departure of the British and independence in 1947. The Pakistanis have consciously changed it very little in the ensuing nineteen years.

The administrative institutions and practices described in the following essays are full of British colonial influence. The reference is not to the superficialities about which so many bad jokes have been made—black-tie dining, pith helmets, or post-prandial toasts. The effective impact has been much deeper. Probably the most profound influence upon the nature and quality of administration today is the English language. It remains the tongue of administration at all but the lowest levels, where of course the ordinary man is most deeply involved. Bengali is spoken by most of the 55 million persons in East Pakistan, while Urdu is but one of no less than five tongues used in the West. The 1962 Constitution describes Bengali and Urdu as the "national languages of Pakistan,"

and it requires that in 1972 a commission appointed by the President examine and report on the replacement of the English language even for official purposes.

There has been discussion of this language situation, beginning with partition and centering on such questions as what script to use, scholarly utility of each, and so on. The problem has not caused as much unrest as have the language problems of India. To the outsider, however, it appears no nearer to a solution in 1965 than in 1947. There can be little doubt, meanwhile, that the use of English in administration has been a major vehicle for bringing Western concepts and institutions into this country and into India.

A second heritage from the British for government and administration is the common law and the patterns of adjudication. The principle of *stare decisis* is the most basic of many English legal concepts that have made a deep imprint on Pakistan. Organization and practices of the Supreme and High Courts also resemble those in England. In the lower courts the judiciary and executive have until recently been combined in a unique organizational setup intended by the British for Indian conditions. Modifications in lower courts since partition have been made in the direction of separating judiciary from executive.

Formal organization for administration in the central government as well as in the two provincial governments remains substantially as in preindependence days. There is, despite some modifications, the continuing division between secretariat and "attached" or operating departments. The theory and in great measure the practice is for the secretariat to confine itself to policy-making, while the operating departments have the sphere of "administration." The distinction is not at all a popular one in the American literature on public administration, and the observer in Pakistan feels that it is less and less realistic with each passing year. A main function of the distinction today is that of providing a rationale for reserving key positions in all three governments for members of the elite Civil Service of Pakistan. These men staff the secretariats to the extent their small numbers allow.

Yet another English practice still flourishing is that of dealing with each problem, decision, or case that comes before the administration by tucking it in its own file and dispatching it up

the hierarchy for reading, noting, and sometimes serious attention at each level. The tendency seems to be to treat all cases alike. Policy formation as a species of collective decision-making to push future decisions down into the hierarchy is most difficult to attain.

Field administration for traditional law enforcement and revenue collection activities remains largely as it has been for decades. That is to say, the smallest areas of administration are the thana in East and the tehsil in West Pakistan. These are grouped into subdivisions (sometimes circles at a level below subdivisions in the East), which are in turn responsible to districts. The district is the primary unit of field administration, and the collector, deputy commissioner, or district magistrate as he is variously called, is one of the most powerful and interesting officials in the whole range of positions. The eighteen years since partition have expanded the definition of his job to include general responsibility for development activities.

The collector in colonial times held virtually all government powers, indeed was the Government in the field. Today he retains most of the power he had under English rule, although his judicial powers are slowly being split off. With regard to the newer governmental activities that have been created in this century primarily—public health and agriculture, for instances—he also has strong formal authority and even general influence. These other departments, often called “nation-building,” those most intimately involved in the development process, ordinarily use the districts as their field areas. Within a district, departmental field representatives may have their own programs, but in the formal hierarchy they are still responsible to a degree to the deputy commissioner. He is charged with “coordinating” their work, and he also evaluates it for the commissioner above him or for the secretariat. The form assumed by these relationships doubtless varies from district to district and by the individual persons involved, but the deputy commissioner is a vital link between headquarters and field. His status may even have been augmented by growing development programs and the specialists they bring to the district, as compared with a few decades ago. Growth of Basic Democracies is also profoundly affecting the DC and line officers below him. Changing patterns of wealth and land owner-

ship have affected the deputy commissioner's status as much or more than such governmental moves, it may be argued. His prestige remains high, for often he is from the CSP and his office always commands the respect of everyone in his district.

Formally the districts are grouped into divisions headed by commissioners, twelve in the West and four in the East. The office of commissioner was created rather late in British times and has never acquired the same popular respect as that of the deputy commissioner, although the latter is a long step down in the hierarchy. The commissioner's office is nowadays a judicial and communications center for the division. It is a steppingstone for officials who have served successfully as deputy commissioners and provincial secretaries, chiefly members of the CSP. The offices of commissioner and deputy commissioner both display traits traceable back to Mogul times or before. The basic imprint, nonetheless, is that made by the British through their two centuries of rule.

The final and perhaps most indelible mark of the British is that made upon the attitudes of administrators, especially at the upper levels and among the members of the CSP. These attitudes are complex, somewhat elitist, and yet in part praiseworthy. Ralph Braibanti has made a good characterization⁴ and Philip Woodruff has captured a common attitude in the title of his history, *The Guardians*. He compares the Indian Civil Service, the forerunner of today's CSP (as well as of the Indian Administrative Service), with the philosopher-kings in the writings of Plato. Representatives of an imperial power, holding the subcontinent in a benevolent but nevertheless tight grip, the ICS has frequently been referred to as the "steel frame" of the government. The epithet now is occasionally applied to the senior service in Pakistan, perhaps most aptly in the years immediately after independence when a few CSP officers shouldered staggering responsibilities.

Corollary to guardianship is the elite status of the CSP, the Police Service of Pakistan, and even to a degree the other superior services. They are in effect set apart from the common run of the people,

⁴ "The Civil Service of Pakistan—A Theoretical Analysis," *South Atlantic Quarterly* (Spring, 1959), see also M. A. Choudhuri, *The Civil Service in Pakistan* (Dacca National Institute of Public Administration [NIPA], 1963); Henry Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), and Muneer Ahmad, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964).

more than in some developing countries. On the other hand it is but fair to note the high sense of responsibility, even a calling to serve the public interest, in many career administrators, and this is also in some measure a gift of the British. In the same manner as before partition, bright young Pakistanis aspire to join the CSP or another of the main services. If this attitude has slightly diminished in recent years, it has been in favor of careers in private industry. Career openings there are limited, however, and the annual examinations for the public service continue to be heavily patronized.

The Civil Service of Pakistan annually takes in about thirty young men, perhaps three or four times as many as any other central service. It has been accused, in some of the writings cited above but also by other critics, of monopolizing the major positions in the administration of Pakistan. What is involved is no conspiracy, at least not in the ordinary sense of that term. A proportion of the positions in the top-level jobs of secretariats and departments are reserved by law and regulations for members of this service. In Chapter VI Albert Gorvine indicates how CSP officers are stationed throughout the administration at positions which are in effect communications centers, checkpoints on all major activities. Henry Goodnow has also spelled out this situation in his recent book.⁵

Certain of the attitudes derived from British times are rather confined to administrative matters, although it might be argued they are indicative of the tone of English nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thinking about colonial matters. Philip Woodruff quotes an Indian Civil Service functionary of Empire days, on the subject of delegation of authority by a superior to lower officers. This is part of the current style of CSP officers:

I have said to each of them in effect—"This is your subdivision or your job. These are the lines on which I want it to be run. Now go and run it. If you make a really serious mistake I shall have to overrule you. Otherwise I shall not interfere. If you want advice, I am here to give it. If you want a definite order, you are free to ask for it. But if you make a habit of wanting either, you will be very little use to me."⁶

⁵ *Op cit*

⁶ *The Men Who Ruled India*, Vol II: *The Guardians* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), pp 213-14. From the papers of E. H. H. Edye.

This may or may not describe typical behavior of members of the senior services in Pakistan. A great deal of administration by rule of thumb does go on. Such thinking, such harking back to English principles is part of the tradition and the vocabulary of Pakistani administrators. One encounters it less often in the provincial services, which are, however, considerably greater in number.

CULTURAL FACTORS

The cultural fabric of Pakistani administration is as complex and in some respects as confusing as that in any developing country.⁷ By "culture" is meant here the way of life shared by members of this society—the attitudes, values, motivations, social institutions, and techniques common to it. This is an ancient culture, comprising many strands that are also woven into the Hindu subculture that exists in the East Wing, as into Indian culture. This is however an Islamic culture, a point dwelt on briefly in the next section of this introductory chapter. Its traditional and rural aspects are intimately associated with its Islamic nature.

Great uniformity throughout this big country is not the case, however. Pakistan's culture is made up of many subcultures. It may be argued that the East and West Wings are discrete in this respect, and as to language and numerous living habits this is incontrovertible. Inside West Pakistan there are also important cultural differences, in eating, dressing, family life, and so on, among Pathans, Panjabis, Sindis and Baluchis. West Pakistan in 1955 was made one unit for governing purposes by amalgamating the former states with which the distribution of these subcultures roughly compared. The 1962 Constitution, however, guarantees their continuing recognition in legislative and administrative institutions.

Modernization is breaking down these traditional identifications, these things in common. Western education and Western ideas,

⁷ For general commentary, see G. M. Foster, *Traditional Cultures and the Impact of Technological Change* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1962); I. H. Qureshi, *The Pakistani Way of Life* (New York: Praeger, 1956); S. M. Ikram, *Muslim Civilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), Ikram and Percival Spear, eds., *The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963); and S. Maron, ed., *Pakistan: Society and Culture* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957).

urbanization, and industrialization have been the yeast of change throughout the subcontinent for many years. Migrations at the time of partition brought people to Pakistan from all parts of India, with assorted ways of life. The impact of these forces has been concentrated but not confined in the cities, where 13 per cent of the population lives. Illiteracy is greatest in the villages today, and the cause and effect of this fact can not be separated. Less than a fifth of the total population, however, is literate. Life in the villages everywhere in Pakistan remains traditional. Signs of modernization always are close at hand, among them not only medicine, foods, and gadgetry but also the opening of urban markets for village produce, better transportation, and, most important of all, new ideas.

The diffuse, yet omnipresent character of both cultural consequences of and cultural impediments to development only impresses one with its fundamental nature. "Every single Pakistani is caught up in a major social upheaval. And most of us, consciously or unconsciously, are unhappy about it."⁸ Unhappy possibly because to these men as to many human beings memories of the past become sweeter as they age. Unhappy also because acculturation brings many troubles to the individual.

The men who carry major responsibilities in public administration frequently epitomize the situation. Mostly children of educated, well-to-do families, they may suffer severely from being caught between two worlds, modern and traditional. They often have been born and reared in villages, offspring of rich landowners. A senior administrator may know many villagers, and know them well, although his education occurred in his home, later in a private school, and subsequently at Oxbridge. Returning from a year or more in the West, such a man entered the examination and won a place in one of the higher services. The technology of his home and its other furnishings are usually Western in style. His children may live in American or European teenage fashion. On the other hand, the family is still an extended one. The administrator probably shares in the ownership of family lands back in the village. His mother may remain cloistered at home if not in purdah. At the

⁸ Agha Abdul Hamid, "Socio-Cultural Factors in Development," *Views of Administration in Pakistan* (Lahore: Pakistan Administrative Staff College [PASC], 1963), pp 3 and 7.

secretariat in the daytime, however, the senior administrator lives in the modern world as he decides about canal design or about the process to be installed in a new fertilizer factory. He is, in short, living in a situation of rapid acculturation, of the conflict of cultures

On top of all this is the blanket of nostalgia and pessimism derived from our literature. . . .

But matters do not end here. At least some West Pakistanis do not live in two worlds but in three. To take an example, a Punjabi born in a village or a small town grows up in an atmosphere where the folklore, lullabies and songs are sung in Punjabi. He goes to school and starts learning first Urdu and then English. Throughout his life these three different influences pull him in different directions. There is a strong desire on the one hand to go forward and yet somehow to cling to the past.⁹

True it is that all the urban middle class is caught in these tensions. Without specifying the subtler cultural parameters impinging on the administrator, however, it should be evident that these gross influences and attitudes bear on his job performance. The pressures on him at times are great. And some Pakistani observers are aware of this condition. For example, Mr. Agha Abdul Hamid, a senior administrator, has listed certain "barriers to development" that he has identified. Among them is the widely held belief in "Kismet," a fatalistic attitude, the roots of which he traces to the general insecurity of the human condition. Poverty, disease, and hunger are also on the list, applying not only in the countryside but also in the cities. Mr. Hamid includes caste and class barriers—in the villages caste lines remain strong despite the departure of Hindus from West Pakistan. The general attitude toward women is still sufficient to keep them from participating effectively in economic life in the city, although in the villages and fields they have always done a great share of the physical work. Finally there is a cluster of attitudes stemming also from the generally rural character of the people—most of them live and die in the village without ever in their lives wandering far from it.

Turning briefly to habits and attitudes bearing more directly on administrators, public and private, Lieutenant Colonel Rao Farman Ali Khan has also commented on the effects of rapid change. Change, on top of the older habit of the dominant role of authority

⁹ *Ibid.*

in administration (by Moguls, English, and others), has led to abuse of hierarchical authority by senior administrators. Colonel Farman points to what he considers an "over-confidence in their own ability" on one hand and "lack of confidence in themselves" on the other as a major paradox in Pakistani administration. Lower in governmental organizations it is said that people are not "used to accepting authority." There is a general "lack of confidence in superiors" and an even more general "fear of being criticized."¹⁰ Such difficulties would not seem to be unusual in a new country.

Corruption in administration is a social and cultural phenomenon which possibly arises out of the stresses of modernization, although, it is by no means certain that it is more serious in developing than in more developed countries. In Pakistan corruption has been the subject of comment (though never of serious study by social scientists), in fact, almost a theme running through administrative commentary since independence. For example, *The First Five-Year Plan* noted that even the services share the feeling that standards in administration have fallen since 1947. In that 1957 document the condition was attributed mainly to the difficulties in changing over from colonial rule.¹¹ As time has passed, however, other critics have suggested there may be innate, cultural sources, as has M. A. Choudhuri in his 1963 book, *The Civil Service in Pakistan*.¹² A Conference on Corruption held at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College in Lahore during the spring of 1964 heard similar opinions expressed.

Foreign critics have at times been harsh in their judgments. One who must remain anonymous recently reported.

Government servants see the private entrepreneurs as corrupt and greedy, only interested in maximising profits for their own use. Business men see civil servants as arrogant, isolated, bound by red tape, and again corrupt. Throughout the country there tends to be an excess of self-interest, a refusal to delegate, an obsession with status and security, a lack of integrity and absence of humanity. It must be recognized, however, that these weaknesses are recognized by most thinking people in the country and there is a general deter-

¹⁰ Hassan Habib and Guthrie S. Birkhead, eds., "Power, Authority and Responsibility in Pakistan Administration," *Selected Papers on Economic Development and Administration* (Lahore: PASC, 1963), pp. 139-41.

¹¹ *Op cit*, p. 114.

¹² Dacca NIPA, 1963.

mination to overcome them, and to make Pakistan economically and politically a lasting and viable proposition.

What friend or student of Pakistan has not heard patriotic Pakistani agree with this viewpoint in private? The quotation gives the flavor of one grouping of critics of administrative practices at the present time.

Fred Riggs postulates in his model of a "prismatic" society that, "All values are seen as so relative and flexible that individuals make no deep commitment to any particular set of them."¹³ So absolute a statement does not typify Pakistan today, for both the Muslim and British heritages run too deep to give it validity. Modernization has, nonetheless, strained the values held by individuals in administration. They are confronted daily with serious difficulties in measuring new programs and ideas against old ways of thinking and doing.

RELIGION AND THE ADMINISTRATOR

In Islam as in Christianity it is virtually impossible to identify the influence of religion on a man's behavior—that is, if we except public prayers, genuflecting, verbal professions of faith, and other routine, ritualistic marks. The social sciences, even in the more behavioral aspects, certainly offer little help in understanding how the gap between religious principles and individual action is bridged. Islam, not unlike Christianity, is a faith which leaves this task to the individual human being. Guidance is of course available to him in the *Qu'ran* and the *Shari'a* (the authoritative laws of Islam) and from the learned men of Islam (the '*ulama*'). All these circumstances make it difficult to say what it means to administration that administrators are Muslims. Specifically with regard to the country here under consideration, a high-ranking member of the CSP has stated:

I have quite often heard my colleagues saying that, no matter what changes took place because of industrialization, our Islamic values would hold together and, therefore, we had nothing to be afraid of. Yet, nobody has explained what exactly Islamic values are and how they are to be fitted into the new world. Collectively we have not yet even decided whether charging interest is Islamic or un-Islamic.¹⁴

¹³ *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 93.

¹⁴ Agha Abdul Hamid, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

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Of course, a less perceptive or perhaps a lower ranking government servant might be appalled by such a frank view. But it does seem difficult in the case of any religion to conceptualize a direct tie-in between faith and behavior.

Good commentaries have been written on the relationship of politics and government to religion, in Pakistan and in Islam.¹⁵ Such studies are far too general to give much insight into the behavior of individual people, but they provide useful background information for examining administration.

Christianity has found an accommodation at a high level of conceptualization with the idea of the secular state. Among Muslims this kind of rationalization has not taken root widely, indeed, could not do so because of the nature of Islam. Islam—surrender—is philosophically all encompassing. This has been expressed by the poet, Muhammed Iqbal, one of the intellectual forefathers of Pakistan:

In Islam the spiritual and temporal are not two distinct domains, and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it.¹⁶

On an assertion stated thus generally, scarcely any Muslim today would take issue with Iqbal, a mystic who considered himself to be conservative. For our purposes here, however, such a global sweep leaves unanswered the questions of the nature of the ties between administration (as part of the state) and citizen, and between an administrator's religious tenets and his behavior.

To repeat, at Pakistan's inception there was perhaps consensus that the constitution and the new government should be Islamic and relate completely to the *Shari'a*. At a lower conceptual level, however, how to relate that Islamic law to the needs of a modern

¹⁵ Among them are H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1963); Muhammad Asad, *The Principles of State and Government in Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); Sayyid Kutb, *Social Justice in Islam* (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953); Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); Wilfred C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: Macmillan, 1957), especially Chap. VI; Abul A'la Maududi, *Islamic Law and Constitution* (2d ed., Lahore: Islamic Publishers Ltd., 1960), and Hafeez Malik, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Reprint, Lahore: M. Ashraf, 1962), p. 154.

state was unclear. Simply to adopt traditional law and to abandon the practices and institutions of recent generations in the subcontinent would have been unworkable and operationally irrelevant. Making Islam operational was a problem on which '*ulama*,' politicians, and administrators had no practical or acceptable plan. Some individuals had diligently worked out their ideas as in the case of Maududi,¹⁷ but general agreement was slow in emerging.

There was a long and heated discussion of Islam and government for Pakistan, while the people waited for a new constitution and especially from 1947 to 1953. Details of that period would be out of place here. An American observer lays the blame for delay in producing a constitution on the inability of politicians to arrive at an acceptable federal formula. That conclusion seems obvious. When further he considers the consequent "explosive development of Islamic political theory" as of contingent significance to politicians,¹⁸ doubts begin to arise. In the course of time, such an explosion is bound sooner or later to have concrete and possibly important effects on politics.

There is no doubt that some kind of peak in politico-religious controversy was reached in the early fifties and has since slumped off. Perhaps this happened out of sheer exhaustion, perhaps because of a sense of guilt stemming from the "Punjab disturbances," the tragic riots of 1953 which occurred mainly in Lahore. Maybe it was both of these plus an even more crucial emphasis on national development and the necessary discipline therefor.¹⁹ Religious controversy has died down.

The 1962 Constitution does not declare a state religion, although that is probably unnecessary in view of the philosophy of Islam and in view of the contents of the Constitution. It emphasizes the Islamic nature of the majority in Pakistan, by speaking in the preamble of Jinnah's ideal of "a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice." And there are three or four similar references to Islam later on. There is a requirement that the president be a Muslim. An Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and an Islamic Research Institute are described in the Constitution and assigned functions denoted by their names. The net effect of these

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, chaps 4, 6, and 7.

¹⁸ Binder, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-18

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

alterations may be interpreted at least two ways. Some Westerners feel that the new document represents on its face a step away from emphasis on Islam as a formal or legal system overarching government. A more likely interpretation is the liberal, Islamic view that these provisions of the new Constitution make easier and more rational the task of relating modern government to the essence of traditional Islam.

Many observers today find many secular elements in Pakistan's government. Binder asserts that the upper levels of the services and the military officers are secular in outlook and also that industrialists tend to fall into this category.²⁰ This again is an opinion difficult to prove, but one that accords with this writer's observations. Doubtless there is more secular thinking among the Westernized, educated elite in Pakistan than among other parts of the population as is the case with most developing countries. Yet the number of such persons, their importance, or indeed their precise views are impossible to state. Observations at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, for example, tend to indicate that there is more than a speaking acquaintance with religion among the high-level managers who have attended there. In each class of about thirty men one finds a substantial number who pray daily and on Friday at a mosque, according to the injunction. Perhaps an equal number adhere to the month-long fast during the religious period of *Ramazan*. Less often, ostensibly, does one find these government servants and industrial managers in close association with the 'ulama.'

Doubtless persons of this type are strongly secular from the viewpoint of the more traditional Muslim. Many higher executives in Pakistan, however, consider themselves to be good Muslims. Many are ardent admirers of the thinking of Iqbal, whose philosophy represented a reconstruction of religious thought. He averred that, "Religion . . . is the only serious way of handling Reality. . . . A wrong deed degrades the whole man."²¹

Islam seems to be undergoing some kind of modernization along with other aspects of life in this country. Who, indeed, is to say that the best educated, less demonstrative Muslims in Pakistan or in other Middle Eastern nations are, because of these characteristics,

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 9.

²¹ *Op cit*, pp. 184-85.

less faithful Muslims? The parallel between Christianity and Islam in this respect seems quite apparent. The individual may hold to his religion in such a fashion that it affects his behavior without a third person making the connection between thought and act. One thus arrives at the elementary if paradoxical point that the basis for social, hence administrative, morality in Pakistan is Islam. It is not too much to say that the Islamic basis is present so long as it is *believed* to be so.²²

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The pessimists who argued during the early years that Pakistan was not economically viable were confounded in 1964 by the country's progress. For the news was good in that year and in early 1965 concerning the state of Pakistan's economy. A brief review of the indicators will help to explain the optimism. It was reported in January, 1965, that, although population growth was at the rate of 2.8 per cent per year, Gross National Product for the last four years had grown at the rate of 5.4 per cent per year. During the 1963-64 fiscal year, per capita income rose to 75 dollars, a modest figure, but one that still indicated an important trend toward a better standard of living.

Over the years 1961-65, growth in agricultural income was about 3.7 per cent per year. This was considered high enough for the experts to predict that within the 1965-66 crop year, Pakistan could become self-sufficient in the production of rice and wheat. In effect, this would mean that the country was producing enough food to get along by itself, a feat that few other countries in the world have performed. The current explanation for this great increase in production emphasized the increasing number of tube wells being drilled in the West Wing, along with the increasing amount of ferti-

²² Cf. Keith Callard, *op. cit.*, p. 230. Luther Gulick and James K. Pollock have stated, "Islamic culture is not only a most favourable foundation for effective government in the modern day, but . . . it offers to the Egyptian people the age-old principles on which they may build their new democracy, with effective leadership, community participation, mutual consultation and the responsible use of private and public property in the service of the nation. . . . The Islamic culture encourages the application of human reason to the needs of the modern world, with full reliance on responsible leadership and mutual consultation." From "Government Reorganization in the U.A.R.," a report submitted to the Central Committee for the Reorganization of the Machinery of Government (Cairo, 1962, processed), pp. 4-5.

lizer being employed there. In the East, great increases in rice production were explained mainly by referring to the public works program for improving irrigation and drainage capabilities that have been financed by, among other sources, Public Law 480 funds. Falcon and Gotsch make a conservative estimate for West Pakistan that the gross value of agricultural output will increase 49 per cent in the Third Plan period, 1965–70, and this will be among the highest ever recorded for a developing country.²³

At the same time that agricultural production was growing, its share of total production was declining because of the greater increases in other parts of the economy. For example, manufacturing product over the years 1961–64 grew at the rate of 8.5 per cent, and the remaining sectors of the economy were reported during that period as growing at 6.7 per cent.²⁴

The Harvard University team assisting Pakistan's Planning Commission reported in mid-1964:

Investment in real terms is doubling per Plan and is expected to reach over 18 per cent of the Gross National Product in 1964–65. Output is now increasing at over 5 per cent per annum, more than double the rate of growth during the First Plan. Output in large-scale industry and in construction is running well above Plan target and there appears to be a breakthrough in agriculture. The Plan development program will be fulfilled in physical terms and exceed[ed] in financial terms. This will be achieved with substantially less external assistance and greater internal resource provision than was contemplated in the Plan. In addition, a remarkable degree of price stability has been maintained and foreign exchange reserves have been increased substantially.

By any criteria of economic development, this is quite a performance.²⁵

It is worth noting what the Harvard University team, with its years of experience in the planning of Pakistan's economic effort,

²³ Walter Falcon and Carl Gotsch, "Agriculture in West Pakistan: An Analysis of Past Progress and Future Prospects" (mimeographed draft, December 27, 1964), p. 38.

²⁴ *New York Times*, January 18, 1965. Gustav F. Papanek reports "output of industry" is increasing at "14 per cent or so a year" in 1965. See "Pakistan: the Development Miracle" (Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, 1965), p. 4.

²⁵ "Planning in Pakistan" (April 1963–June 1964), A Progress Report of the Development Advisory Service, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, to the Government of Pakistan, the Ford Foundation and the Agency for International Development (July 1964), pp. 1–2.

count as the principal reasons for the success of the development program recorded in these figures. The team cites commitment to development by the entire nation, the high quality of the Civil Service, the increasing decentralization of government machinery, and various specific economic policies which the team considers enlightened.²⁶

This is a glowing report of economic progress, especially when it comes after years of discouragingly slow accomplishments. The friends of Pakistan have been enthusiastic in recent months about her immediate prospects. One does not conclude (nor is it argued in this volume) that this success is directly related to the character of Pakistani administration or to any recent changes in practices or organization. It was seen earlier that the same Planning Commission which estimated this progress called for many improvements in public administration during the Third Plan, which began in July, 1965. There is certainly the danger that long and violent hostilities would cause a letdown in effort, but there is also the likelihood it will bring an uplift in spirits and efforts if it is brief.

THE 1962 CONSTITUTION

A short description of the new Constitution will fill in an important part of the background for administration in Pakistan. Of course, it is too early for the second Constitution to have had any deep effect on government or administration, but debate of many of its features has begun in the press, the courts, and government offices. The presidential system it incorporates is vastly different from the parliamentary organization which Pakistan tried to practice before and after independence. That the country is now "a form of federation," as the preamble to the 1962 Constitution puts it, already seems to be having some repercussions in administration. And of course that new Constitution also provides in Chapter 2 of Part VII for the continuation of the Basic Democracies established before 1962.

The president is elected for a five-year term by the 40,000 electors (Basic Democrats) of each province who are in turn elected by adult franchise. In general, the president has the same range of authority the American president has. He is the supreme com-

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp 7-16.

mander of the armed forces, grants pardons and reprieves, holds the "executive authority," and is also termed a part, with the National Assembly, of the Central Legislature. His powers in this last regard, however, extend beyond those in the American system. Not only may the president summon the National Assembly to meet, but he may also dissolve it. He may appoint parliamentary secretaries to serve as his representatives in the Assembly. When the president comes in conflict with the Assembly, he may submit that question to referendum by the electoral college—that is, the 40,000 electors from the Basic Democracies in each province.

Lengthy guidelines are laid down for financial and personnel policies and procedures. Indeed, details like this are often found in the laws or even the rules and regulations of other governments, not often in constitutions. Part IV of the new Constitution in effect prescribes rules for financial and budgetary procedures in the provinces, analogous to those for the National Assembly. Of course, in the provinces the governor, an official appointed by the president, is the counterpart of the president for most administrative purposes. The president appoints a comptroller and auditor-general who, with the approval of the president, prescribes the form in which both central and provincial accounts will be kept. Otherwise his functions are to be prescribed by the National Assembly, both with regard to the center and to the provinces. His reports are to be submitted to the president when they deal with the center and to a governor when they deal with a province. Each executive in turn is obligated to present the reports to the legislature at his level.

Part VIII of the Constitution is entirely concerned with terms and conditions of service for the government and with the public service commissions. By and large, these paragraphs continue the services and the public service commissions pretty much as they have been in recent years. Security for those who work in government is a major aim of all these provisions.

As to the "form of federation" which shall prevail in Pakistan, in Part I it is established that there shall be only two provinces. As with the president, the governor in each wing may create cabinets of ministers and appoint parliamentary secretaries for liaison with the provincial assemblies. The governor has a veto during the thirty days after a bill is presented to him. Each provincial legislature has 155 members, elected for five-year terms, although the governor

under certain conditions may dissolve a legislature before its term ends (Part IV, Chapter 2). A governor dissolves an assembly only after the problem on which he has disagreed with them has been referred to the National Assembly and that body has decided the conflict in the governor's favor, with the concurrence of the president. Indeed, it is not apparent at this time that emergency power to take over provincial government resides in the chief executive under this new Constitution as it did under the so-called Section 92A before the 1956 Constitution or in Article 193 of that Constitution.

The heart of the federal relationship may be determined from inspecting the powers that are reserved to the central government in the Third Schedule of this 1962 constitution. Among the "matters with respect to which the central legislature has exclusive power to make laws" are the following: defense, external affairs, citizenship, foreign trade, economic planning, and the usual list of financial powers. The central government also has exclusive powers in the substantive fields of nuclear energy, oil and gas, national and provincial assembly elections, numerous taxes including excise, corporation, income, estate and sales taxes, and a host of other minor matters.

Ostensibly, therefore, a number of important fields are left to the provinces, far more than was in theory and practice the case before this new Constitution went into effect. Among these, for example, are many aspects of local government, agriculture, health, water resources, police, streets and highways, and more. Article 132, indeed, seems to give *residual* powers of legislation to the provinces: "A Provincial Legislature shall have power to make laws with respect to any matter other than a matter enumerated in the Third Schedule." Precisely how this will be interpreted in contrast with Section 131 remains to be seen. There, subparagraph 2 reads:

Where the national interest of Pakistan in relation to—(a) the security of Pakistan, including the economic and financial stability of Pakistan, (b) planning or coordination; or (c) the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter in different parts of Pakistan. So requires the Central Legislature shall have power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Third Schedule.
[sic]

This latter section is broad enough to allow the courts to make

almost any interpretation they may wish. There is room for the central government to reign supreme in any important field of legislation.

In connection with legislative powers both of center and of provinces, judicial review in the sense Americans know it has apparently been expanded in Pakistan by the new Constitution.²⁷ On this point, however, there is a considerable amount of exhortation and language. It seems evident, therefore, that there will have to be both legislative debate and court deliberation before the question may finally be settled.

For example, among the "Principles of Policy" beginning the Constitution, there is a declaration that "parity between the Provinces in all spheres of the Central Government should as nearly as is practicable, be achieved." Such a directive is vague on its face and cries for interpretation. But it is to be legislative interpretation. "The validity of an action or of a law shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not in accordance with the Principles of Policy, and no action shall lie against the State, any organ or authority of the State or any person on such a ground." (Article 8, Section 2.)

There are courts for each province, along lines very similar to those prescribed for the Supreme Court, the major central judicial body. The High Courts in the provinces have judges appointed by the president after consultation with the chief justice of the High Court involved as well as the governor and the chief justice of the Supreme Court. In the very elaborate provisions for the issuance by these High Courts of "orders" lies perhaps one of the principal protections for anyone who may feel himself wronged by government, including members of the career services. In effect these "orders" are modern versions of the traditional writs (mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, error, habeas corpus and quo warranto) taken for the subcontinent from the English system of common law. The new Constitution appears to restrict the use of writs to certain crucial cases, but Ralph Braibanti has found that the concept of writs has been expanded by subsequent interpretation.²⁸

²⁷ See Ralph Braibanti, "Pakistan: Constitutional Issues in 1964," *Asian Survey* (February, 1965).

²⁸ See his "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in J. LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

SUMMARY

This introduction has laid out several of the basic influences shaping public administration in Pakistan. The long and varied history of this part of the world was first elicited. The distant past has undoubtedly had direct effects on institutions and individual behavior today. But the more recent English rule and influence, combined with the struggles for independence and separation from India, seem much more prominent. In the sphere of administration, many units, processes, rules and practices remain virtually untouched since 1947.

The culture has like all cultures emerged from that history and thus it is a varied fabric—differing most importantly between East and West Pakistan. Relating cultural traits to administrative behavior has not of course been carried out in detail. The relation nevertheless may be said to be direct and profound. Ways of living and thinking that originated in the village, traditions, fatalism, the extended family are these days directly confronting the complex forces of modernization, at least in the lives of administrators, among other elites, and in the cities.

Perhaps the most obtrusive of all such cultural factors is that of religion. One can scarcely deny the shaping of a man's character and behavior by religion, any more than one can identify by current research techniques the nature of the linkage. Islam is a belief which theoretically pervades a man's whole life. It is an active but elusive element in Pakistani administration. The investigation of linkages between administration and such cultural factors is a principal way in which we may come to understand organizational behavior in developing societies.

Almost in textbook style, economic planning has become a fixation for senior administrators in this country. Thus for them there was extra satisfaction in the glowing reports on the economy in 1964–65. Things seemed to be working out as men had intended for them to do—for a change. There was no evidence that changes in administrative organization or practice were to be credited with the rising graphs. The growth seemed instead to be related to a number of economic and technological factors. Apparently there was still an urge to try to upgrade administration with the aim of better "implementation."

Finally the Constitution, laws, ordinances, and regulations go also to compose the base for administration. Herein has been given a brief outline of portions of the new 1962 Constitution especially relevant to understanding the subject in this book. New as the Constitution is, still it reflects much of past practice and it does set the stage for developments in the immediate future. And it would be useful to go on, perhaps, to outline many key laws, rules and regulations for the reader. Yet something must be left for the authors of succeeding chapters.

Indeed many points in this chapter would not have been necessary, if human beings were not prone to oversimplify. "What kind of administration does Pakistan have?" one asks. The reply may be, "Muslim administration" or "Primarily British." This chapter makes the point that these answers are wrong. Pakistani administration shares some of the virtues and vices of administration elsewhere. It has also in nineteen years developed some virtues and vices of its own.

II. The Administration of Basic Democracies

The major aims of a decentralized administrative system usually are to increase popular participation in community life and stimulate opinions conducive to experimentation and progressive change¹ At the heart of this approach is the accent on discussion by the very people who are being urged to accept innovation, new techniques and even alien methods. Experience proves that popularly adopted changes are more likely to meet with success than those forced upon a community through superior power.

FORM AND STRUCTURE

Basic Democracies have been fashioned to encompass both the rural and urban areas of Pakistan, but stress is on the former, where 85 per cent of the country's population resides. In the rural areas the structure has four tiers: union council, tehsil/thana coun-

¹ There has been a proliferation of works on community development and the decentralization process. Some of the more noteworthy coming within the context of this study are Henry Maddick, *Democracy, Decentralization and Development* (New Delhi: Asia House, 1963); Jack D. Mezirow, *Dynamics of Community Development* (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1963); United Nations, *Social Progress Through Community Development* (New York, 1955); Masihuzzaman, *Community Development and its Audience* (Lahore, 1960); H. B. Minocher Homji, "How Others Do It" (mimeographed manuscript, 1956); and "Community Development and Local Government," in S. Z. M. Rizvi, ed., *A Reader in Basic Democracies* (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development [PARD], 1961); Aziz Beg, ed., *Grassroots Government* (Rawalpindi, 1962); Inayatullah, ed., *District Administration in West Pakistan* (Peshawar: PARD, 1964); Inayatullah and Q. M. Shafi, *Dynamics of Development in a Pakistani Village* (Peshawar: PARD, 1964); Sir W. Ivor Jennings, *The Approach to Self-Government* (Boston, 1963).

BASIC DEMOCRACY STRUCTURE, 1965

<p>DIVISIONAL COUNCIL (16) <i>Chairman:</i> Commissioner <i>Members:</i> half or more elected, remainder officials</p>
<p>DISTRICT COUNCIL (78) <i>Chairman:</i> Deputy Commissioner <i>Members:</i> half or more elected, remainder officials</p>

In Rural Areas

TEHSIL OR THANA COUNCIL (630)
Chairman: Subdivision Officer,
 Tehsildar or Circle Officer
Members: half or more chair-
 men of union councils,
 remainder officials

**UNION COUNCIL (7,614)
 OR TOWN COMMITTEE (220)**
Chairman: elected
Members: 10 to 15 elected

In Urban Areas

**CANTONMENT
 BOARD (29)**
Chairman: Official
Members: half chairmen
 of union committees,
 half officials

**MUNICIPAL
 COMMITTEE (108)**
Chairman: Official
Members: half chairmen
 of union committees,
 half officials

UNION COMMITTEE (888)
Chairman: elected
Members: elected

W A R D S

Note: The municipal corporations of Karachi and Lahore are also represented at the divisional level and are administratively subordinate to the West Pakistan Department of Basic Democracies and Local Government. These two corporations have component union committees.

cil, district council and divisional council. The Basic Democracies Order of 1959 also established a Development Advisory Council at the top of the pyramid with power to advise the governor on all matters relating to Basic Democracies, but it was abolished after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1962 and the convening of the national and provincial legislatures.

In the urban areas there are two tiers, the union committees and the municipal committees.² Union committees are to be found in municipal and cantonment areas. Town committees, located in semiurban centers, are linked with the rural administrative structure. Town committees represent small urban communities with a population of less than 15,000 persons. The lowest tier or union councils/town committees in the rural and semiurban areas are coequal with the union committees in municipal areas. The total number of union councils, town committees, and union committees is 8,712.

In the rural areas, where the Basic Democracies system is most apparent, a union council covers a group of villages with a population ranging between 8,000 and 15,000 persons. There are exceptions to this, however, in sparsely populated regions such as Kalat in Baluchistan. On the average each Basic Democrat represents between 1,000 and 1,500 persons and is elected to a five-year term on the union council. A union council normally consists of ten to fifteen Basic Democrats. The chairman of the union council is elected from among the total membership.³

In addition to these elected members of the union council, the original order called for the nomination of about 40,000 nonofficial members who either represented special interests or who were

² The first level in an urban area is divided into a number of unions similar to the union councils in the rural regions and a union committee represents each union. At the second level, the municipal committee originally consisted of elected, official, and appointed members. See Government of Pakistan, *Municipal Administration Ordinance* (Karachi, 1960). A new directive issued in June, 1965, abolished the practice of "nominated members." *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), June 5, 1965.

³ In the original Basic Democracies Order a chairman could not be removed. In 1963, the order was amended so that "the Chairman of the Union Council shall vacate office if a vote of non-confidence is passed against him in the prescribed manner by a two-third majority of the total members of the Union Council." *The Gazette of West Pakistan* (November 16, 1963), pp 4420-21.

selected because of the contribution they could make to the community. In part, this was made necessary because the more educated and influential members of the community refused to campaign or were generally suspicious of the new system. These appointed members were not allowed to exceed one half the total of elected members. By a Presidential order in 1962 this practice was ended, but the members already appointed were permitted to complete their terms. Where vacancies occurred they were to remain unfilled, but with the new elections to the Basic Democracies in November, 1964, the nomination system was discarded altogether. The rationale for the change, in part, was the realization that the people were taking a larger interest in the Basic Democracies and that they no longer had difficulty in attracting the "better" elements of the community ⁴

The tier immediately above the union council is called the tehsil council in West Pakistan and the thana council in East Pakistan. There are 614 councils at this level (412 in East Pakistan, 202 in West Pakistan). The union councils and town committees are represented in the tehsil/thana council by their chairmen, who occupy half the seats on that council. The remaining members are appointed by the deputy commissioner in West Pakistan and the subdivisional officer in East Pakistan. They comprise both official and nonofficial members, their numbers being determined by the controlling authority ⁵. The chairman of the tehsil/thana council is the subdivisional officer/tehsildar/circle officer.

The tehsil/thana council is charged with coordinative functions but possesses no operational functions. Unlike the union council it has no power to tax and therefore is completely dependent upon the district council. The tehsil/thana council, given its proximity to the union councils, is in a position to understand local problems, however. It is at this level that government officers of the various

⁴ It is illustrative of the heightened public interest in Basic Democracies that in the November, 1964, elections more than 90 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls. The new Basic Democrats are reported to be more mature, educated, and affluent than their earlier counterparts. It is also a fact that many "appointed" Basic Democrats contested the November elections and a large number have been returned as elected members.

⁵ In this case, the deputy commissioner and the commissioner. Government of West Pakistan, *A Handbook on the Law of Basic Democracies*, Volume I (Lahore, 1962), p. 6.

nation-building departments (e.g., agriculture, health, education) are required to join with the representatives of the people in common endeavors. The utility of this tier will be recognized when the activities of the thana council in East Pakistan are observed.

The district council, which stands above the tehsil/thana council, is the most important tier in the Basic Democracies system. This comes as no surprise, since the district has been the most vital unit of administration for the last hundred years. The policies of government, the paternal social activities, the maintenance of law and order have all come within the purview of district administration. When the average villager conjures up an image of government, it is the district administration which is most meaningful to him:

Evolving through history district administration has developed a character of its own—a character which fixes its own stamp on the execution and implementation of ideologies, policies and programs of any regime at [the] national level. More than the ideological nature of governments at the national level, democratic or authoritarian, it is the nature of the relationship between the district bureaucracy and the common citizenry which determines the concrete relationship between the ruling elite, bureaucracy and the masses ⁶

There are seventeen district councils in East Pakistan and fifty-eight in West Pakistan ⁷ The district council comprises 50 per cent official members, consisting of the chairmen of the tehsil/thana councils, municipal committees, presidents of cantonment boards and others designated by the government and appointed by the commissioner. Another 25 per cent are appointed by the commissioner in consultation with the deputy commissioner from among the chairmen of the union councils and town and union committees. The remaining 25 per cent, comprising nonofficials, were formerly appointed in the same manner as the union councilors. As in the case of the union councils, this was discontinued in 1962 and has been abolished altogether with the installation of the second generation of Basic Democrats. It is stated that in the future, all the non-official members will be elected to the district council. This was to be done in a prescribed manner wherein an electoral college con-

⁶ Inayatullah, *Basic Democracies, District Administration and Development* (Peshawar: PARD, 1964), p. 15.

⁷ These figures include twelve agency councils for the tribal areas of West Pakistan

sisting of the chairmen of the union councils, town committees, and union committees within the district would determine the elect. An average district council comprises between thirty and fifty members. The chairman of the district council is the deputy commissioner/collector. The district council is responsible for coordinating the programs in the district. It not only is held accountable for evaluating these activities, but it must also recommend the curtailing, expanding, or introduction of new district schemes.

The uppermost tier in the Basic Democracies system is the divisional council. There are twelve such councils in West Pakistan and four in East Pakistan. Each is presided over by the divisional commissioner. The divisional council draws its membership from the districts that compose the division and the government reserves the right to apportion seats among elected and official members. It is customary, however, to have the composition of the divisional council follow that of the district councils. The rule which has been followed stipulates that the elected members shall not be less than the total number of official members. The chairmen of the district councils are *ex officio* members of the divisional council.⁸ Formerly, 25 per cent of the nonofficial members were appointed by the government in consultation with the commissioner from among the chairmen of union councils and town/union committees. The remaining 25 per cent were appointed by the government in consultation with the commissioner from among those who were prominent in the community but who did not hold elected office. The new ruling, however, proclaims that all nonofficial members shall now be elected from among the electors by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of the district council of that district.

In West Pakistan the membership has been fixed at forty-five. The figure has not been determined for East Pakistan and it varies according to local conditions. Unlike the district and union councils, the divisional councils have no power of taxation. Like the tehsil/thana council, the divisional council is a coordinating but not an operating body.

Thus the structure of the Basic Democracies system is an inter-

⁸ Official members consist of the representatives of various government departments, e.g., agriculture, health, education, cooperatives, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, and WAPDA.

locking and interdependent arrangement of institutions that focuses on the primary objectives of national integration and development. Each tier has its own responsibilities but is also a component of the larger whole. The basic functions of the system can be described as follows. First, Basic Democrats represent the voter at all levels but chiefly at the union council level. Elected representatives are thus in a position to exchange views with the bureaucracy on a regular basis and are free to criticize and make suggestions for the improvement of administration in their area. Second, members of the lowest tier, the union councilors, have been designated by the Constitution as the electoral college which elects the president and president and representatives of the national and provincial assemblies.⁹

Third, the Basic Democrats have administrative responsibilities within their own constituencies. These will be further delineated below. They mark the first time the people have been offered a direct share in the functioning of government. Career officials in the administration, traditionally the strongest element in the country, are thus faced with a potential counter to their power. It is not too much to think that the Basic Democracies system will provide a change from what has often been called the paternalistic attitude of the bureaucracy and the feeling of the ordinary man that he is overprotected. Fourth, Basic Democracies are provided a judicial role in the union councils. They are now responsible for establishing conciliation courts where a variety of minor civil and criminal cases can be settled.¹⁰ The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 also gave these councils authority to settle family problems, i.e., women's rights, marriage disputes, polygamy, and other related matters.¹¹ The fifth and final determinant in the system concerns the integration of the people with the government administration so that the former may be drawn into the development process. This function of the Basic Democracies will also be detailed in this chapter.

The Basic Democracies system does not aim explicitly at eliminat-

⁹ There are many similarities between Basic Democracies and Panchayati Raj in India, as well as newer local governmental systems in Syria and elsewhere. This electoral feature, however, is unique.

¹⁰ *The Conciliation Courts Ordinance*, March, 1961.

¹¹ *The Family Laws Ordinance*, 1961.

ing all the older political and governmental evils, but it does nonetheless provide for a continuing experience in local self-government. In time it may prove a useful and vital school for grassroots democracy.

THE BUREAUCRATIC PRESENCE

The Basic Democracies system in part aims at breaking the paternal control of bureaucracy, decentralizing administration, and fostering the growth of responsible leadership at the grassroots level. But, as has been noted, at all the tiers above the union council, the civil servant continues to dominate the scene. As chairman of the tehsil/thana, district and divisional council, the administrator is in a key position to guide and canalize the peoples' development effort. As official members of these councils the administrators are responsible for the expertise and sophistication in the Basic Democracies setup. It is no exaggeration to emphasize the dependence of the Basic Democracies on the active participation of the civil servants. Success or failure will be written in the sincerity and willingness of the civil servants to fulfill the objectives of the system as set forth by the President.

The Constitution describes the electoral college and the legislatures, but it is the Basic Democracies Order that details the total institution. A Basic Democracies unit in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in the central government serves an information function. In each province matters considered of a policy nature are the realm of the governor and the responsible minister. At the secretariat level in both East and West Pakistan there is a Basic Democracies and Local Government Department. In West Pakistan social welfare is an added responsibility of the secretary, whereas in East Pakistan health is added.

The secretary of Basic Democracies today usually has joint secretary status, one step higher than provincial secretaries have stood in the past. Under him in West Pakistan are five "wings" or subdivisions, of which three are concerned with Basic Democracies. They handle, respectively, the general problems of planning, evaluation, research and training; legal problems; and rural works projects (described below).

The theory here as elsewhere in this government is that the secretariat transmits policies from the government to the field staff, but it does not have administrative control over field operations. Field

operations are controlled by the "generalists"—from the governor through the chief secretary to the commissioners and on down the line to the deputy commissioners, subdivisional officers, tehsildars, and so forth.

Given this traditional explanation of organization in West Pakistan, it will soon be noted that there are still other "lines" extending to the field. There are the technical officers from what are termed the nation-building departments, i.e., education, health, agriculture, and some public corporations. These officers may be charged with Basic Democracies responsibilities in addition to their regular assignments. Another "line" consists of the Basic Democracies officials who are concerned exclusively with the proper functioning of the new system. These officials at various levels bear the titles of directors, assistant directors, development officers, supervisors, and secretaries of union councils.

In charge of Basic Democracies in each division is a director, usually a ranking member of the CSP. He reports to his division head, the commissioner, as well as to the secretary of Basic Democracies and he is also *ex officio* secretary of the divisional council. Under him are the assistant directors, each responsible for a district. The assistant director (ADB) who is appointed to the district council by the secretary of Basic Democracies, is one of the keys to the entire structure.

Working under the deputy commissioner, the ADB has a long list of assigned duties which amount to detailed responsibility over all Basic Democracies staff and projects in the district.¹² He must call regular meetings of all career staff in this work as well as provide for their training. The ADB is also a field officer. He is supposed to inspect all union councils in his district at least once a year in order to see to their proper functioning.¹³

In short, the ADB is a personage of many roles. According to

¹² Government of West Pakistan, *A Guide to Basic Democracies for Assistant Directors* (Lahore, 1963), pp. 15-21.

¹³ "Master Training Courses" for the supervisory staff of Basic Democracies, which included 12 directors, 51 assistant directors, 94 development officers, and 108 supervisors from all over West Pakistan, were held simultaneously at the academies in Peshawar, Tandojam and Lalamusa in April and May, 1965. These officers will arrange courses for the 40,000 newly elected members of the union councils and town/union committees Government of West Pakistan, *Basic Democracies Review* (Lahore, April, 1965), p. 12.

his *Guide to Basic Democracies*, he should be an educator with relation to his staff, the public, the Basic Democrats (union council members), and he should be able to acquaint farmers with modern techniques of agriculture, veterinary work, poultry, sericulture, public health and afforestation. He must be a planner and conduct surveys, collect data, and assist others in the compiling of advance reports. Further, the guide refers to the ADBD as an evaluator of training programs and development schemes, responsible for follow-up programs and evaluation reports for the district.

Next he is coordinator, under the deputy commissioner, of the work of the nation-building departments. He is said also to be a supervisor in the sense of "a friend, a guide and an arbitrator"¹⁴ for his own staff, the functioning of the local councils, the voluntary organizations, development schemes, and training courses. He must also check and inspect stores, accounts, and records of his own staff as well as the staff of the local councils. Finally he is directed to be an administrator with apparently all that implies. Clearly the task before the ADBD is formidable in the extreme.

Supporting the ADBD in his multifarious activities are the development officers who act as the secretaries of the tehsil councils where the subdivisional magistrates are the chairmen. In many respects these men are the counterpart of the ADBD, one level down. They are responsible for their subdivision, not only to him but also to the subdivisional magistrate, who is of course under the general administrative control of the deputy commissioner. In those tehsils not organized as subdivisions, the counterpart of the development officer is called a supervisor. He exerts the same authority as the development officer over secretaries of union councils in his tehsil and he also convenes meetings of union councils. He bears responsibility for organizing community development and for the implementation of the training programs within the tehsil.

Finally, at the lowest tier there are the secretaries of union councils, who are controlled and supervised both by the chairmen of the union councils and by their immediate superiors in the Basic Democracy administrative structure. The deputy commissioner appoints the secretary, and in respect of disciplinary control the latter comes under the deputy commissioner. The secretary is considered a full-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p 25

time employee of the union council, but he is paid by the provincial government.

In West Pakistan the majority of secretaries of union councils were former Village AID (V-AID) workers.¹⁵ Many held higher positions and received larger salaries in that defunct organization, and the arrangement in which they now find themselves feeds their frustrations. Furthermore, the obscure line of command confuses them. It seems that the deputy commissioner is their ultimate operational superior; the union council chairman, their immediate operational superior, and the supervising staff of the Basic Democracies Department, still another controlling superior. The demoralization of the secretary who is responsible for the records, accounts, and minutes of union council meetings is apparent.¹⁶ It is therefore not difficult to understand why many of the former V-AID workers have proved less efficient as secretaries than have new entrants.

The union councils, at the present juncture, are incapable of providing their own administrative services. They, therefore, will continue to be dependent upon the tehsil and district authorities. It follows that the effectiveness of the Basic Democracies rests upon the willingness of the administrators to respond to union council needs. Thus ADBDs, development officers, and supervisors are supposed to visit the union councils as often possible, but present demands on their time at the district and tehsil prevent them from fulfilling these obligations.¹⁷

A second problem is that ADBDs have been given innumerable tasks and responsibilities but little authority to see them through. In the last analysis it is the representatives of the nation-building departments who ultimately satisfy or discourage popular demands. And here is a major conundrum. The officers of the Basic Democracies Department lack the authority to issue orders to officials from other departments. Furthermore, there is a genuine reluctance to work at the tehsil level where local needs must be gauged and programs for rural uplift undertaken. Inayatullah has noted:

At present the contacts between district and tehsil bureaucracy are

¹⁵ See Chapter IV.

¹⁶ M. Asghar Suleri, *Union Councils in Operation in District Stalkot* (unpublished master's thesis, University of the Panjab, 1964), pp. 17-18.

¹⁷ Some observers of the ADBD "in action" would say that "they are simply lazy, easygoing, and improperly motivated."

too few. This limits the effectiveness of Basic Democracies in meeting the demands of the people. The administrative organization at district and tehsil level does not possess the organizational vitality to meet the demands made on it. Therefore, on this account too, the success of Basic Democracies will be contingent on how lower bureaucracy rationalises itself.¹⁸

One thing is clear: traditional administrative institutions must be not only drawn into the new system but also given responsibility for its successful operation. The V-AID lesson is a case in point:

[The] services of Village Aid were not only substantial but were principally responsible for the good start made by the Basic Democracies. But Village AID soon sensed that the orthodox bureaucracy resented the interference of Village AID in determining the character of the Basic Democracies . . . Village AID supported the Basic Democracies in order to protect the village councils. It tried to mould it into a thoroughly democratic caste and turn it into a stronghold of Village Councils. This it could do through its own organizational strength and training capability. But this only heightened the struggle that underlay the community development goals of the orthodox administration.¹⁹

The Basic Democracies Departments are in no position to contest the authority of traditional bureaucracy as the V-AID Department sought to do. The answer to the dilemma of national integration and development lies somewhere in the capacity of the older institutions to absorb the new, and, by so doing, to arrive at a new synthesis wherein the maximum utilization of available resources is achieved.²⁰

The full prestige of district administration must be employed in this endeavor. It is not the ADBD but the deputy commissioner

¹⁸ Inayatullah, *Basic Democracies*, op cit, p. 280.

¹⁹ Masihuzzaman, *Community Development* (unpublished manuscript), 1964, pp 110-11.

²⁰ Mir Naseem Mahmood offers another "solution." He writes: "The Basic Democracies Department should be renamed as 'Basic Democracies and Community Development Department.' . . . The departmental personnel at the Tehsil/Thana, District and Divisional levels should be thoroughly oriented [to] community development . . . Young CSP and PCS officers should spend at least two years of their careers as Development Officers and Assistant Directors." Mir Naseem Mahmood, "The Revival of Village AID. A Plan" (unpublished paper, Lahore, 1963)

To quote from the President's Election Manifesto, "Whatever the institutional form democracy may take in Pakistan, it must be based on pragmatism rather than dogmatism." *Ayub's Manifesto* (Karachi, 1965), p 2

who will determine the destiny of Basic Democracies. The former can assist but he cannot make policy; he can respond but he cannot administer; he can instruct but he cannot control. The powers of the deputy commissioner are as formidable today as during the colonial period.²¹ Whether CSP or PCS, he links the district to the departments and all the departmental officers within his district come under his authority. As executive officer in the district he is in a position to demand compliance with his directives. As chairman of the district council he may become a popular leader with many new roles. The isolation, the aloofness, the paternalism of the past may have given way, but in the present period he must still "play the role of a guide, educator, practical thinker and motivator."²²

THE EAST PAKISTAN EXPERIMENT

Experiments in rural development at the Academy for Rural Development in Comilla, East Pakistan, are of profound importance in reforming Pakistan's administrative system and in assuring the success of the Basic Democracies. Akhter Hameed Khan, long-time guiding spirit at Comilla, is quick to emphasize differences between East and West in these experiments. Among those most relevant are the smaller numbers of divisions and districts in the East but the larger total of thanas as compared with tehsils in the West. The thana is far smaller in land area and more concentrated in population than the tehsil. Further, in the absence of a wealthy landowning class, East Pakistan administrators are more closely identified with popular sentiment than their West Pakistan counterparts, and administrative organization is tied more intimately to the soil. Thus the Comilla Academy could focus its attention on the thana in its endeavor to improve rural administration.²³

²¹ See Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 395; M. A. Choudhuri, *The Civil Service in Pakistan* (Dacca: NIPA, 1963), pp. 89-90.

²² Inayatullah, "Changing Character of District Administration in Pakistan," in Inayatullah, ed., *District Administration in West Pakistan*, op. cit., p. 132.

²³ M. R. Tarafdar, "Evaluation of Basic Democracies in a New Framework for [the] Emergence of Local Leadership in Village and Local Administration," paper delivered at Pakistan Council Seminar on Basic Democracies, Peshawar, October 13-15, 1964, pp. 4-5.

The Thana Development Center, central to the "Comilla approach," comprises three parts: a Training Center for village representatives; a Cooperative Federation for administering the primary village cooperatives; and the Thana Council, like other Basic Democracies bodies at this level composed of the chairmen of union councils and town committees and an equal number of official members with the subdivisional officer as chairman.

In February, 1965, the Comilla District Integrated Rural Development Program was set up to expand the thana experiment. This five-year program will be directed by an additional deputy commissioner who will also be attached to the Basic Democracies Department as an officer on special duty. It will be his task to try to avoid conflict between so-called operational administrative and technical control. He will be assisted by a greatly augmented staff and the officers of the nation-building departments will come under his supervision.²⁴ This ADC will report to the district council while a high-powered Provincial Committee for Rural Development will backstop the district program. This committee will consist of the Additional Chief Secretary (Development), and as many as a dozen officials chosen ex officio from relevant agencies. It can be seen that the entire organization, unlike the secretariat-district-tehsil line in West Pakistan, is designed to provide an integrated administrative apparatus with a clear chain of command and sufficient resources.

The *Third Five-Year Plan* points to important future changes in the administration of Basic Democracies, with the Comilla approach setting the pace. Indeed, the Thana Development Center is to be duplicated throughout Pakistan with necessary "adjustments" being made to fit local conditions. It has been announced that four pilot projects will be launched in West Pakistan in late 1965. The project areas will be in the districts of Peshawar, Lahore, Gujrat, and Hyderabad, and they will draw upon the facilities of the Rural Academy at Peshawar and the Basic Democracies Training Institutes at Lalamusa and Tandojam.

²⁴ See *The Comilla Project: An Experiment in Rural Administration* (Lahore: PASC, 1965), p. 103; and A. T. R. Rahman, "Basic Democracies and Rural Development in East Pakistan," in Inayatullah, ed., *Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan* (Peshawar: PARD, 1963), pp. 348-49.

THE WORKS PROGRAM

Planning and development at the grassroots level have been brought to life by the Rural Works Program in both wings. In August, 1961, the governments of Pakistan and the United States agreed that the latter would send over a four-year period \$621,000,000 worth of surplus agricultural commodities. As originally conceived, the counterpart rupees resulting from this agreement were to be devoted to financing rural development. This was the genesis of the Pakistan Rural Works Program which an Indian journalist was later to describe as having released a "magic spring."²⁵

Previously, Basic Democracies institutions lacked the means to pursue their assigned objectives. They had taxing powers, but the villagers were too poor for this to mean very much.²⁶

Most Union Councils raised taxes only on such items as those on births, marriages and feasts. Among all the Union Councils of Pakistan as in 1960-61, 9 per cent levied no taxes, 85 per cent taxed less than Rs. 11 (something more than two dollars) and only 1.7 per cent more than Rs. 30 (approximately six dollars) per annum.²⁷

Furthermore, government grants to the union councils for development purposes were meager, the funds being given directly to the central ministries, the provincial departments, and the public corporations.

In 1961-62, as compared with a province-wide current budget of Rs. 18 crore (approximately 36 million dollars), the resources commanded by the Basic Democracies was only Rs. 8 crore (approximately 16 million dollars). Of this about one-third was required for current operations, leaving less than Rs. 1 (twenty-one cents U.S.) per capita for development. While the Basic Democracies made a brave effort and supplemented their limited resources

²⁵ *The Times of India*, December 8, 1964.

²⁶ *Retrospect, op. cit.*, p. 12. The union and district councils are given the power to levy taxes in Chapter II of the Basic Democracies Order. The same chapter denies this power to the tehsil/thana and divisional councils.

²⁷ "Community Development Overseas Study and Observation Tour" (Salisbury. Southern Rhodesian Department of Internal Affairs, 1963), p. 10.

with voluntary assistance, it is not surprising that the villager should have found it difficult to see any improvement.²⁸

Originally it was thought the Basic Democracies system must stand on its own merit, but no countrywide survey was ever carried out estimating the extent of the work done through self-help. A study of Jhelum district in West Pakistan, however, revealed that by June, 1963, 448 projects valued at Rs. 596,298 (approximately 120,000 dollars) had been completed. Nine per cent of this total came from government grants; the remainder came in cash and labor, from union councils and individuals.²⁹

Efforts like that in Jhelum were obviously not enough, so the government sought to modify its policy and offered to meet half the cost of any project gaining its approval. The other half it was agreed must issue from the people. However:

The rigidity of the conditions governing the grant of matching funds had certain unfortunate consequences. As the policy made identical demands on rich and poor areas, it widened the regional disparities.³⁰

Hence, when the Works Program eventually came along, it tended to breathe new life into the Basic Democracies. The objective of the Works Program is in three essential parts: it aims at using surplus manpower, creating rural infrastructure for increasing agricultural production, and strengthening local leadership and government.

East Pakistan

Initiated on an experimental basis in 1961 by the Comilla Academy, the Rural Works Program was an immediate success.³¹ For only Rs. 200,000 (approximately 40,000 dollars) a large number of canals, roads, dikes, embankments, and culverts were built or

²⁸ Richard V. Gilbert, "The Works Program in East Pakistan," paper delivered at the Conference on Labor Productivity (Geneva, 1963), p. 7.

²⁹ Saeed Ahmad Qureshi, "Development Through Basic Democracies," paper delivered at the Pakistan Council Seminar on Basic Democracies (Peshawar, 1964), p. 5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³¹ Useful insights into the procedures employed in the Academy program are in: *Report on a Rural Public Works Programme in Comilla Kotwali Thana* (Comilla: PARD, June, 1962); and *A Manual for Public Works* (Comilla: PARD, August, 1962).

repaired. In addition, the program employed more labor than at any other time in the community's memory, and the added purchasing power gave the area economy a new resiliency.

The Pakistan Government therefore in 1962-63 appropriated Rs 10 crore (approximately 20 million dollars) for a province-wide works program. Again, the Comilla Academy prepared the way, and the Basic Democracies apparatus worked pretty much according to the theory.³² The councils enjoyed complete authority for planning, approving, and executing the schemes. This was necessary to avoid delays, for the time was short between the development of a plan and its implementation. The bulk of the funds, however, were given to the district councils, where sufficient checks on the distribution of the money were available.

The 1962-63 program in East Pakistan was even more successful than the experimental 1961-62 program. Thus, the government decided to double East Pakistan's allocation for 1963-64 to Rs. 20 crore (40 million dollars) and to launch a similar program in West Pakistan. This time the distribution of funds in East Pakistan placed primary emphasis on the thana and union councils. Both planning and execution were the domain of these councils, although each scheme would be passed by the higher "approving authority."³³ The Works Program had come of age.

West Pakistan

Three explanations may be offered for the decision to extend the Works Program to all of Pakistan. First, the East Pakistan test proved project results could be dramatic and immediate. Second, public confidence in government is more readily achieved through the construction of small and clearly identifiable rural improvements than by grandiose and distant schemes. Finally, local contributions in land, money, and labor would greatly reduce the government expenditure required for similar schemes.

In West Pakistan, the allocation of funds for 1963-64 was Rs 10 crore. But unlike the East Pakistan emphasis on thana/union council projects, in the West the program was made the major re-

³² *An Evaluation of the Rural Works Programme, East Pakistan, 1962-63* (Comilla: PARD, October, 1963), pp. 19-20.

³³ Government of East Pakistan, *Works Programme Through Basic Democracies, 1963-64* (Dacca, 1963), pp. 4-6.

sponsibility of the district councils³⁴ Even so it was specified that 75 per cent of the overall allocations should be spent by the union councils on schemes of their own choosing.

Without the insight afforded by a pilot study,³⁵ West Pakistan leaned heavily on its senior administrators In 1963, a policy committee of ranking officials was organized under the chairmanship of the Additional Chief Secretary, Planning and Development Department, in effect to formulate policies for the Works Program. After long discussions, this committee decided to allocate the funds equally among the districts of West Pakistan. This policy was to provide higher per capita allocations to union councils in remote areas where conditions were considered to be more backward As these areas were far from the main centers of activity and lacked technical staff and equipment, districts were told to spend up to 7.5 per cent of their money to employ experts and equipment Furthermore, the committee adopted the principle of "payment upon performance" Money was to be made available in phased releases; later allocations would be determined by the success of the preceding project.

The program's emphasis was to be on projects initiated by the union council, developed through labor-intensive methods, and utilizing local building materials and capabilities where possible. Special consideration was to be given to the construction of a productive infrastructure, i.e., irrigation bunds and roads as opposed to schools and dispensaries.³⁶

A Development Working Party in the secretariat was set up to

³⁴ The deputy commissioner was nominated the project director for the Rural Works Program in each district

³⁵ "To run a number of projects in the different regions (of West Pakistan) would have been too costly and time-consuming for the contribution they might have made to the programme" A K Pickering, "Rural Works Programme in West Pakistan up to March 1964" (unpublished manuscript), p. 9

³⁶ *The Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), October 13, 1964 Despite this emphasis, however, the sectoral breakdown of the expenditure during 1963-64 revealed that school buildings received top priority. In fact 27.7 per cent of the total capital resources under the Works Program went into the education sector A summary of the results of the West Pakistan Rural Works Program is presented in two articles by the Provincial Program Director, Shahid Javed Burki, found in *The Pakistan Times*, May 17 and May 19, 1965 For a more complete rendition see Government of West Pakistan, *Rural Works Programme. Evaluation Report, 1963-64* (Lahore, 1965).

guide the overall program and to pass upon major schemes for inclusion in provincial plans. District councils were allowed to approve projects worth up to Rs. 50,000, while divisional councils today can sanction projects costing as much as Rs. 500,000. The day-by-day supervision of the Works Program became the responsibility of the Basic Democracies Department and their field officials, working with deputy commissioners, district engineers, and so on.

The total number of projects for this first year of the West Pakistan Works Program was given as 16,000, of which 14,000 emerged from union councils and the thousands of project committees which were thus formed were led by individual union councilors.³⁷ The concept of delegation of authority was completely foreign to the villagers, but they took to it with alacrity.³⁸ The project committee system apparently helped to control the use of Works Program funds, corrupt practices are reduced when everyone in the locality knows to whom money is paid and how much the project costs. Similarly, work was further stimulated by monthly tehsil meetings where union councils and project committees would openly compete with one another for increased allocations.

The success of the Works Program in West Pakistan was mirrored in a government decision to continue its support through the next Five-Year Plan (1965-70); and there was no denying the lessons learned in the program for 1963-64. These lessons can be listed as follows.

- 1) Phased release of funds in some cases led to waste, because many projects required money when the weather was right. In some instances labor was available when money was unavailable and vice versa. Therefore, "financial flexibility had to be increased to enable Union Councils to build at the times of the year most suitable to them."³⁹

- 2) Backward districts were limited by the shortage of trained personnel despite a willingness to pay handsome salaries. Also, the

³⁷ The project committees have proved very useful in associating the public with the Basic Democracies. In Multan District, for example, in 499 project committees there were 869 members of union councils and 747 members from the public. *Rural Works Programme in Multan District 1963-64* (Multan, 1964), p. 7.

³⁸ Pickering, *op cit*, pp. 27-38; *Evaluation Report, op cit*, p. 14.

³⁹ Pickering, *op cit*, p. 29.

cost of some equipment proved prohibitive, and many project committees found it impossible to purchase needed implements.

3) The principle of "payment on performance," if too rigidly applied, prevented directors from completing work on time.

4) Projects suffered because of a lack of training for personnel or because of faulty research.

5) Finally, there was the problem of recurring expenditures. With the Works Program moving apace, the mounting maintenance and operation costs were of special concern.

The provincial policy committee reacted by agreeing to release allocations on a biannual rather than a quarterly basis. It organized a motor pool from which project directors would draw vehicles, and it gave union councils more flexibility in hiring technical personnel. It sought to improve the training programs as well as the methods employed to evaluate performance. Last, it agreed to permit the use of a percentage of future allocations for maintenance and operating costs of projects already completed.⁴⁰

For the Works Program in 1964-65 Rs. 250 million went to East Pakistan and Rs. 150 million to West Pakistan, and the government is now contemplating making the Works Program "a separate sector"⁴¹ The Third Five-Year Plan provides for a Works Program of Rs 2,500 million—Rs. 1,500 million in East Pakistan and Rs. 1,000 million in West Pakistan—to cover projects like rural electrification, supply of drinking water, community housing, schools, markets, dispensaries, graveyards, and thana and tehsil training and development centers.

Pros and Cons of the Works Program

Given the emphasis on large infusions of government assistance, it is possible to lose sight of the need to stimulate self-help among the rural folk. Certainly it is necessary to project ahead to a time when Public Law 480 funds will no longer be available and the rural population will have to help sustain development with their own resources. The feeling persists that so much Works Program money dampens the initiative of villagers.⁴² The outline of the

⁴⁰ *The Pakistan Times*, May 1, 1965.

⁴¹ *Outline, op. cit.*, p 235

⁴² The Provincial Director of the Works Program counters this belief with the following argument: "The contributions in terms of money, land, labor and material made available by the local rural people towards the Rural

Third Five-Year Plan emphasizes that "Councils at the Union level will be expected to mobilize additional resources from local taxation or through the utilization of voluntary labor."⁴³

No doubt the Works Program harbors shortcomings, but the achievements and the promise far outweigh them. Along with the visible physical improvements should be mentioned a rural population infused with a new confidence in themselves and in their country. Planning is becoming a way of life, and organization, management, and technical competence are developing at a rapid pace.⁴⁴ Perhaps the most important dividend of the Works Program is the new rapport generated between the administration and the rural masses:

The social and psychological results of the Programme may be even more important. The Works Programme has very substantially changed the farmer's image of the Government from that of a remote, omnipotent entity, at times benevolent, at times avenging, and has made the farmer much less fatalistic in his outlook. The implications for future development of this change in outlook can be revolutionary.⁴⁵

THE URBAN SCENE

The hope and excitement in the countryside contrast with the despair and frustration of the urban dwellers. No urban works program caters to them. Yet, in West Pakistan, the problem is especially acute. Twenty-two per cent of the population is already crowded into these centers of trade and commerce, and it is believed that this figure will rise to almost 50 per cent before the end of the century. This is a terrifying prospect, for existing services are woe-

Works Programme funds was strictly voluntary. However, out of a total expenditure of Rs. 10.09 crore during the first year of the Programme, Rs. 192 lakh (19 per cent of the total expenditure) came in the form of self-help." *The Pakistan Times*, May 19, 1965, and *Evaluation Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁴³ *Outline*, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

⁴⁴ S. Javed Burki notes: "Union Councils work as tentacles for the planning agencies in the country, they prod, feel, locate, assess and ultimately satisfy the immediate needs of the people living in the rural areas." *The Pakistan Times*, May 17, 1965; and *Evaluation Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁴⁵ William C. Hollinger, "Implementing Pakistan's Second Plan: Some Lessons We Can Learn," paper presented at the Conference on Pakistan Since 1958 (Montreal, 1964).

fully inadequate and each addition to the city register makes life that much more difficult.

Union committees are supposed to look after the needs of city people, and, by and large, they are given the same statutory responsibility as union councils. But responsibility and power are not equivalent. Power in the cities resides in the municipal committees (corporations in Karachi and Lahore), and they are reluctant to delegate any authority to union committees. Without funds, authority, or encouragement the union committees will continue to reflect inertia and resignation. And the cities will continue to frown upon Basic Democracies while nurturing the system's most vocal critics ⁴⁶ Efforts are being made to correct this situation, however.

Nominated councilors throughout the Basic Democracies system were abolished on June 4, 1965, by decision of the Governors' Conference. Thereafter only elected and official members would comprise Basic Democracies councils, including those in urban areas. Municipal committees and corporations must offer seats to all chairmen of the lower union committees. Ten per cent of the seats were to be reserved for special groups, i.e., women, minorities, and social workers, but even here no nominations would be permitted. It was further agreed that the municipal corporations of Karachi and Lahore would expand their membership to ninety-six and sixty respectively. The former ceiling of thirty was abolished. These latter decisions were obviously an attempt to counteract the criticism of the urban Basic Democracies system as well as to provide a more meaningful forum for urban problems. Also, the expansion of the corporations reflected the growth in population and the

⁴⁶ A recent article in the *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) took note of this situation. It described a recent meeting of the Lahore municipal corporation in which several members demanded that the powers vested in its chairman under the Basic Democracies Ordinance should be delegated to the union committees. The chairman's critics explained that the union committee resolutions were being ignored and implementation of local development schemes made impossible. The "Municipal Authorities started work on their own schemes and disregarded the suggestions of the Union Committees." In an effort to correct this malpractice, it was suggested that each union committee be allocated a specific sum in the annual budget, and as with the union councils, the development program should follow on the recommendation of the union committee. Finally, the resolution called for the creation of union committee suboffices within the city to function under the supervision of the elected Basic Democrats. *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), May 26, 1965.

need to give more representation to an increasing number of city dwellers.⁴⁷

In October, 1964, a Peshawar seminar on Basic Democracies called upon the government to investigate the urban-rural disparity and to consider the introduction of changes in the Basic Democracies structure which would make improvements possible.⁴⁸ In an Islamabad seminar in April, 1965, a specially constituted group on urban areas recommended amending the Basic Democracies Order and Municipal Administration Ordinance so that the functions of the union committees could be "rationalized."⁴⁹

FUTURE ROLE OF BASIC DEMOCRACIES

Looking back over six years of Basic Democracies President Ayub should have reason to be proud, if not completely satisfied. He believes that he is fulfilling his promise to restore a form of democracy which the people of Pakistan can work. The new system has revitalized the rural community and set in motion a process which will probably accelerate economic growth as well as political consciousness. This is especially evident in the Works Program and electoral college of Basic Democrats. On the administrative side, there are also significant trends. Not only has the government been upgraded, but the officer class is undergoing change.⁵⁰ Although not yet clearly discernible, the new emphasis on development administration is beginning to bear fruit:

At present local officials are supervising activities of Basic Democracies. The next stage should be for officials to be associated with the working of Basic Democracies more as advisers and consultants than as supervisors. Finally local officials assigned to different development Departments, e.g., Irrigation, Health, Agriculture, Labour, should become servants and employees of local bodies. *It should be possible to move towards the final stage by the end of (the) Third Five Year Plan.* (Italics supplied.)⁵¹

The target date of 1970 (the terminal date for the Third Five-Year Plan) may be somewhat unrealistic, because Basic Democracies

⁴⁷ *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), June 5, 1965

⁴⁸ *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), October 20, 1964

⁴⁹ *Basic Democracies Review*, Volume I, No. 2 (April, 1965), pp. 5-6

⁵⁰ The President's address at the inauguration of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, December 24, 1960, helps to explain this transformation

⁵¹ Statement by the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Basic Democracies Wing), May 8, 1964

have been blended with a system known for its rigid paternalism. Nevertheless, the fact that the goal has been established and efforts directed toward it is sufficient to establish the sincerity of the aspiration.

The President is the Basic Democracies' most persistent critic. He is the first to admit that the system is in need of change and reform and insists that he will listen to anyone with a constructive suggestion for its improvement.⁵² President Ayub's ideas are usually expressed in letters or minutes which are circulated to become the subjects of high-level conferences. Conference deliberations then lead to new inquiries and, finally, policies calling for specific changes in the system. Three of these minutes deserve special attention.

A Presidential minute on Basic Democracies, February 27, 1964, asked that the system become more than just an effective step in the decentralization of the administration. Not satisfied with the utilization of manpower ("although we have made a good start and results so far achieved are encouraging") President Ayub suggested that still more work could be accomplished if more people could be organized to work for longer periods on specific tasks. He stressed the view that the union councils should be instructed to take on more responsibilities in this direction. The President then proceeded to list possible undertakings in the fields of agriculture, rural industries, and social and health services:⁵³ The minute became the subject of discussion in a meeting of the Expert Committee on Problems of Local Taxation. Raising the funds to meet these new

⁵² The President's Second Inaugural Address, Islamabad, January 2, 1965

⁵³ In agriculture the President suggested "modernization, utilization of fertilizers, production and utilization of modern implements, better crop rotation, correct use of water and farm-yard manure . . . service cooperatives for procurement of necessities and scale of produce . . . credit cooperatives, farming of different types of poultry . . . terracing, tree plantation organized breeding and upgrading of cattle and sheep," etc. For industry, he believed "small-scale handicrafts, better utilization of local raw materials" was possible. With reference to social and health services, he was concerned with the need to organize charitable groups, to "reform extravagant social customs," and to practice proper sanitation. "The sight of our villages is [an] utter disgrace. Even our cities are no better. The major towns along the roads are the example. They are the home of filth, stagnant water, breeding grounds of flies and mosquitoes and diseases. Surely, it does not cost much to put all this right."

responsibilities was debated, and it was generally agreed the union councils should not provide the money.

In this quandary, the opinion was expressed that guidance might be sought in the Chinese Communist and Yugoslavian experiences. In those countries, it was believed, rapid progress in agricultural and industrial development had taken place, in a short period of time, through local institutions corresponding to Basic Democracies. It was suggested that the experiences of China and Yugoslavia should be studied more closely.⁵⁴ The difficulty of adopting these techniques, however, was described in a subsequent memorandum by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting:

We do not have yet sufficient experience of Union Councils taking up economic projects of the type which have been taken up by such local bodies as in Yugoslavia and China. It can be said that the chances of such economic projects proving successful in our own conditions may not be very bright, because in our conditions we are lacking a strong political party to exercise supervisory control, as is available in Yugoslavia and China

The memorandum then proceeded to offer a way out of the dilemma:

It is, however, possible that in our conditions the Union Councils instead of taking on projects should encourage certain progressive private entrepreneurs. We have to see how far the concept of Basic Democracies based on decentralization of [the] administrative pattern could combine with the encouragement of [sic] private enterprise at the local level. I would like to mention here the Third Report of the World Bank which has stressed the need to encourage the progressive farmers in our country. The Report quoted the example of Japan and America where the credit for revolution in agriculture does not go entirely to the Government services. The most important element of success has been the initiative of the farmer, not the down trodden farmer but rather more substantial owner farmers who have been willing to take the risks and to try new methods. The pioneering work of such farmers has spread to their neighbors and brought about the agricultural revolution.

The Deputy Secretary concluded by noting that "we have to see, therefore, how far in our conditions the idea of Basic Democracies

⁵⁴ Felix Greene, *A Curtain of Ignorance* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1963) has been of special interest to Pakistan's leaders

can combine the happier sides of both private enterprise and community development on the pattern of Communes in China and Yugoslavia”⁵⁵

In a second minute in April, 1965, the President referred to “the future role of Basic Democracies.” He called for the realization that “while the population has been divided into identifiable units it is my feeling that the Union Council is too large an area to provide for effective participation of all members of the community in local affairs and in the implementation of local projects. There is, I feel, need for further decentralization.” President Ayub explained that the basis for further decentralization of the Basic Democracies already existed in the “wards” into which each union council had been divided. One union councilor represents each ward, and the President felt that this Basic Democrat should play a larger role.

We have to give him a pivotal position in his ward. He should be the ward leader assisted by a committee of 4 or 5 prominent members of different groups in the ward. They should meet as often as possible every week to discuss local problems, to review results of local effort and to plan for the progress of the community within the ward. They should organize joint activities and determine areas where they can act together for the community.⁵⁶

The power of the chairman of the union council has increased with the passage of time, and the President was obviously concerned how this concentration would effect the Basic Democracies if allowed to go unchecked. He no doubt was also aware of the imbalance in development activities: that in many union council areas, certain less influential villages were being underrepresented and their needs neglected. The situation had already resulted in some disillusionment with the system and if allowed to continue might drastically curtail development efforts. Another aspect was, of course, the enormous allocation of funds to be made available through the Works Program in the Third Five-Year Plan. The President wanted to be assured that the project committees, which in many instances are coincident with the individual wards, will reflect the requirements of every region and village. Finally, the

⁵⁵ Memorandum by M Uhsanul Haq, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Basic Democracies Wing), April 6, 1964, pp. 5-6.

⁵⁶ *The Gazette of West Pakistan*, November 16, 1963, p 4422.

President was conscious of the temptation to corrupt practices where so much money is involved.⁵⁷

President Ayub also raised the issue of collective action.

While a ward in a Town Committee could organize joint activities for keeping the area well drained and cleaned, arranging Adult Literacy classes on a voluntary basis, organizing instruction in Hygiene, Civil duties, Family Planning, supervision and administration of mosques and primary education etc., wards in Union Councils could organize common facility centers, common ploughing, common threshing, etc.

The government was to provide assistance along the lines of education and finance. In the former category were vernacular literature, charts, diagrams, standardized schemes for organized community work and, at a later stage, lessons in community development which were to be broadcast over Radio Pakistan. In the finance category the President was not explicit, but some of his recommendations may have wide implications for the future:

In order to establish common facilities some initial capital outlay would be required in each ward. The State should provide the necessary infrastructure for the implementation of community schemes and projects.

Money for this can be found by diverting bulk of the funds meant for the Works Programme to the building up of community infrastructure in each ward instead of spending it on individual schemes. This would not only ensure better use of funds but also help in improving the economic life of the people. The object is to build up common facility centres and an infrastructure for community projects with financial assistance from the Government. Since the community cannot, under our conditions, pool its resources for common projects the advantages of working jointly can best be shown by providing common facilities with Government funds. The establishment of such an infrastructure and common facilities centres should serve to stimulate the interest of all members of the community and educate them in making better use of whatever resources may be individually available to them.

Certain workshop facilities will be necessary for the maintenance

⁵⁷ Wards were in fact established in East Pakistan in late 1965 and in West Pakistan in early 1966. In essence they constitute a new bottom tier in the Basic Democracies structure. Government of East Pakistan, Notification No. S-II/3R-21/65/121, *Dacca Gazette Extraordinary*, Part I, September 11, 1965 and Government of West Pakistan, Notification No. L7532, *The Gazette of West Pakistan*, March 15, 1966, pp. 433-34.

and upkeep of agricultural implements and machinery. These facilities cannot be organized on the basis of wards or even Union Councils. To begin with it should be enough to establish these facilities at the Tehsil/Thana level.

The funds available under the Rural Works Programme, even if they are wholly diverted to the building of community infrastructure and common facilities centres, will not be adequate. It would, therefore, appear necessary that this effort should be supplemented by proper use of credit given by Government and other loan giving agencies in the field of agriculture. A substantial part of Tacavi (agricultural) loans should be given for community purposes. Similarly, the Agricultural Development Corporation and the cooperatives should encourage applications for loans to community projects rather than to individuals. (*Italics supplied.*)

The plan outlined by President Ayub, in his words, was based on the assumption that "the elected member of each ward is a man with a sense of mission who will devote part of his time to the services of his community." Always the realist, he followed this statement with the view that not every Basic Democrat is suited for the role. "Yet these are the people we have and these are the people we must make use of. . . . Democratic pressures would, in the course of time, either bring out the best in him or eliminate him." But to be certain of getting the best results from these Basic Democrats the government must also consider what it can do:

We have to consider whether any form of compulsion would be built into this plan. Simultaneously adequate incentives and recognition should be provided for good work. If a particular ward leader achieves results he should be given nation-wide recognition. Whether this recognition can be combined with some financial concessions or benefits should also be examined. The Provincial Governments should give careful consideration to this and suggest suitable measures of compulsion or incentives which can be built into the system.

The success of the plan will depend on building up country-wide consciousness for community work. For this all means of education, instruction and propaganda should be pressed into service.

At a governors' conference in the President's House, Rawalpindi, on June 1, 1965, this April minute was high on the agenda. One of the more significant decisions emanating from the meeting was one which sought "to give a new purpose to the Basic Democracies system." It was agreed that a program would be launched making it possible to organize the villagers for collective activities. The first stage of the program called for the establishment of communal

pilot projects in one or two union councils of every district in Pakistan, both East and West. The program was to start on October 27, 1965, and was to include joint harvesting, threshing, ploughing, and similar activities. The Agricultural Development Corporation was ordered to assist the projects by supplying seeds, mechanical devices, and maintenance and servicing facilities. If the government found the program satisfactory after a six-month trial period, they would extend it to other union councils⁵⁸

The President's third minute came in the form of a six-page note circulated among members of the working committee of his party, the Muslim League (Conventionist), and publicized on May 13, 1965. In this communication President Ayub is concerned with the ineffectiveness of his party as well as the political vacuum prevailing in the country. On the one side is his clear desire to strengthen his party, on the other, the need to stimulate political consciousness among the inert rural population. Basic Democracies have begun to awaken the people and their energies have been directed at useful tasks, but the realization persists that they have only been partially successful.

The political nature of the Basic Democracies system is apparent, but stress is still on its developmental and social aspects. The President's minute places the system in a more balanced perspective. Apparently it is his intention to use Basic Democracies in the construction of a strong government party, thereby committing the Basic Democrats to a larger cause than that circumscribed by the union council. The political organization is expected to reinforce the Basic Democracies and vice versa. The combination is to produce a fully mobilized, ideologically disciplined and centrally directed organization of well over a hundred thousand persons. It will be the task of this group to remove the inertia, counter narrow individualism, and challenge the ignorance of the rural masses. The President's note clearly recommends the establishment of a volun-

⁵⁸ *The Pakistan Times*, June 2, 1965. A three-man team consisting of the Director of West Pakistan Rural Works Program, the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and a representative from the East Pakistan Basic Democracies Department spent four weeks in China in June and July 1965. Before their departure a news item described the purpose of their trip in the following manner. "On its return to Pakistan, the team will submit a detailed report to the Government on the working of Communes in China. On the basis of that report, the Government is likely to introduce certain changes in the present pattern of rural development." *The Pakistan Times*, June 11, 1965.

tary corps, trained along military lines, which will act as an arm of the Muslim League Party and will be devoted to "social welfare activities "

According to President Ayub the rural population is still unaware of its responsibilities and, unlike people in the urban areas, lacks identification with the national movement. In part this is the fault of the political parties. In another sense, the popular indifference is due to the historical conditioning process which denied the people a voice in their own affairs. "Therefore facts must be faced and the only way [is] to make the community of Basic Democrats into an effective and purposeful political organization."⁵⁹

President Ayub believes it possible to integrate "basic politics" with the Basic Democracies. The recent elections highlighted the nation's political backwardness. The population, despite Basic Democracies, remains politically fragmented and the conventional political parties have shown an inability to rally more than a small fraction of the populace; their deficiencies often force them to demagogic and unconstructive acts. It appears that the President is not yet thinking of a one-party state, although this could well be the outcome of his reforms. For the moment at least, the emphasis is on moulding the rural society's political character. The central purpose in this exercise is the necessity of galvanizing the latent ambitions and energies of the people. The new concept envisions a Muslim League structured along parallel lines with the Basic Democracies.

The Basic Democracies system should become the basis of the political party system in the country. Apart from the fact that there is [a] serious lack of political workers outside the community of Basic Democrats in the country, there is also the question of funds which any political party would need to build itself into an effective organization. Once political parties are identified with the system of Basic Democracies many of the administrative and financial difficulties will be removed. The Pakistan Muslim League as the chief protagonist of the system of Basic Democracies should, therefore, take the initiative in this regard.⁶⁰

There is no gainsaying the fact that the Basic Democracies system is in flux, its future intertwined with the future of the nation

⁵⁹ *The Pakistan Times*, May 14, 1965.

⁶⁰ *Ibid* See the description of the President's new Muslim League Party structure in the Appendix.

APPENDIX

Description of the President's New
Muslim League Party Structure

Union Muslim League. In each Union Council we should set up a primary political unit consisting of members owing their allegiance to the Muslim League. The formation of the unit should be on a voluntary basis and the Chairman of the Union Council (where he is a Muslim Leaguer) should be the chairman of the Union League.

If in any particular Union Council, the Chairman is not a member of the Muslim League, those members of the Union Council who are also members of the Muslim League should form a Union League and elect their own chairman. In such areas the Union League will act as a disciplined opposition keeping close watch and supervision over the affairs of the Union Council.

A Union League formed on the above basis should co-opt an equal number of Muslim League workers from the area as members of the Union League. The formation of the Union League will be supervised by the Tehsil/Thana League.

Tehsil/Thana Muslim League. The Muslim League at the tehsil/thana level should be formed on the same principles as described above and with the co-option of an equal number of Muslim League workers in the area as the members of the Tehsil/Thana Council.

At the tehsil/thana level it would be useful for the League to have a small Working Committee to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the party.

The supervision including the formation of the Tehsil/Thana League will be entrusted to the District Muslim League.

District Muslim League. The same principles of forming the District League with the Muslim League members of the District Council and co-option of an equal number of M L workers would apply.

A small working committee should be elected for the District League. The supervision of the work of the District League and its formation will be the job of the Divisional League.

Divisional Muslim League. The Divisional Muslim League should be established along the same principles and in the same manner as described above.

Provincial Muslim League. In each province a certain number of representatives from each district should be elected by the District League.

In West Pakistan each district may elect two or three members to the Provincial Muslim League and in East Pakistan each district may elect seven or eight members.

The total number of members of two provincial bodies should be the same

The Provincial League should meet and elect its own President.

The President should nominate a Working Committee from amongst the members elected to the Provincial League to function as a Working Committee. The Committee should consist of approximately 10 to 12 members

The other office-bearers, namely, the Provincial League Secretary, Treasurer, etc., should be nominated by the President.

Pakistan Muslim League At the national level the Muslim League should consist of approximately 200 members, equally elected from the two Provincial Leagues. In selecting members to the national body each Provincial League should ensure adequate representation from all districts.

The National body should elect its President and the President should nominate a Working Committee consisting of 10 to 12 members and the other office bearers of the National League.

Source *The Pakistan Times*, May 14, 1965.

III. Business Participation in Administration

There are some fundamental differences between the bureaucracies of the West and of Pakistan. In any study of Pakistan's administrative process, these disparities must be taken into consideration. The most important of the differences is the dominant role which the bureaucracy plays in the governmental process. In reality, when one studies the administrative process, he is studying nearly the entire governmental process.

Frequently the only viable institution of government in a newly formed country like Pakistan is the bureaucracy. If there is to be more democracy, this dominance of the bureaucracy requires not only that it create and administer programs, but also that it build a governmental structure responsive to the wishes of a newly sovereign, independent population. In other words, if the bureaucracy does not create the institutions of responsible self-government, the chances are they will not be created.¹ The bureaucracy then is called upon to make considerable contributions not only to improvement of administrative processes and procedures, but also to the form of government itself and its relation to society.

Students of the administrative process in the West take comfort in the fact that political institutions other than the bureaucracy exist and effectively participate in the governmental process. There are

¹ It is difficult to find agreement on what constitutes responsible self-government. For the purposes of this essay it is assumed that two necessary tenets of responsible self-government are: (a) equal access to the policy-making process for interested parties, and (b) availability of procedures through which recourse might be sought from the adverse effects of arbitrary government actions.

elected assemblies, interest groups of many varieties, the mass media, and the courts. Responsible government is more or less assured because these "outside" institutions are reliable checks on bureaucratic activity. Historically, the study of ways to improve the administration of government programs was emphasized and the study of bureaucratic responsibility became a secondary, although important, concern.

In Pakistan some nonbureaucratic groups do exist, but they are not effective participants in the governmental process. For this reason it is likely that Western experience with the study of the administrative process is not directly transferable. There is perhaps need for different emphasis in Pakistan. A number of students have, of course, questioned the inapplicability of Western experience to countries like Pakistan. Yet it is not clear whether or not the outstanding characteristic of these bureaucracies has always been recognized.² The bureaucracy's preponderant weight in the governmental process, often to the exclusion of other groups, makes it an institution strikingly different from its counterparts in the West.

In the study of the administrative process in Pakistan, it seems to the author that the central concern should be the development of procedures and processes which compel the bureaucracy to share its policy-making functions with nonbureaucratic groups or individuals. A secondary concern should be the development of more effective techniques for administering government programs. Fortunately, these concerns are not only compatible but complementary. Administrative improvements can result from opening the policy-making process to nonbureaucratic participation. Sharing of policy-making by the bureaucracy could affect both the *internal* efficiency of bureaucratic operations and the *external* relationship of the bureaucracy with society by aiding in the development of responsible self-government. These two aspects of the administrative process can be defined as follows: *external*—the growth of responsible self-government depends on provision of opportunity

² Edward W. Weidner wrote the following concerning US Technical Assistance Programs in public administration, "Most of the work in technical assistance in public administration has been concentrated on budgeting, personnel, O and M and supervisory or executive development. Most of it reflects the old efficiency and economy school of thought." *Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas: The Case for Development Administration* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1964).

for interested citizens to participate in policy formulation, *internal*—nonbureaucratic participation provides a “check” on the bureaucracy or an incentive for more effective administration. Consent and compliance with bureaucratic regulations might increase

Fred Riggs sees a significant, positive correlation between non-bureaucratic participation in policy-making and administrative effectiveness for these reasons:

If groups outside a bureaucracy exercise major influence in controlling the actions of the bureaucrats, then the decisions of the bureaucrats must be largely concerned with the implementation of norms set by the controlling groups, i.e., with *administrative functions*. But if there are no such control groups . . . then the officials cannot devote themselves primarily to implementing policies. Since they are unlikely to agree readily about such policies, most of their time will be spent in power struggles among themselves, in other words, in *political functions* . . .

If external groups control a bureaucracy . . . then they [the bureaucrats] can produce services and impose regulations with relative efficiency and effectiveness. . . They would secure the consent and compliance from the effective population, not only because of their administrative competence but because the policies enforced would command respect.³

This chapter explores the applicability of this approach to the administrative process in Pakistan by examining the policy-making and administrative functions of the bureaucracy, particularly those aspects dealing with the industrial regulatory programs.⁴ The conditions which make the bureaucracy the dominant institution in the governmental process are discussed first. An examination of the role industrial interest groups play in the governmental process serves to illustrate the possibilities which exist for participation of nonbureaucratic groups in that process. The obstacles to opening up the governmental process to nonbureaucratic participation are covered here. Finally, the prospects that these groups might articu-

³ Fred W. Riggs, “Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration,” *Public Administration Review*, XXV (March, 1965), p. 76.

⁴ To make this study workable, a single interest group was examined. Industrialists were selected because the government is actively promoting industrial growth. The industrial community is small, mostly confined to large metropolitan areas, and was willing to participate in a study of this kind.

late demands which could generate some administrative efficiency, while simultaneously they might carry part of the policy-making burden, are major considerations of this essay.

NONBUREAUCRATIC GROUPS AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

Nonbureaucratic groups in Pakistan may be divided into two categories: component parts of government, and private or non-governmental groups.⁵ Those in the first category are the elected assemblies and the courts. The second category includes industrial and commercial interest groups. One of the striking characteristics of the political process in Pakistan is the small number of organized groups in the second category. Industry and commerce are the only groups which are formally organized and staffed for the purpose of representing the interests of their membership. Ethnic groups, religious groups, and even political parties are spontaneous in their activities. They are characterized by informality of organization, lack of identity, and a rather consistent failure to articulate whatever position their adherents might have.

Government policy is both formulated and administered without the direct (and with very little indirect) participation of the elected assemblies and the courts. This statement can be substantiated through an examination of the effectiveness of the assemblies and the courts on the formulation and execution of three government programs of industrial regulation: (1) labor welfare regulations, (2) industrial taxation, and (3) foreign exchange allocation.⁶

Elected Assemblies

Elected assemblies in Pakistan were first established by the British, although they only remotely resemble their English prototype. The Pakistani assemblies are subordinate to the bureaucracy today, as they have been historically. Although the Constitution promulgated in 1962 created a presidential system, the assemblies

⁵ Gabriel Almond has classified interest groups in developing nations for purposes of comparative analysis in four categories: (a) institutional, (b) non-associational, (c) anomic, and (d) associational. *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 33-34. Here we are mainly concerned with his first and fourth categories.

⁶ These areas were selected after discussions with a number of Pakistani industrialists and government leaders. They are the regulatory areas these people designated as most important in terms of their effects on industrialists.

have not yet taken a position independent of the bureaucracy. They do not play an important role in the policy-making process, and there is little indication that they will do so for some time.

The 1962 Constitution vests considerable power in the president. He may appoint ministers at his discretion, the only restriction being that persons appointed must be otherwise qualified to sit in the National Assembly.⁷ The Assembly is empowered to override the president's veto by a two-thirds vote. However, its action is not final. The president may send any measure back to the Assembly requesting reconsideration. If his veto should be overridden a second time, the president may either sign the measure or submit it to a referendum of the electoral college, where its fate is finally decided. The president is also empowered to promulgate ordinances when the Assembly is not in session. Ordinances must be laid before the Assembly when it reconvenes, but they are seldom struck down by any of the assemblies.

Most legislation originates in the bureaucracy. Administration-originated legislation is generally passed by the assemblies without consideration either on the floor or in committee. The committees have very little power to amend a bill and no power to keep one from coming to the floor. All bills, with the exception of the finance bills, are referred directly to the appropriate committee unless a majority of those on the floor vote to keep them from the committee. Given the support the administration had in the assemblies, only an insignificant fraction of the legislation introduced in the first four sessions under the 1962 Constitution was referred to committees.⁸ In the East Pakistan Assembly during this same two-year period, four bills received committee consideration, seven in the West Wing Assembly, and about one dozen at the Center. The standing committees on industries and commerce did not meet in any of the three jurisdictions.

The committees of the assemblies are empowered to summon outside witnesses and take testimony, although they have not yet

⁷ There are three elected assemblies in Pakistan, the National Assembly at the Center and one assembly in each of the two provinces. The Constitution prescribes the same procedures for all three assemblies.

⁸ The administration's control of the assemblies was strengthened in the 1965 elections. In the National Assembly the administration has more than a 24-to-1 edge over the opposition. *The New York Times*, June 27, 1965, p. 25.

done so. Committee sessions are confidential; no transcript of the proceedings is released. A copy of committee recommendations is published for use of the assemblies only.

Approximately one-third of the National Assembly's twenty-five enactments during the first four sessions (1962-64) were presidential ordinances. The remainder were administration bills. In West Pakistan, the Assembly passed thirty ordinances, nineteen administration bills, and two private bills. No administration bill or ordinance has been defeated in any of the assemblies. Assemblies' supervision of administrative action is severely limited by restrictions placed on assembly control of budgets. At the Center, for example, the president presents the budget to the National Assembly for each fiscal year, but the Assembly may only debate it. The Assembly is not empowered to submit budgeted expenditures to a vote unless that expenditure is "new expenditure." The administration decides what is "new." Sums assigned to the new classification are small; it was estimated that only 7.5 per cent of total central expenditure for 1963-64 could be so classified.⁹

The parliamentary device of moving an adjournment motion to permit general debate on government policy has not been employed successfully in Pakistan. For example, there were not sufficient opposition members in the West Pakistan Assembly during the first two years under the new Constitution to move for adjournment. There were about thirty opposition members in the 156-member National Assembly, but they were not able to use the adjournment motion successfully. Unfortunately, the question hour has resulted in inquiries on matters of strictly local concern. There have been no serious challenges to the administration during the question hours of the first four sessions.¹⁰

⁹ "National Assembly Debates," *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), June 12, 1963.

¹⁰ A Pakistani observer once described the assembly proceedings as follows, "Nursing their constituencies and equipping themselves with the knowledge of national affairs being exacting pursuits, the members resorted to pandering parochial sentiment as the easiest way to ensure a political future. Generally, they were indifferent to their function whatever they understood it to be. The Speaker had to ring the bell for a quorum even on such occasions as the beginning of the general discussion on the budget and the introduction of the Finance Bill. Disorderly behavior and the use of unparliamentary expressions became a common feature of the Assembly's proceedings." Mushtaq Ahmad, *From the Gallery* (Lahore: Progressive Papers Ltd., 1963), p. 135.

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The rather inconsequential role which the elected assemblies play in the governmental process may be further substantiated by an examination of the assemblies' participation in the three major areas of industrial regulation mentioned above.

The assemblies have shown little or no leadership in the formulation of labor welfare legislation. The major enactments in this area were passed either during the martial law period, when the assemblies were defunct, or during the period of British control. Alterations in labor welfare policy are made by the administration and formalized through administrative rule-making procedures.

The National Assembly participated in the creation of the wealth and gift taxes in 1963. However the major industrial taxes—*income and excise*—were initiated during the British period. Tax policy is still, for the most part, formulated by the Central Board of Revenue, an administrative body, under its rule-making powers. Promotional and regulatory schemes such as the tax holiday for new industries were initiated through administrative rules without reference to the assemblies. The complexity of modern taxation schemes has, in all governments, necessitated the delegation of much legislative authority to the administration. In Pakistan, where there is constitutional provision for reference of new tax measures to the assemblies, only the 1963 wealth and gift taxes went this route. The Central Board of Revenue is clearly the unchallenged policy-maker in this area.

The controls associated with the allocation of foreign exchange were also initiated by the administration without reference to the assemblies. Policy formulation concerning exchange allocation and associated controls are today and were in the past monopolies of the administration.

Initial policy decisions concerning the allocation of exchange are made when the five-year plans are adopted. The formulation of the plans is the first step in exchange allocation. These plans were written by the Planning Commission with the approval of the National Economic Council, a body appointed by the President to determine economic policy for the nation and the provinces. There is no requirement that the plans be referred to the National Assembly for approval. An industrial investment schedule is drawn up annually by the Department of Investment Promotion and Supplies, which was formed in 1960 by an executive order. The schedule provides guidelines for investment in industrial expansion and establishment

and, again, there is no requirement for legislative approval. Allocations for expansion or establishment are decided by the Department alone or in conjunction with government lending institutions. Decisions made through the exchange allocation mechanism affect the size, location, and ownership of industrial undertakings. These decisions are made within the administrative structure itself and without participation of the assemblies.

Similarly, policy decisions concerning the allocation of foreign exchange for industrial operations, i.e., importing of raw materials and spare parts, are also made almost entirely within the administrative structure. Licensing boards attached to the three regional offices of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports decide the amount of exchange to be allocated to industrialists on the basis of. (1) the total amount of foreign exchange made available by the Ministry of Finance for industrial purposes in each six-month shipping period, and (2) the entitlement of each industry as expressed in a survey of industrial needs made by the industries department of each province.

The foreign exchange allocation process, from the Planning Commission to the survey of industrial needs, is excluded from the purview of assemblies. The allocation mechanism used today was created by executive order and any sharing of policy-making powers in this area has to be approved by the administration itself. Thus Gustav Papanek wrote:

Given the nature of government in Pakistan, decisions of any importance are concentrated in the hands of a few government officials and Ministers . . . Economic power rests primarily with the Central Government and especially its Ministry of Finance. As a result, an extraordinary share of major economic decisions is in the hands of a very small number of individuals in that Ministry, nearly all of them civil servants.¹¹

The Courts

If the assemblies do not provide initiative in policy-making or oversight of administrative actions, the courts clearly do wield influence in the governmental process. There is a spirit of independence on the bench and a willingness to rebuff the bureaucracy

¹¹ "Economic Policy Decisions in Pakistan," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds, *Public Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 135.

when in the eyes of the court it has engaged in some inequity in its dealings with the public. In this sense the courts participate in a limited way in the policy-making process

The independence of the judiciary in post-1947 India prompted Sir Harold Duncan, former Legal Advisor to the Colonial Office, to state for *The Times* of June 27, 1953.

I think it can fairly be said that . . . in practice Judges in British Colonies, in discharging their judicial duties and reaching conclusions of fact on issues before them are just as independent of the executive as is the case with Judges in this country [Great Britain]

The judiciary continues to take a forthright position in opposing the administration. It is true that the 1962 Constitution gives the president control over appointments to the bench. The courts have established a reputation for independence with the people, as is evidenced by the fact that they are petitioned frequently for redress of grievances which are ordinarily resolved elsewhere in Western governments.¹² The courts, for example, handle an unusually large number of civil service disputes concerning such issues as dismissal, retirement, and payment of salary. Students come to the courts with writ petitions to protest alleged unfairness in academic grading procedures or in matters concerning the administration of their universities.

The judiciary does not influence government policies as frequently through judicial review of legislative enactments as it does through its writ jurisdiction over cases involving administrative activities. The 1962 Constitution provided that the assemblies be the final judge of the constitutionality of any law, a remarkable change from the position taken in the nation's previous Constitution.¹³ In all likelihood however, the first amendment to the 1962 Constitution, passed in late 1963, will give the courts broader grounds for reviewing acts of the assemblies. The amendment has made fundamental rights justiciable.

¹² See Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) for an impressionistic account of the esteem in which the courts are held.

¹³ The former Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High Court, Mr. Manzur Qadir, described the difference between the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions as follows, "The Legislature is now the sole judge of reasonableness of a proposed law, while previously the decision as to whether the law fell within

Although there has been little review of legislative enactments, there is a discernible trend toward extension of judicial review of administrative actions through the writ powers.¹⁴ The courts have extended the doctrine of "quasi-judicial" actions to administrative activity which previously had been considered beyond the pale of judicial review. The courts have begun, in effect, to require closer adherence to judicial procedures in administrative activities which in the past were held solely discretionary.

Perhaps the most narrow interpretation of the "quasi-judicial" doctrine was in the Tariq Transport case of 1958.¹⁵ In it the Supreme Court held that the Regional Transport Authority, which is empowered to grant bus transport licenses, was not necessarily required to act in a judicial manner. The court held that since there was nothing in the act which created the Authority requiring it to act in a judicial manner, it was not necessary that the Authority do so. The act contains no requirement that the Authority give reasons for failure to issue a permit. Consequently, the courts felt that they could not insist that the Authority do so.

In 1961, this decision was partially overruled by the Supreme Court. A case decided that year involved an importer who was denied a hearing by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports when his import license was canceled. The hearing was denied on the grounds that one was not required in the statutes under which the Chief Controller operated. The Court now held that the Chief Controller, by canceling the licenses without a hearing, violated the plaintiff's fundamental rights:

The maxim *audi alteram partem*—"no man shall be condemned unheard," applies to judicial as well as administrative bodies, especially where the proceedings taken may affect the person or property or other rights of the parties concerned in the disputes. *Even if therefore the proceedings before the Chief Controller were*

or outside the purview of reasonable exception to the enunciated fundamental rights, was ultimately given by the courts" "Constitution Makes Legislature Supreme," *Pakistan Times*, October 5, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁴ Under the 1956 Constitution the five common law writs were cited by their familiar titles—*habeas corpus*, *mandamus*, *prohibition*, *quo warranto* and *certiorari*. In the 1962 Constitution the writs were not named, but the High Courts were empowered by Section 98 to provide remedies similar to those encompassed by the traditional common law writs.

¹⁵ *Tariq Transport Co v Regional Transport Authority*, Lahore (1958) 2 Pakistan Supreme Court Reports [PSCR] 103.

neither strictly judicial nor even quasi-judicial in character, the principle of natural justice embodied in the above maxim could be called in aid by the appellants This principle is of universal application (Italics added)¹⁶

Most of the cases brought to the courts by industrialists—outside of the taxation which is handled in a special taxation court—involve the issuing of licenses for foreign exchange. The courts have held that a license for exchange is a privilege rather than a right, yet they have made it clear that the procedure used in granting, refusing to grant, or in revoking a license cannot be arbitrary:

It is clear that grant or refusal of a license is not a judicial act. This, however, does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the Collector or Commissioner can be arbitrary and fanciful and that if it be so the courts can not interfere¹⁷

The judiciary has been active in suggesting procedures to preclude arbitrary decisions by the administration. Yet, in the absence of any specific legislation, the administrator has little guide as to what does or does not constitute arbitrary action. The criterion is, of course, judge-made and scattered through a number of decisions; in no single decision or statute is a thorough explanation made. In one case, the Supreme Court indicated that the elimination of arbitrary administrative actions is, to a great extent, dependent on the self-restraint of the administrator.

Every officer who passes an order in a manner of discretion should ask himself the question: "What is the order I should pass if I were acting justly, fairly and reasonably?" If the order that he passes is not in accordance with the answer which he would himself give to this question, he exceeds his jurisdiction and abuses his powers¹⁸

A few specific procedural requirements may be found in other decisions. The Court has held, for example, that no person can be deprived of his liberty or property without having an opportunity to be heard. But nowhere is it clearly stated what constitutes a hearing. The Supreme Court has held that although a hearing is re-

¹⁶ *Faridsons Ltd. v Government of Pakistan*, Pakistan Legal Decisions [PLD] (1961) SC 371

¹⁷ *S S Miranda Ltd v The Chief Commissioner of Karachi*, PLD (1959) SC 134

¹⁸ *The Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd v. The Director of Food Purchases and Others* (1958) PLD, SC 869

quired, it is not necessary that the applicant for a license and the objector be heard in the presence of each other.¹⁹ The task of determining what constitutes a fair hearing remains in the hands of the judiciary, for there is no statutory description of procedures for administrative hearings.

Other requirements enforced on the administration by the courts include the right of the plaintiff to have the opportunity to know the evidence against him and the source of that evidence. The Court has also held that the government is negligent in cases involving delay in the issuing of import licenses if such delay results in loss to the plaintiff. The administration must act with speed and efficiency equal to the needs of the business and industrial community.²⁰

Given the nature of judicial proceedings, one cannot expect the courts to play a major role in the governmental process although they provide a check against administrative excesses. It is quite clear that neither the courts nor the assemblies in Pakistan play major roles in the governmental process. One might hope that the failure of these governmental institutions to participate meaningfully would be offset by the activities of nongovernmental groups. The failure of industrialists to participate effectively in the governmental process indicates that this hope may not materialize for some time.

Industrial Interest Groups

One could reasonably expect that industrialists in Pakistan would have organized themselves for effective participation in the governmental process. Circumstances are ripe for such organization. Indeed, if industrialists do not find it possible to organize for such participation, it is very unlikely that other groups will. There are three major incentives for the creation of effective industrial interest organizations. First, there is a lengthy history of well-organized industrial and commercial interest groups on the subcontinent. Second, the government of Pakistan has encouraged private ownership of industry. Third, the government controls nearly all facets of

¹⁹ See the *Tariq* and *Faridsons* cases cited above, and *Federation of Pakistan v Sardar Ali* (1958) 2 PSCR 266

²⁰ *Muhammadi Steamship Co Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan*, PLD (1959) Karachi 232.

industrial expansion, location, and production, thereby challenging the most vital interests of industrialists. Yet, in spite of these rather fortuitous circumstances there has been little well-organized participation of industrialists in the governmental process.

After partition the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in India expanded at a rate which paralleled the development of commerce and industry in that country. Their development in Pakistan, however, was quite different. The newly formed Muslim nation faced a leadership crisis in all sectors, but particularly in industry. The introduction to the nation's First Five-Year Plan (1955-60) referred to the leadership deficit:

The mass departure of non-Muslims created a sudden void in many vital fields which the Muslim refugees with different occupational patterns could not always fill. Banks and insurance companies, manufacturing and commercial firms were crippled as the Hindus who had operated them left in large numbers leaving only inexperienced and lower grade staff behind them.²¹

Gustav Papanek found that those whose primary occupation was trade before 1947 (or before entering an industrial enterprise if this was later) account for about half of the nation's entrepreneurs today. Put differently, only 22 per cent of industrial investment is controlled by individuals with pre-1947 industrial experience.²²

The absence of experienced industrial leadership is a significant factor in the weakness of industrial interest organizations. Whereas the Indians built rather successfully on the organizational structure left behind by the British, the Pakistanis found themselves weakened by indecisive leadership. Immediately prior to partition there were 56 recognized chambers and 37 recognized trade associations on the subcontinent. Only a small portion of these were located in the area which was to form Pakistan. In the first ten years of independence over 1,300 chambers and trade associations were formed to speak for businessmen and industrialists. Consequently, there was no effective voice for either of these communities. Whatever effectiveness they might have had prior to partition declined or disappeared. Communications between the industrial sector and the

²¹ Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-1960* (Karachi, 1958), p. 7.

²² Gustav F Papanek, "The Development of Entrepreneurship," *American Economic Review*, LII (May 1962), p. 52.

government disintegrated as the nation moved toward martial law in 1958.

The failure of industrialists to form effective interest groups points to one of the most difficult challenges which faces the bureaucracy in Pakistan. The bureaucracy not only has to create processes and procedures which will lead to a sharing of policy-making with nonbureaucratic groups, but also has to *create* these groups. The government of Pakistan took an important step toward meeting that challenge in 1956.

By 1956, the government had become concerned with the rapid proliferation and consequent weakness of industrial interest groups. The government was having difficulty in gaining industrial support and in obtaining compliance with its regulatory programs. The administration was eager to locate representatives of the industrial community to facilitate communication between the government and the private sector. For this purpose a reorganization proposal was announced in late 1956. The proposal was not implemented until martial law was established in 1958. The new regime moved quickly and made the reorganization scheme one of its first orders.²³

Under the reorganization scheme all the industrial and commercial associations in existence in 1958 were abolished and only eighty-six new ones created. A Director of Trade Organizations was created in the Ministry of Commerce at the Center. The Director was given a great many powers over the new organizations. These powers include the right to inspect organizational records, to recognize new organizations, to attend any organization's meetings, and to cancel, suspend, or modify any resolutions adopted or decisions made by any chamber or trade organization.²⁴

Thus far, the Director has exercised his powers cautiously and in a limited fashion. There is some question as to whether or not the

²³ The scheme created five tiers of associations, a federated chamber, associations representing commerce and industry on a geographical basis, associations representing trades or industries on an area or nationwide basis, town associations where industrial or commercial activity is not sufficient to warrant a full-fledged chamber, and associations representing trades or industries of specific areas

²⁴ Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, Ordinance No. XLV of 1961, Section 9, *The Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary* (Karachi, December 2, 1961).

effectiveness of the interest groups has been enhanced by the reorganization scheme. Businessmen and industrialists have been reluctant to join the newly organized bodies. Perhaps they do not recognize the opportunities provided by them, or perhaps they feel that the government, through its restrictions, has rendered them useless.²⁵

In either case, it is evident that any strengthening of the industrial interest groups will depend to a very large extent on the willingness of the bureaucracy to further encourage industrialists' participation in the governmental process. The initiative apparently will not come from the industrial community. To encourage greater participation most effectively, procedures and processes should be established to accommodate this participation *within the administrative structure itself*. Administrative procedures for participation exist today, although they are infrequently used. A review of the use industrialists make of these procedures substantiates this, and suggests some revisions which would result in their improvement.

INDUSTRIALISTS' PARTICIPATION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

Most of the existing procedures designed for industrialists' participation within the administrative structure were used during the British period. For purposes of discussion, they are best grouped in two categories, *formal* and *informal*. By the first is meant legally constituted bodies or procedures specifically designed to incorporate the views of nongovernmental groups in policy-making. These include advisory commissions, councils or boards, and formal procedures for administrative rule-making.

The informal classification is divided into subcategories, "overt" and "covert." Overt means include public statements or petitions of individuals or groups and the use of mass media in attempting to influence the government. Covert methods, although they include lawful private contacts, are sometimes illegal—bribes, for example. Covert means are certainly used in Pakistan, but they can hardly be studied by academic research techniques.

²⁵ In 1963 only nine of the 14 recognized chambers and 40 of the trade associations had joined the Federation. The Chittagong Chamber had only eight charter members; the Lahore had about 100 members, and the largest, the Karachi Chamber, had about 650 members.

Industrialists and Formal Procedures

Advisory councils most directly concerned with industrial regulatory policy are those in the Ministries of Finance, Industries and Commerce at the Center, and the Departments of Industries and Labor Welfare in the provinces. Membership on these councils is controlled by the administration, although it does accept nominations for memberships from industrial organizations. It has been suggested that these organizations be permitted to elect members directly to the councils, but this proposal has not yet been accepted by the government. Advisory council agendas are usually prepared by the government and are seldom circulated more than a few days in advance of the meeting. There have been complaints that subjects discussed at the meetings frequently do not encompass some important topics of industrial concern. The president of the Federation of Chambers referred to this in an address to the advisory council of the Ministry of Commerce:

We . . . feel that the limited activities of the council do not fully justify its name. It has been observed that the council meets once in six months and then only for discussing the coming import policy. . . . The council should not restrict itself to the import schedules, but become an important forum for reviewing and discussing the entire range of commercial and industrial policies and activities.²⁶

The procedures used at council meetings have not been successful in producing meaningful recommendations on policy matters. The sessions are generally held for a period of one or sometimes two days and are attended by a large number of individuals. There has been little use of committees or other devices which might encourage more thoughtful exchange of views on a subject. Formal hearing techniques have not been used by the councils, and there are no provisions for expert testimony, cross-examination, or verbatim transcripts of proceedings.

Advisory councils have proved to be ineffective devices for the purposes of both industry and government. Industrialists fail to do their homework in preparation for council meetings and they have not been able to formulate industry-wide positions on issues. Their presentations at council meetings are often weak, contradictory,

²⁶ The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry, *Brief Report of Activities 1962-63* (Karachi: Trade and Industry Publications Ltd, 1963), p. 85.

and ineffective. On the other hand, the government has not shown willingness to adhere to the recommendations of these councils. The councils exist as a possibility for the expansion of nonbureaucratic participation in the governmental process, but their usage to date has not been of much significance.

Another device for representing industrial interests in policy formulation has been initiated in the establishment of minimum wages. The Minimum Wages Ordinance of 1961 created a three-man board to set minimum wages in various industries. One member of the board must come from the industry concerned, one from labor, and the chairman of the board is a civil servant. All three members are appointed by the provincial governors, and any minimum wage established must be approved by the governors.²⁷

On occasion the administration appoints special inquiry commissions to write reports on a variety of national problems. Those commissions which were directly concerned with business or industrial problems have not always included representatives from these sectors. The journal *Trade and Industry* made the following comment about the membership of the Credit Enquiry Commission:

Lack of analysis of the credit situation from the point of view of those who have strongly felt credit strain in the country should be ascribed to the absence of representatives of trade and industry, chambers of commerce and industry and professional economists in the Committee which consisted of two representatives drawn each from the Ministry of Finance, State Bank of Pakistan and the Planning Commission.²⁸

The government has in some cases provided for a consultation with industrialists in the rule-making or sublegislative process. These provisions, however, have had a mixed history of usage. The reforms of rule-making procedures undertaken by Western nations in the 1940's to provide wider public participation in the process have not made any impact on Pakistan. There has been no study of rule-making procedures and no suggestion, official or unofficial, for undertaking such a study. The government of Pakistan still operates under the rule-making provisions of the General Clauses

²⁷ Similar provisions for direct participation by industrial and labor representatives are made in the Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1959.

²⁸ "Report of Credit Committee—An Assessment," *Trade and Industry* (January, 1963). Reprint from Banking Supplement, Vol. VII, No. 1.

Act of 1897. This Act provides for previous publication of rules in draft form whenever an enactment specifically includes such a requirement. Any legislation which fails to state that rules shall be implemented only after previous publication is not covered by the General Clauses Act. In those cases where the act does not apply, rules are handed down by the administration, printed in the official gazette, and become enforceable immediately. After 1897, the British wrote requirements for previous publication into nearly all industrial regulatory enactments. Several laws passed since 1947, however, do not carry this provision.

Four major labor welfare enactments passed since 1947 do not include the provision for previous publication.²⁹ There are two exceptions. The Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1959 requires previous publication. The Minimum Wages Ordinance of 1961 provides that persons likely to be affected by the minimum wage regulations be given the opportunity to offer comments and make suggestions.

In the taxation area the postindependence drift away from the requirement for public participation in rule-making is apparent. The Central Board of Revenue is the sole rule-making authority for central taxes (most industrial taxes are central taxes) and has been so since the inception of the income tax in 1922. The Excise Tax Act of 1944 does not provide for previous publication, but it does require that rules made by the executive be laid before the legislature for a period of thirty days. If the legislature does not modify or veto the rules in that period they become law. These requirements for rule-making have not been strictly followed by the Central Board of Revenue. The requirement in the Excise Tax Act was not followed when a major change in the rules was handed down on December 29, 1962.³⁰ In the two major tax acts passed since 1947, the Wealth Tax and Gift Tax Acts of 1963, there is no requirement for previous publication of rules. Under these acts, the Board may make rules which become effective immediately upon publication in the official gazette. There are no provisions for non-

²⁹ They are Road Transport Workers' Ordinance, 1961, Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960, Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1960, The Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952.

³⁰ Government of Pakistan, *The Gazette of Pakistan*, No S 1033 (June 8, 1963), p 357k

bureaucratic participation in rule-making in the area of foreign exchange allocation.

A memorandum written to Mr M Shoaib, Central Minister of Finance, by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Karachi took note of the failure of the Board to follow rule-making procedures:

Whenever amendments in the Laws and Rules are made, unless they are of a secret nature, it is requested that the representative organizations of trade and industry and the Income Tax Bar Association be taken into confidence in advance, so that anomalies, if any, are avoided ³¹

The requirement for previous publication does not successfully accommodate nonbureaucratic participation in the *formulation* of rules. Instead it merely allows objections after the rules have been made by the administration. No record need be kept of these objections, and their incorporation in the rules is at the discretion of the administration. The record of industrialists' participation in rule-making is not impressive. In fact, the only cases of industrial participation this writer could find were in the area of labor welfare regulation.

Industrialists and Informal Contacts

The infrequent use of these channels for formal participation has tended to increase reliance on informal attempts to influence the shape of public policy. Industrialists have considerable informal contact with top-level administrators, as one might expect in a nation where the leadership community is small and located in or around three or four major metropolitan areas. There is not enough information for one to comment extensively on the nature or the extent of this contact. It does appear, however, that a small group of extremely successful industrialists, particularly those in the Karachi area, frequently meet informally with government officials. Some of the larger industries have made it a point to employ former government servants.

Most informal attempts to influence regulatory policy formulation take the form of letters or *aide memoires*, telephone conversations, and conferences with the appropriate ministry officials. A

³¹ Memorandum quoted in Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, *Annual Report 1962-63* (Karachi: International Press, 1963), p. 62.

large number of letters are sent from industrialists and their representatives to the administration on matters of regulatory policy. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi, noted in its 1962-63 annual report.

During the period under review the Chamber has sent a number of communications to the Government, some on policy matters in the shape of exhaustive memoranda and others in the form of letters on various matters affecting trade and industry.³²

This statement is followed by a list of forty-seven subjects on which that Chamber approached the administration. In that period, representatives of the Chamber attended only four formal conferences called by the administration.

The informality of these representations necessarily lessens their effectiveness. No official records or memoranda are kept of the discussions, making it difficult to accumulate a convincing case or to refer to the proceedings at a later date. To compensate for the absence of record, the industrialists themselves will at times circulate a summary of the discussion to their colleagues and to the government departments concerned.

Another technique sometimes used by the administration to obtain the viewpoints of interested parties is the circulation of draft legislation. When the reorganization scheme was proposed, the administration indicated it would circulate drafts to the chambers and trade organizations. According to representatives of the industrial associations, the government has failed to live up to this pledge.

Additional informal methods used by industrial organizations to communicate their views to the government are their annual dinners and conventions. High-level administration officials are invited to these meetings. President Ayub Khan usually attends the Federation's dinner meeting each year, and his ministers the meetings of the affiliated chambers and trade associations. Speeches are exchanged in advance of the meetings and views are frequently exchanged informally after the speeches. The major chambers of commerce and industry publish annual reports containing their organizations' positions on a number of policy matters. Some of them also publish and distribute trade journals.

³² *Ibid*, p 31.

The most widely circulated (paid circulation of about 5,000) industrial journal is *Trade and Industry*, published monthly by an independent concern in Karachi. The publishers are frequently outspoken in their criticism of the government. This journal, in its tenth year of publication, frequently brings out special issues on specific industries that are of great value for the statistical information they contain. It provides a good forum for the presentation of the industrial viewpoint. Occasionally the editors circulate drafts of their articles to industrial organizations for comment.

The daily press contains few references to the problems of industrialists or to their viewpoints. Reports of the proceedings of annual meetings are recorded in the press. The *Dacca Observer* and the *Morning News* maintain columns for news from the Dacca Chamber. However, an examination of these newspapers over a six-month period and discussions with the Dacca Chamber staff revealed that only five releases were given to the press. These were only notices of meeting dates, not policy statements.

Participation of industrialists within the administrative process has been minimal. Institutions for such participation exist, but neither the industrialists nor the administration has been willing or able to use them effectively. Their existence has not altered the fact that the administration fails to share the policy-making process with others. Myron Weiner has noted that this "failure to share" is common to the three major governments of the subcontinent, Pakistan, India, and Ceylon:

If one takes the narrow theoretical position that government's economic policy [for example] is simply the reflection of diverse interests being articulated and aggregated by the ruling party and government, it would be impossible to understand the policies of South Asian governments. Businessmen do have some effect on commercial legislation, and industrialists do have some effect on industrial policy and taxation, landlords do have some effect on agrarian legislation, and unions do have some effect on industrial relations legislation and wage policy. But the major development programs of the three countries while they have been influenced by organized interests, seem to be conceived almost independently of these interests.³³

³³ Myron Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia," in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 212. On the problems of labor in Pakistan see Sidney C. Sufrin, *Unions in Emerging Societies* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964).

More effective use of the procedures for nongovernmental participation could make a significant contribution both to the internal efficiency of the administrative process and to the development of responsible government. What steps might be taken to expand this participation?

EXPANSION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION

The expansion of participation in policy-making will, at least in the short run, have to take place within the administrative structure itself. For it will take many years (and perhaps some constitutional revision) before the elected assemblies can effectively participate in this process. The courts, of course, participate in policy-making today, at least indirectly, but given the nature of the judicial process, one could not expect their role to expand greatly.

Responsibility for the development of procedures which would strengthen "outside" participation in the governmental process rests primarily with the administration. Currently, there are no "outside" groups, official or unofficial, which could successfully force the administration to share its policy-making functions. Henry F. Goodnow, in a recently published study of the Civil Service of Pakistan, has argued that the bureaucracy must demonstrate its willingness to bring nongovernmental interests into the governmental process. At the same time he recognized the enormity of this task by referring to the long tradition of bureaucratic supremacy on the subcontinent:

The bureaucratic elites in Pakistan have been able to dominate all institutions of government by a strict centralization of power largely inherited from the days of British rule. Important decisions involving the use of force or the allocation of financial resources have been made by civil or military officers in the highest echelons of the central government.

If democracy is to be realized a devolution of governmental power is necessary³⁴

A highly centralized decision-making structure not only retards the growth of democratic institutions but also fails to provide the administrative machinery necessary for effective development programs. Goodnow points to this problem when he writes:

³⁴ Henry Frank Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1964), p. 276

A major breakthrough in development, however, will necessitate the making of decisions on a massive scale by tens of thousands of persons operating independently—persons who do not have to wait for approval from a central hierarchy and who have no fear that their decisions may be overruled by fiat. The more energetic, intelligent, and imaginative individuals must be free to initiate, organize, criticize, or experiment ³⁵

The absence of effective interest organizations is, of course, a major obstacle to sharing the policy-making function. The reorganization of the chambers and trade associations in 1958 was an indication of the administration's willingness to take some important steps toward broadening the base of participation. Industrialists' response to the reorganization has not been particularly gratifying. More needs to be done to encourage the participation of outside groups like industrialists. Participation in policy-making could be increased by expanding the use of advisory councils and by developing a series of administrative procedures which would permit and encourage participation in rule-making.

Advisory councils could be used more frequently and more effectively. The introduction of formal hearing techniques, including advance publication of agendas, expert testimony, cross-examination, and public record, could significantly expand their usefulness. Dr. Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, Economic Adviser to the Government of Pakistan, noted in an interview that the formal hearing procedures used by committees of the United States Congress would be helpful in strengthening the communication between industrialists and the government. The weakness of the elected assemblies in Pakistan limits the usefulness of such techniques in those bodies at the present time, but similar hearing procedures could be used in an expanded advisory council system.

Rule-making procedures are also in need of reform. Administrative rule-making is an important, indeed fundamental, component of policy formulation in any country and especially in Pakistan. It was noted above that no guidelines for public participation in rule-making have been set forth since the General Clauses Act of 1893, and those were quite vague. New procedures incorporating elements of administrative due process should be adopted to allow

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 289.

interested parties to participate in the drafting of rules. To facilitate this kind of participation, a committee or an advisory council might concern itself exclusively with rule-making. This could serve as an important stimulant to the growth of the advisory council system in addition to encouraging participation in rule-making.

The widespread respect for and understanding of judicial procedures could be capitalized upon to extend existing procedures for review of administrative decisions. A few years ago, the Supreme Court showed considerable interest in the establishment of a system of administrative courts similar to those under the *Conseil d'Etat* in France. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, A. R. Cornelius, has consistently supported the idea. His concern with the problem of limiting the discretionary powers of administrators has been expressed in journal articles, the press, and in some of his decisions. In a speech before the Lahore Rotary Club, he said:

To talk of equality before the law when the written law leaves such vast areas of discretionary action within the exclusive control of the executive is idle if you have no other means of control than the courts as at present constituted. The greatest inequalities can be practiced within the written words of law, and so long as those words are satisfied the courts of the land will be helpless to correct those inequalities³⁶

At a later date the Chief Justice made a direct appeal for the establishment of administrative courts in Pakistan. A rather lengthy *obiter dictum* on the subject contained the following:

Here, I may diverge a little from the main discussion to express regret that in our country there is no procedure similar to that of the French Administrative Law which with variations appears to be in operation over the whole of Europe with the exception of the United Kingdom. . . . In our law, apart from departmental appeals . . . the judicial remedy lies only with the prerogative writs. . . . The procedure . . . is cumbersome and lengthy.³⁷

A series of articles on this subject appeared in the *Pakistan Times*, and the Constitutional Commission considered the feasibility of instituting such a system through the 1962 Constitution. However, in its report the Commission states, "It is not practicable to introduce this system here at present."³⁸

³⁶ Quoted by Nasim Hasen Shah, "Concept of Administrative Law—I," *Pakistan Times*, January 18, 1961.

³⁷ *Faridsons Ltd v Government of Pakistan*, PLD (1961) SC 371

³⁸ Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Constitutional Commission* (Karachi, 1961), p. 97.

Introduction of such a system at the present time might be premature. A system of administrative courts would place severe demands on the limited administrative and judicial resources of the nation. Legislation prescribing procedures for internal review of administrative decisions could, however, be adopted. Hearing officers should be expected to follow the decisions of the courts on the subject of appeals and other procedural requirements. These judicial decisions are largely unknown to administrators. They are scattered through a number of cases and have not been brought together. A handbook of hearing procedures would be a first step to which the government could commit itself in improving and expanding the use of appeals procedures.

These devices for the expansion of nonbureaucratic participation in the governmental process are patterned after those used in the West, but they are not new to Pakistan. Most of them have been used on the subcontinent (to some extent) for a number of years. Both administrators and leaders of such groups as industrialists are familiar with them and show unusual faith in their efficacy. The difficulties of acculturation would probably be minimal for this reason. Of course some adjustments would have to be made, but it would not take a major educational effort.

The strength of the bureaucracy could be used to good advantage in experimenting with new techniques for nonbureaucratic participation. These techniques could of course be largely indigenous, founded on the nation's heritage of forceful administrative leadership. It is important for the student of government in Pakistan to approach the bureaucracy with full knowledge of its extremely important role in the governmental process. For only then does one become fully aware of the necessity for developing *administrative procedures* which facilitate the growth of responsible government. This kind of administrative reform is not alien to but essentially complementary to the development of "practicable" schemes aimed solely at improving the efficiency or effectiveness of the administrative process. R. C. Dutt has noted the practical value of nonbureaucratic participation:

The practical importance of . . . consultation . . . lies first, in the various parts of the Government machinery being made more directly responsive to the feelings, the opinions and even the prejudices of the people concerned . . . Secondly and perhaps more important than the first, is the fact that consultation with representative bodies creates a feeling of association between the administra-

tion and the interests which are consulted. This is a matter of utmost importance, for no Government, and much less a democratic government, can function unless there is a general consciousness that the various administrative measures adopted . . . are not only for the good of the people for whom they are meant, but also in response to their expressed desires and wishes.³⁹

Relieving the bureaucracy of part of its policy-making burden not only creates more responsible government but also allows the bureaucracy to devote itself more fully to administrative functions. In this sense, there is a close relationship between administrative efficiency and the development of responsible self-government.

³⁹ R C Dutt, "Hearing and Consultation Procedure in Public Administration," *Indian Journal of Public Administration* IV (1958), 290

IV. Agriculture: Administration and the Search for Expanded Productivity

Perhaps the major paradox of this half of the twentieth century is that Western farmers are producing crop surpluses, while starvation constantly threatens more than half of the world's people. The advanced knowledge and techniques that have worked so well in the West have not been employed in like manner nor with the same intensity in the developing nations. There millions of farmers cultivate their fields in biblical fashion, oblivious to the existence of ways for multiplying food production many times. Transforming scientific knowledge into *tortillas* or *chapatis* is not primarily a scientific matter. It is a complex of human problems, and a workable solution for inadequate harvests seems to continue to elude scientists and administrators alike. Meanwhile the population keeps on growing and consuming any progress that may be made.

This essay examines the problems that have been encountered in the effort to plan and effect increased agricultural productivity in Pakistan. If that nation is to develop, it must develop agriculturally. Agriculture provides employment for more than 75 per cent of the labor force and provides much of the foreign exchange. Already Pakistan ranks first in the world in jute production and stands high in rice, cotton, and wheat output. Only 63 million of 234 million acres are under cultivation, but this is still the ninth largest nation in terms of arable land. Further, it contains more than 12 per cent of the world's irrigated soil.

Attempts at land reform have followed different patterns in the two provinces. In the East, occupancy rights for cultivators were guaranteed in 1885, and in 1951 a State Acquisition and Tenancy

Act authorized the state to acquire all rent-receiving interests. Thus the cultivators became "tenants" of the state rather than of the *zamindars* who had formerly collected the rent. The Act also limited individual holdings to about 33 acres in most cases, a ceiling later raised to 125 acres. The 1960 Agricultural Census determined that fewer than 3 per cent of the cultivator holdings were solely renters, but much of the land is mortgaged. Many farmers now own three acres where their fathers owned five.

Land reform was introduced in West Pakistan in 1959 by the martial law regime. Ceilings of 500 and 1,000 acres were placed on irrigated and nonirrigated holdings, and the government resumed all excess land with exceptions such as orchards and livestock farms. Tenants who had farmed the same plot for three years were given security of tenure. Only a slight shift in ownership has resulted, however. By 1965 about 2.2 million acres had been resumed, and not all of this was under cultivation. The new regulations have spurred attention to oranges and other crops in short supply, have forced some land to be farmed, and have encouraged landlords to pay more attention to the plight of their tenants. Of course, where it divides a holding into plots too small for mechanized agriculture, land reform may adversely affect total production. Evidence that these measures have fragmented potential commercial-type farms is lacking, however. The Third Five-Year Plan calls for studies to be made in both wings to evaluate the effects of land reforms.

Among the many characteristics of Pakistan's agriculture that might be mentioned here, three are especially troublesome: (1) small, fragmented land holdings; (2) low per-acre yields; and (3) declining per capita production. This last condition of course arises in great part from the fact that Pakistan's agriculture must feed a rapidly growing citizenry. Estimates of recent population are in excess of 110 million, and projections for 1980 are in the neighborhood of 150 million. For Pakistan, as for so many developing countries, the problem is too many people and not enough food. With little foreign exchange for importing food, an increased standard of living appears to be contingent on agricultural growth within the country.

Essentially, the technical means of solving this problem include: (1) cultivation of new land, (2) expanded irrigation, (3) research,

and (4) improved farm management and practices. Between merely stating these techniques, however, and applying them on the soil of Pakistan lies a seemingly unbridgeable chasm. As to the first means, prospects for increasing food production through creation of new farming areas have not been very encouraging. East Pakistan is fast approaching maximum expansion of cultivable area. In West Pakistan the new Ghulam Mohammed and Gudu Barrages with other, smaller projects are opening up great tracts which may become productive. One is reminded by the Paddock brothers, however, that, "If a piece of land anywhere on this globe of ours is today sparsely settled there is a reason for it. The reason: even hungry people can feed themselves better somewhere else."¹

Continued improvement of the vast Indus Basin irrigation network is providing also for more dependable water supplies on old farm land. More water and better drainage are also deriving from the wells that private and public agencies are sinking at a rapid rate, especially in the Punjab. Salinity control and reclamation projects with American aid seem to be progressing well. In East Pakistan, however, massive irrigation schemes such as the Ganges-Kobadak Project have been characterized more by failure than by success. Nevertheless, the use of pump irrigation to grow three or four crops where only one or two are now raised during the monsoon season offers an impressive promise for the future.

The third and fourth means of attacking this productivity problem go together, and indeed offer a potential of the greatest magnitude. By research and development, better seed varieties, more useful fertilizer, improved farm management, better cultivation methods and equipment can be originated. Once these "tools" are in hand, however, it still remains to secure their adoption by farmers, large and small.

The challenge implicit in the last two means is to bridge the gap between technical knowledge and farming practices. This gives the government a problem far different from doubling steel output, constructing roads, or establishing universities. In those cases the physical structures can be erected and operated once men and money are mobilized. In agriculture, however, trained scientists and funds alone will never provide the new framework with which

¹ William and Paul Paddock, *Hungry Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), p. 25.

to begin. The framework can only be the hundreds of thousands of farms and farmers, and the vast majority of them must participate if any drive for more food and fiber is to be successful.

The combined efforts of men, institutions, and public and private money devoted to agriculture since 1947 have not been without impact. The Harvard University advisory team to the Pakistan Planning Commission noted in its 1964 report that "after many years of stagnation and frustration, output of a number of basic crops is increasing at quite spectacular rates. While weather undoubtedly plays a part and while final judgment must be postponed for a number of years to allow for the effects of a weather cycle, there is reason to believe that a breakthrough has occurred"² Sugar cane, rice in East Pakistan, and cotton in West Pakistan are the crops that have registered unusual yields. Increased acreage and additional fertilizer are in part responsible for the gains in sugar cane while fertilizer, better seed, and additional water, mostly from private wells, appear to be factors in expanded cotton harvests. The report notes that reasons for the record rice crop are not clear, but that an important element may be improved drainage resulting from the public works program described later in this chapter. Wheat research findings have stepped up productivity in parts of West Pakistan, as have Mexican experts in wheat culture, who are newly arrived there.

BARRIERS TO CHANGE

The experience in Pakistan suggests that the basic obstacles separating farmers from more productive agriculture are mainly beyond the reach of traditional ideas and administrative devices, such as "agricultural extension," that have been developed in the West. These obstacles or barriers are to be found in four components of the society in which the farmer lives. The *first* is in the system for providing capital, the capital necessary for purchasing seeds, machinery, and new land and for improving or adding irrigation facilities. The *second* barrier is in the marketing system through which the farmer seeks maximum value for his crop but more likely

² Excerpts from "Planning in Pakistan" (April 1963-June 1964), A Progress Report of the Development Advisory Service, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, to the Government of Pakistan, the Ford Foundation and the Agency for International Development (July, 1964), p. 5.

receives only a small portion of its worth. A large profit goes to middlemen who control the marketing and often the credit system.

The *third* obstacle is in the nature of the structure for providing education to the farmer and his children. In essence, of course, education constitutes the basis for any successful program to induce change. And if the end is revolutionary in scope, education must do more than simply furnish trained agricultural agents to work with a few farmers. Myriad contacts beginning in village schools are needed to provide farmers with the knowledge to compete in what is an increasingly technical world, even for Pakistani villagers. Training—of technicians, people to work with the cultivators, research personnel, cooperative experts, and men to create and administer nationwide irrigation and land improvement programs—constitutes another responsibility of the educational organization. Some caution in these endeavors is necessary, however, because an educational system that stimulated excessive numbers of rural young people to move to cities seeking nonexistent work would be a disastrous by-product of agricultural development.

The *fourth* and final roadblock to development is in the general governmental structure surrounding the farmer, a bureaucracy embracing not only agricultural projects but all of the other points of contact between government and the farmer. Deputy commissioners, subdivisional officers, and their subordinates personify "government" to Pakistani villagers. They constitute the line of authority and the possibility of assistance in time of need. Traditionally, such officers have held themselves aloof from development programs, limiting their activities to law, order, and taxes. Consequently, the strongest arm of government has not been involved in the subject most important to rural areas—agriculture. The career service system in Pakistan also discriminates against the agricultural expert, relegating him to a position of less authority and prestige than the generalist administrator.

That subprovincial units of government should participate in agricultural development in Pakistan has been written into law and regulation—among others, the Basic Democracies Order of 1959. Nevertheless, the exact role the various councils should play is still undetermined.³ In one sense, they have their hands full with im-

³ The Basic Democracies system for local administration establishing a tier of local councils to function as an electoral college and as units of limited self-government was introduced by President Ayub in 1959 and is

mediate problems of roads, health services, and education, and lack either the finances or the expertise to make more than a token contribution to agricultural development. It is indeed possible that agricultural development may have more to offer local government than the reverse. A growing, expanding agriculture may emerge in Pakistan quite separate from these subordinate units of government, and the latter may in turn be the recipients of a new and vital impetus from that very agriculture.

General cultural patterns have not been listed here as barriers to the search for a more productive agriculture. Yet any change will dip deeply into the culture. Rural people in Pakistan, as elsewhere, exhibit a strong preference for the habits of their fathers and grandfathers, and respect for convention is reinforced by a host of cultural or social traits. The farmers speak languages that are ill suited to the discussion of Western farming methods. Higher education and research in Pakistan usually involve English, a language completely foreign to cultivators and many agricultural technicians as well.⁴

A final instance of this cultural point lies in the heavy dependence on irrigation. Karl A. Wittfogel distinguishes Asian farming economy from Western in terms of hydro-agriculture (the small-scale irrigation farming representative of the United States) and hydraulic agriculture (large-scale and government-managed works of irrigation and flood control typical of Asia). He contends that "the characteristics of hydraulic economy are many, but three are paramount. Hydraulic agriculture involves a specific type of division of labor. It intensifies cultivation. And it necessitates cooperation on a large scale."⁵ The success of the current public works program in Pakistan supports Wittfogel's observation. Based on a division of labor and large-scale cooperation, the works program has success-

the subject of Chapter II. For a description with special reference to rural development, see Richard O. Niehoff, "Basic Democracies and Rural Development," in Inayatullah, ed., *Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan* (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development [PARDA], 1963), pp. 299-325.

⁴ On this point, see Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 64-65.

⁵ Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 22.

fully involved entire communities in efforts to improve the infrastructure of rural areas. Such an approach is fundamentally different from the emphasis on the role of individuals found in the Western concept of agricultural extension. Success may well be a reflection of an important characteristic of Asian culture that should be built into development programs.

Summarizing, "there is now rather general agreement that the technological possibilities for increasing food output in the low-income areas are good."⁶ Most of these solutions, however, relate to problems of insects, low soil fertility, crop selection, cultivation, and machinery use. Answers for farm fragmentation, control of villagers by money lenders, marketing assistance, credit, and a host of other human problems that stand in the way of application of technical knowledge are still in the experimental stage. The challenge to administrators is to surmount them and bring the know-how of modern technology into village and field.

SEEKING ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

A number of ideas for stimulating food production have been tried in Pakistan, including American extension ideas, "business methods," and organizational permutations and combinations. With such devices the traditional service and educational agencies might adequately minister to the needs of farmers, if they were operating within the framework of a more advanced agricultural community. As in other countries, however, Pakistan's leaders hope in all facets of development to compress into a few years changes that elsewhere have evolved over a long period of time. The effort involves breaking virgin sod.

The devices and ideas heretofore introduced have often appeared to superimpose on Pakistan agriculture programs that have succeeded in countries resembling Pakistan very little if at all. There is no widely accepted theory of agricultural development to provide clear principles or guidelines to follow. Other nations—Mexico,⁷

⁶ D. Gale Johnson, "The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development," in M. Clawson, ed., *Natural Resources and International Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 23.

⁷ For a more detailed account of Pakistan's agricultural programs plus a comparison with those of Mexico, see my "Administration and Agricultural Development in Mexico and Pakistan" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, 1962).

USSR—have experienced major agricultural gains, but their experiences have received too little attention in comparison with studies of or even slight acquaintance with agricultural development in Europe and the United States. In 1964 and 1965 top Pakistani officials also were paying close attention to China's agricultural development programs.

In recent times concern with agricultural problems has fluctuated among general rural development, raising productivity, several versions of extension ideas, and initiating the decision process at the village level. In the remainder of this chapter the major direct attempts at stimulating the agricultural sector are examined briefly, in organizational and functional terms. Space limitations do not permit a review of all the stratagems used by agricultural administrators in Pakistan. Hence tariffs, government purchasing practices, allocation of foreign exchange, and price controls, among other factors, are excluded from analysis.

Departments of Agriculture

Following partition, Pakistan left responsibility for agriculture in the provincial departments, although the central government has retained a strong interest in the subject. In each wing a secretary is responsible for the cluster of agricultural programs, but because there is a breakdown below him into attached departments or directorates—agronomy, forestry, animal husbandry, and others—programs still seem highly compartmentalized in day-by-day administration.

Pakistan also inherited the traditional British and American approach that is based on the assumption farmers would "progress" if agricultural specialists advise them how to do so. The departments therefore emphasized extension services, and in addition tried to supply seed, fertilizer, insecticides, and equipment. This approach, however, which has been so reverently imported by foreign experts into country after country, has not met expectations. Several reasons for this condition have been suggested. First, the basic philosophy underlying extension derives from experience in advanced countries. Modeled after the American county agent, the agricultural specialists have worked primarily with the most advanced farmers. Whether ideas demonstrated to the large land-owners will "trickle down" to the small farmers is questionable.

This is important because in Pakistan the few wealthy farmers are not responsible for a great share of production, as is the case in the United States.

A second explanation for the lack of success of the extension approach comes from the overwhelming problems of implementation in Pakistan. The agriculture departments have been unable to attract and hold a sufficient number of trained agricultural specialists. Young university graduates enter the provincial agricultural services on the district level and work up. Prestige and good pay are gained only at higher echelons, and there is little if any incentive for trained agriculturalists to make careers of working directly with farmers. Following the general pattern of administration in Pakistan, the system is highly structured, leaving few decisions to the field. Charles M. Hardin comments that, in Pakistan "agricultural administration consists in A telling B, who tells C who tells D who tells the farmer."⁸

The front line, those men who work with the farmer, represents the weakest link in the hierarchy. Formed in 1959 to examine the causes for food shortages, the Food and Agriculture Commission reported:

These then are the front line staff upon whom the nation depends for its vital contact with farmers, in East Pakistan it approaches in numbers the minimum requirement for such work, but it lacks the knowledge and the facilities to do the job; in West Pakistan the staff is too small to make any impact and, although more knowledgeable, is equally without the facilities to make any real contact with the farmers. At the most they can be little more than demonstrators and, for a cadre required to inspire an agricultural revolution, the enthusiasm of the majority of them is further tempered by the knowledge that they have little hope of promotion to senior posts because of their lack of professional qualifications.⁹

The Food and Agricultural Commission aptly summed up the problems faced by the departments of agriculture:

In such circumstances, it is not surprising that almost universally in our tours of the country farmers complained that they never saw

⁸ Charles M. Hardin, "Agricultural Administration in Pakistan," Government of Pakistan, Report to the Food and Agriculture Commission (December 22, 1959), p. 19 (Mimeo.)

⁹ Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Food and Agriculture Commission* (Karachi, 1960), p. 155.

the agricultural extension staff or when they saw them had no great confidence in their ability to be of much service. In point of fact, quite apart from their insufficient numbers, inadequate knowledge and poor status in terms of pay and facilities, their ability to be of service, even for the "five firsts," is dependent on the availability of good quality fertilizer, seed and plant protection materials in stores near enough to the farmer to induce him to use them. It is also dependent on the existence of an effective supply line to such stores which free the front line men to spend their days where they ought to—in the farmers' fields. At present, neither of these conditions exists.¹⁰

Rather than giving the agriculture departments tools to cope with such difficulties, the Commission recommended a substantial reduction in their functions. But despite the creation and support of other agencies as vehicles for development, the agriculture departments have continued and expanded their extension work. In the sixties new life and direction have been injected into it in several experimental areas. For example, in Mymensingh District in East Pakistan, where the new agricultural university is located, a profitable relationship between government agricultural workers and farmers has been developed. The approach includes training both extension personnel and cultivators plus organization of the rural community. Measurable increases in production have followed.¹¹

The V-AID Experiment

The Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program (V-AID) from 1952 to 1961 was Pakistan's version of the community development philosophy. Many people around the world indeed still consider "community development" as the best approach to rural reconstruction. In Pakistan the approach combined the idea of extension with that of self-help. The village worker (VAW) was conceived as the implementing force for programs evolved in the secretariats, and he relied on the departments for technical backstopping while he attempted to stimulate self-development. Representatives from other departments were not supposed to work directly in the villages.

¹⁰ *Loc cit*

¹¹ For a description of this experiment, see Ben R. Ferguson, "Technical Report. A Report of the Operation of a New Extension System for East Pakistan" (Mymensingh, July 8, 1963). (Mimeo)

V-AID operated through development areas with a population of about 100,000, stationing 23 to 30 VAWs in each to assist villagers in organizing councils; building roads, wells, and schools; vaccinating livestock; and adopting improved farming practices. Expanding rapidly, the program comprised eleven training centers and 5,000 field workers by 1961.¹² Staff *esprit de corps* was high, and all employees were proud of the democratic spirit they had introduced into an administration traditionally somewhat authoritarian:

The VAW is unique among all government employees, he is not an "officer." Rather he is a "worker"—a servant of the people. He has no regulatory or enforcement powers over the villager and can not so much as command lodging for himself.¹³

In the central government, which was providing 75 per cent of the funds (including U. S. public and private aid), V-AID was at the peak of its popularity as the ultimate solution for rural development in the late 1950's. Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, writing to the chief ministers of both provinces in October, 1955, commented, "It would be useful to impress on the heads of Departments concerned that their work will be judged to a large extent by their contribution to the success of Village AID."¹⁴

On provincial levels, however, much of the support existed only on paper. V-AID was never given recognition as a professional program and was constantly shifted among departments. Departmental lines in Pakistan are, if anything, more jealously guarded than in the United States, and the departments of agriculture evidenced an early dislike for V-AID. They were never willing to accept an arrangement whereby they would relinquish contacts with farmers and withdraw to a support position. Agriculture, they argued, was necessarily the major concern in rural areas, and money spent on reinforcing their entire extension arm would produce better results.

¹² See John J. Honigmann, "Economic Development and Cultural Change: A Case Study of Community Development in Pakistan," Reading Paper No. 26, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, p. 10. (Mimeo.)

¹³ James W. Green, *Rural Community Development in Pakistan: The Village AID Program* (Washington, International Cooperation Administration, n.d.), p. 7. Mr. Green is the former chief V-AID adviser.

¹⁴ Cited in Government of Pakistan, *Village Aid Administration, Village Aid: Five Year Plan, 1955-56—1959-60* (Karachi, 1956), p. vi.

The program was further complicated by the fact that few people had any idea, or at any rate few had similar ideas, about what community development should be. Every new project requiring contact with village people—insect control, adult education, cottage industries—was thrust on V-AID because they alone had a cadre of trained workers in the villages. As the center became more and more interested in agricultural production, V-AID found itself increasingly involved in agriculture, often working beyond its technical competence. The leaders of V-AID, lacking political and administrative experience, found themselves in a battle without the knowledge of political infighting necessary to compete with politicians. As the program was perhaps beginning to achieve a degree of maturity, government support was withdrawn.

The Food and Agriculture Commission recommended in 1960 that V-AID withdraw completely from agriculture. V-AID officials, during what they later admitted was a period of too rapid expansion, had advanced the claim that 60 per cent of their program was devoted to agriculture. The Cabinet committee charged with determining V-AID's future decided that there was little need to retain the organization if so much of its work would be assumed by the new agricultural corporations. V-AID officials hurriedly revised their figures and stated that only 17 per cent of their program dealt *directly* with agriculture, but the damage had been done. The Governors Conference followed the recommendation of the Cabinet committee, and Village AID was terminated in 1961.

Several factors were apparently involved in that decision. Among them were withdrawal of United States technical assistance from V-AID, failure to increase production, the perhaps too rapid expansion of V-AID and the resulting tendency of workers to consider themselves technical experts in areas where they lacked competence, consistent opposition by the agricultural departments, creation of the Basic Democracies, and the inability of V-AID to understand and engage in a political fight. Together, these factors provide an interesting case study in the politics of development.¹⁵

¹⁵ The V-AID experiment is examined in Jack D. Mezirow, *Dynamics of Community Development* (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1963). See also Mezirow, "Community Development, Extension, and the Village Aid Synthesis," *Community Development Information*, II (January-February, 1961), 6-13, and Honigsmann, *op cit*.

If the concept of community development has not been rejected in Pakistan, it has at least been greatly modified. The challenge presented to the Basic Democracies¹⁶ to instill the elements of self-government in the political system and to serve as centers for a variety of development projects contains many of the same elements. Yet V-AID had little if any immediate impact on agricultural production, and a more direct approach was judged necessary. The agricultural corporations became the focus of attention in this field.

Corporations

Constituted in the fall of 1961, the two agricultural development corporations (ADCs) represent a major instance of the martial law government's decision to depend more on the corporate form than had been the case in the past. The ADC in each wing is administered by a board of four full-time directors, appointed by the governor, and an ex officio member, the Commissioner or Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The provincial government also designates one of the directors to be chairman and chief executive. Each corporation has considerably more freedom to operate than do the departments, if only because the corporations are freed from a part of the usual personnel and budgetary restrictions.¹⁷

The Food and Agriculture Commission defined the corporations' responsibilities in terms of the now-famous "five firsts" for agriculture: better seed, fertilizer, plant protection, improved cultivation techniques, and medium- and short-term credit. Thus the functions allotted to the ADCs included: (1) arranging on a commercial basis for supply of seed, fertilizer, plant protection equipment, and machinery; (2) promoting cooperative societies with the aim of eventually handing all supply activities over to them; (3) assuming management of state farms when so directed by the government; and (4) promoting the production of farm machinery. In practice the corporations have limited themselves mainly to

¹⁶ In 1961 the structure of V-AID was merged with the new Basic Democracies program. V-AID supervisors became Basic Democracies officers and many of the male VAW's were retained as secretaries to the union councils. The training institutes were transferred to agriculture or turned into training centers for Basic Democracy personnel.

¹⁷ The role of public corporations in Pakistan is treated in Chapters V and VI.

supply. They have moved into extension only in special project areas where the department representatives generally do not come, e g., in the new lands opened up by Ghulam Mohammed Barrage in the lower Sind. There they are authorized to supersede the traditional bureaucracy.

Relationships between the corporations and the departments have never been clearly sorted out, and the mere existence of the ADCs raises questions about the traditional structures. When the corporations were established, specialists in the agriculture departments resented not getting the chance to do what was assigned to the ADCs. They felt they had been frustrated in the past by time-consuming administrative procedures and by generalists above them who did not understand agriculture. Many specialists thought the corporations were only another attempt to improve agriculture by the wrong people—generalists, administrators, and the military.

The ADCs are confronted with the same set of exhausting circumstances that have plagued previous programs: small farms, poor soils, ancient farming methods, lack of credit, and lack of education. In addition, they have continuously faced the difficulty of obtaining competent professional personnel. The departments hold an almost total monopoly of experienced agricultural specialists, and they have given few indications of willingness to share this scarce resource.

Early reports indicated that the fertilizer distribution campaigns in East Pakistan and West Pakistan were unusually successful in the 1964–65 crop year. In 1966, if the war has not hindered their activities too much, the ADCs should be easier to assess. In the meantime critics are arguing that, although the corporations may deliver seed, fertilizer, and other materials better than the departments did, thus far they have nothing new to offer in inducing farmers to adopt new techniques. The government is also charged with falsely assuming that because corporations have succeeded in other fields they can succeed in agriculture. It is said that the agricultural functions at issue are not suited to the corporate form.

The cardinal question raised in this analysis probes the specific purposes of the corporations. Their history and what we know of their performance to date strongly suggest that the purpose is to increase total food output through an approach that will most benefit those farmers who already employ advanced techniques. If this is a correct analysis, the next question becomes: Is the

agricultural base in Pakistan—land tenure system and cultivation methods—such that it will respond to what is an attempt to bring about a more commercial type of agriculture? One hesitates to answer affirmatively, although the good crops in recent years may indicate a trend away from subsistence farming.

Irrigation

The next part of this picture relates to the provision of water by several agencies. Most of West Pakistan is semiarid, but the Indus and its five great tributaries provide water for what amounts to 12 per cent of all the irrigated acreage in the world. The Indus has a mean annual flow of 168 million acre-feet, all used except 60 to 70 million acre-feet that empty into the sea during the summer season. Nearly half of this runoff will be turned over to India by about 1970 as a result of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. Lack of provisions for drainage when the canal system was constructed plus poor irrigation and cultivation practices and inadequate supplies of water have resulted in a loss of hundreds of thousands of acres because of waterlogging and salinity which, in official words, "threaten the very existence of the country and the survival of its people."¹⁸

The Irrigation Department in West Pakistan has responsibility for managing the extensive network of canals and was originally charged with planning and construction of new works. Dissatisfaction with the Department, however, particularly with its efforts to construct new facilities and to combat salinity, resulted in transfer of these activities to a new West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) in 1958. A similar authority (East Pakistan WAPDA) was established for construction and operation of power and water facilities in East Pakistan.

The various parts of agricultural programs are indeed split among a variety of offices, of the traditional departmental type and of much more independent varieties. WAPDA is an example of a current trend in Pakistan that resulted largely from impatience with the inability of traditional departments to act and to provide leadership. Rather than strengthen existing agencies by removing exces-

¹⁸ West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, *Programme for Waterlogging and Salinity Control in the Irrigated Areas of West Pakistan* (Lahore, May, 1961), p. 4.

sive financial, operational, and personnel restrictions, Pakistan chose to create new agencies outside the normal governmental hierarchy. WAPDA builds water control structures, and the Irrigation Department operates and maintains them. But even semiautonomous corporations have not been able to produce magic solutions to pressing problems of low productivity.

Agricultural Credit

Pakistan farmers, like those elsewhere in the world, require credit each year for operating expenses, capital improvement, and often for family needs. Although accurate information is not available, the Agricultural Development Bank estimated in 1961 that the yearly demand for credit was about three billion rupees.¹⁹ Government credit programs are able to furnish less than 20 per cent of this demand, and commercial banks do not usually lend for such purposes. Consequently, the major sources of agricultural credit in most localities are a variety of noninstitutional elements—money-lenders, landlords, commission agents, and friends and relatives. Interest charged by these sources is often excessively high, and marketing freedom is severely restricted by such arrangements.

Few farmers are able to save, and their capacity for capital formation is low, a fact that constantly works against plans for agricultural development. At the same time, the capacity for savings is present in the form of repayment of continual debt. Thus the potential exists to free cultivators from money-lenders if they can be provided with a means (perhaps through cooperative organization) to furnish their own capital base. This possibility has become a major element in the program for agricultural development being designed at the East Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, described below. A functioning credit program remains as a major development need. The Agricultural Development Bank and the majority of cooperative organizations have scarcely fulfilled the need.

¹⁹ S. H. Moinuddin, "Agricultural Credit in Pakistan: Role Played by the Agricultural Development Bank" (Lahore: Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, October, 1961), p. 3 (Mimeo). This Bank was created in 1960 by merger of the Agricultural Development Finance Corporation with the Agricultural Bank of Pakistan. It has about 120 pay offices to cover the approximately 100,000 villages of Pakistan.

Cooperatives

Pakistan has had almost a half century of experience with co-operatives, and provincial departments establish and service them. No evidence, however, suggests that the cooperative movement has been successful on a large scale. The situation was recognized in the *Third Five-Year Plan*. "Some of the main reasons for the inadequate and uneven growth of co-operative movement in Pakistan have been the lack of general and special education among the people in the co-operative movement"²⁰ Credit cooperatives are supposed to receive special attention during the Third Plan period under a basic policy of linking credit with marketing. The experience from cooperative farming societies in the Montgomery and Multan districts will be used to start new societies in other areas, and cooperative colleges are being strengthened in each wing.

The record of the past fifty years indicates that farmers will not inaugurate viable cooperatives merely on the suggestion of the government. Rather, the essential climate must be created in the villages and carefully nourished by a complete administrative program, as is the case in the Comilla projects described later in this chapter. Unfortunately again, Western experience in agricultural development does not provide a model for successful cooperatives among farmers with such limited means and education.

Education

The tasks confronting institutions of elementary and secondary education have already been noted. The rural people must have a further degree of general knowledge. They do not need motivation to leave the village for employment in cities, but rather motivation and know-how to work toward development of their own sphere. The bridge between farmers and scientific agriculture can best be accomplished by erecting spans from both sides. The extension approach has not found an environment conducive to new ideas, and thus building from the village has been discouragingly slow. Farmers who understand the services government programs make available will probably use the services. The unique feature of the experiments at the Academy for Rural Development in East Pak-

²⁰ Government of Pakistan, *The Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70)*, May, 1965, p. 438.

istan, described below, is that they are designed to inculcate new skills, meanings, and values in the villager so that he can profit from technical assistance and other advantages.

As to higher educational institutions, they must provide graduates and holders of advanced degrees to serve as specialists for departments and corporations, teachers, researchers, and in some cases even managers of large private farms. Such centers also may serve as centers for in-service training. Thus it is significant that recently new agricultural universities in each wing have substantially augmented Pakistan's resources in higher education. Established at Lyallpur and Mymensingh, the two universities bear a strong resemblance to American land-grant colleges, reflecting the impact of American advisers.

The strengthening of higher education will delineate even more sharply a problem of organization and substance that faces administrators: management and coordination of education, research, and extension. Agricultural research, for example, has long been characterized by inadequate planning, coordination, and funds. Today there is agreement that it must be greatly expanded and must be related to the practical aspects of agriculture, and there agreement ends. Both provincial governments support a network of research stations, and research is increasing in the colleges and universities.

The 1959 Food and Agriculture Commission thought the national government should supply most research funds and recommended establishment of a research institution in the central Ministry of Food and Agriculture.²¹ They asked for policy to be determined by an agricultural research council, and for the central government to undertake all long-range or basic research. Under this plan provincial departments would be responsible for "research problems focusing primarily on the immediate need to increase agricultural production." Pakistan agriculturalists tend to agree that this is not a real distinction, but they welcome the coordination and finance that such a program could introduce. Although the research council was formed in the center, research is still a provincial matter. The division between research in the departments and in the new agricultural universities is a coordination problem at only a slightly lower level that is also yet to be clarified.

²¹ *Op cit.*, pp 265-73.

The evolving relationship between research and extension also concerns all educational levels as well as agricultural administrators. Research results have customarily come to departmental attention through numerous formal and informal arrangements, have been accepted as policy and fed into action programs, and then transmitted through extension facilities to the user. The current reshuffling of assignments, however, may eventually split research, education, and extension among different secretariat departments and agencies. Those who feel that the three factors are essentially inter-related argue that research, education, and extension are being isolated in an unrealistic fashion and that essential interweaving of the three will be difficult to maintain.

Meanwhile, agricultural experts both Pakistani and foreign constantly note the potential contribution of agricultural research. Rice yields in East Pakistan, for example, are less than half those in Japan or Taiwan. It is not surprising, therefore, that Dr. A. Colin McClung of the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines noted in 1965 that there has been no significant rice-breeding research in East Pakistan since 1940. At the same time he was confident that an accelerated program in cooperation with the International Rice Research Institute could boost production by 50 per cent in perhaps five years ²²

Academies for Rural Development

Academies for Rural Development were established at Peshawar and Comilla in 1959. They were designed as laboratories to research rural and agricultural problems, assisted by Michigan State University with Ford Foundation support. They were also to be training agencies to acquaint public officials with new ideas and practices. Organizationally, they report to the Departments of Local Government and Basic Democracies in each wing today.

The content and direction of the programs evolving in the two institutions are significantly diverse, reflecting the differences between East and West Pakistan as well as their different physical settings. The Peshawar Academy is located in a university community on the edge of a city, far from the "bread basket" of West

²² "Accelerated Rice Research Program for East Pakistan in Cooperation with the International Rice Research Institute" (Dacca, May, 1965). (Mimeo)

Pakistan, while the Comilla Academy is situated in a much smaller city in the heart of rural East Pakistan. Basic to both, however, are three kinds of activities: training, research and evaluation, and extension and demonstration. Each year special courses are provided for thousands of people ranging from government officials to American Peace Corps Volunteers. Research and maintenance of elaborate records have been stressed from the beginning, and the result is an impressive and useful list of studies and evaluation reports.²³ Experimental activities under way at both locations have included organization of cooperatives, education of villagers, and rural administration.

The "Comilla approach" is a far-reaching attempt to find and introduce a new system for complete reconstruction of rural life that has resulted from the initial years of experimentation at that institution. Under the leadership of Akhter Hameed Khan, the Academy has uniquely defined its responsibilities.²⁴ Beginning with a conviction that traditional administration of rural development has failed, the Comilla staff launched an experiment that builds from the village "up" rather than from governmental departments "down." As Richard Dickinson states, "The distinctive programmatic feature of the Comilla project is that it is centered *in* the village, uses *existing* village leadership, and *keeps* the leaders in the village."²⁵

In one sense the Comilla approach follows the V-AID concept of meeting "felt needs," but a significant difference also exists. The Comilla formula concentrates almost exclusively on solving problems that have a direct bearing on the economic well-being of the villager. Agriculture in East Pakistan, according to this model, needs the following: (1) an effective village organization through

²³ A complete bibliography of publications and items pertaining to both academies is available. Edgar A. Schuler and Raghu Singh, *The Pakistan Academies for Rural Development, Comilla and Peshawar 1959-1964, A Bibliography* (East Lansing: Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1965).

²⁴ Akhter Hameed Khan received the Filipino Magsaysay Award in 1963 for "his inspiring personal commitment of experience and energy to scientific testing and application of a workable formula for rural emancipation among his people." He has served as Director of the Academy from its inception, with the exception of a brief interlude in 1964.

²⁵ Richard Dickinson, "Villages on the Move," *Pakistan Quarterly*, XII (Summer, 1964), 25.

which training and investment programs can operate, (2) a program of supervised savings and credit, (3) a storage and marketing system that will permit farmers to receive the full price of the market, (4) an irrigation system to support year-round cultivation, (5) a flood control system (where possible), (6) mechanization through the use of electric and diesel power, and (7) the introduction of more efficient methods, ideas, skills, and materials. The Comilla experiment suggests that simply providing farmers with better seeds and fertilizers or new methods of cultivation will not result in a significant increase in output unless coupled with solutions to more basic problems. Given the fragmented, two-acre farms of East Pakistan, cooperatives are held to be the only institutions that can provide a workable village organization, capital for purchasing pumps and tractors, and a way to obtain a fair price for each farmer's crop ²⁶

The village is recognized as the primary area in the cooperative structure. It is the logical social unit, but it constitutes too small an economic base to be a satisfactory business unit. To gain a larger base, the business cooperatives and the nucleus for all activities were located at the thana headquarters.²⁷ A Thana Training and Development Center was formed to encompass a variety of government specialists, including those normally assigned at the thana level; experimental plots and farms; headquarters for cooperatives; offices for the thana council of the Basic Democracies system; and facilities to disseminate a wide range of information

The key to the Thana Center idea is perhaps just the opposite of the old county agent approach. Instead of sending experts to talk and work with individual farmers or groups, the farmers are

²⁶ Early stages of the Comilla experiment are covered by H. W. Fairchild and Shamsul Haq, "Cooperatives vs Commune," in G. Hambidge, ed., *Dynamics of Development* (New York, 1964), pp. 312-34. The cooperative movement has had a long history in both wings of Pakistan, apart from this Comilla development. The experience of 50 years seems to indicate cooperatives will succeed only when the climate for them in the villages is nurtured by a complete administrative program.

²⁷ East Pakistan is divided into 4,285 unions, 411 thanas, 17 districts, and four divisions for administrative purposes. The thana is the lowest level for assignment of most government officers and historically represented the area of one police station. At present the average thana contains more than 100 villages and about 140,000 people in an area of approximately 140 square miles.

brought to the Center. The Development Center program, as it has evolved at Comilla, is based upon the idea of organizing cooperative societies among the villagers. They elect their own "organizer," the individual they trust to carry their small savings to be deposited at the Thana Center. This man then becomes the link between Center instruction about improved agricultural practices and the other farmers. Each week as he brings in the savings he attends sessions designed to improve his skills. When he goes home he conveys this information to his neighbors. The Thana Center is also the focal point for "model farmers," representatives of women's groups, religious leaders, teachers, union and thana council members, and other villagers. At Comilla, the Thana Training and Development Center concept has effectively demonstrated its ability to improve the economic status of farmers.²⁸

The Comilla Academy also experimented with an idea that has matured into a national public works program designed to infuse capital into country areas, provide off-season employment for agricultural workers, and build roads, canals, and embankments—the rural infrastructure so essential for development. Inaugurated on an experimental basis in 1961, the "Works Programme" has been expanded throughout both East and West Pakistan. Villagers are paid in cash and wheat (financed by Public Law 480 counterpart funds) and grain, at a cost of Rs. 800 million from 1962 to 1965. An expenditure of Rs. 2.5 billion is contemplated during the Third Plan period, with Rs. one billion from counterpart funds and the rest from Pakistan's own resources. East Pakistan farmers, who are rice eaters, at first resisted partial payment in wheat, but this was largely overcome when the price of wheat was reduced far below that of rice.²⁹

²⁸ The annual reports of PARD, Comilla, contain detailed accounts of the impact of the new programs on the economy of the villages. See also *The Academy at Comilla: An Introduction* (Comilla, 1963); and A. Farouk and S. A. Rahim, "Modernizing Subsistence Agriculture: An Experimental Survey in Comilla" (Dacca, 1965). (Mimeo.)

²⁹ *Third Five-Year Plan, op. cit.*, p. 531. For a more complete analysis of the public works program see Akhter Hameed Khan and A. K. M. Mohsen, "Mobilizing Village Leadership," *International Development Review* (September, 1962), pp. 4-9; A. T. R. Rahman and others, *An Evaluation of the Rural Public Works Programme, East Pakistan 1962-63* (Comilla, PARD, 1963); and Basic Democracies and Local Government Department, *East Pakistan Rural Works Programme. Report 1963-64* (Dacca, 1965).

Thana Training and Development Centers are now expanding into all of Comilla District and also are being established in other thanas. The major question is whether or not trained personnel can be generated fast enough to direct the efforts. With more than four hundred thanas in East Pakistan, this is a formidable hurdle. It is one thing to be effective when supported by the combined efforts of the most experienced and dedicated individuals available, but it is something else to transfer these ideas through people of lesser ability. Experience with pilot areas in operation since 1963, however, supports the conviction of Akhter Hameed Khan and his staff that it is possible to make Thana Centers the apex of an agricultural revolution in rural East Pakistan.

DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

Comparative analyses of the administration of agricultural programs are all too scarce, although the patterns in a few countries, Mexico for example, have attracted attention.³⁰ One classification of the work in this field was drawn up several years ago by Arthur T. Mosher, in his survey of technical cooperation in Latin American agriculture. He identified four theories often put forward as suggested bases of development programs. First, he listed a knowledge theory wherein research and improved methods are hypothesized as holding the answer. Second, he described a capital theory that focuses on the infusion of capital for seeds, fertilizer, and equipment as the major need of a developing agriculture. Third is a public administration theory because public programs are involved, administration holds the key to greater effectiveness. Fourth and finally, Mosher identified a general economic climate theory

³⁰ The mechanics and the results of Mexico's agricultural development programs have been well documented. For studies that emphasize administrative elements, see Ana M. Gomez, "Mexican Agriculture Makes Rapid Progress," *Foreign Agriculture*, XXVI (April, 1962), 16-18; Edmundo Flores, "The Significance of Land-Use Changes in the Economic Development of Mexico," *Land Economics*, XXXV (May, 1959), 115-24; Clarence A. Moore, "Agricultural Development in Mexico," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXXVII (February, 1966), 72-80; Richard W. Parks, "The Role of Agriculture in Mexican Economic Development," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XVIII (Summer, 1964), 3-27; George M. Platt, "Administration and Agricultural Development in Mexico and Pakistan," *op. cit.*; and Kathryn H. Wylie, "Mexico's Agrarian Reform," *Foreign Agriculture*, XXV (February, 1961), 17-18.

Thus nationwide improvements in health, education, roads, and industry will result in agricultural improvements as a by-product.³¹

When a more adequate theory may eventually be evolved, all of these elements will surely be accounted for. New techniques, more productive crop varieties, infusion of capital, ties between agriculture and the rest of the economy, and relationships with social and cultural patterns are all essential components of any attempt to explain the whys and wherefores of agricultural development. This chapter has centered on the operation of public programs in Pakistan's parturient efforts at raising productivity. There, as in other countries, the intrinsic centrality of administration derives from the necessarily great size and scale as well as the public nature of almost every new effort. Some areas of West Pakistan may indeed respond independently to cash-crop farming, where large acreages are controlled by individuals. That will only scratch the surface and scarcely diminishes the job to be done by governmental agencies.

"Administration" does not refer to questions of formal organization alone, but to the whole process of striving for governmental objectives. Form and hierarchy have probably received too much of the attention Pakistan has directed to agricultural development. Such preoccupation encourages manipulation of organizational structure and detracts from the serious analysis of other elements that may contribute to program weaknesses. As another result, attempts to isolate and define the "problems" to be attacked may also suffer. Obviously, it is somewhat easier to create a new organization than to attempt to reform one that is tradition bound. Perhaps the most popular reason among those given for establishment of the development corporations was that it was necessary to bypass traditions and methods which made the departments ineffective. This may be sound reasoning, but it still rests on an overriding belief in the efficacy of structure.

In the remaining pages of this chapter two clusters of administrative problems will be portrayed. The inadequacies in program planning and operation within agricultural agencies themselves will be discussed first. Second, the needs for trained manpower and for conscious plans to develop such manpower deserve some comment.

³¹ Arthur T. Mosher, *Technical Cooperation in Latin American Agriculture* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 34.

For the years of experimentation with agricultural programs and ideas in Pakistan fortunately are not devoid of experiences that can be employed to improve future ideas and efforts

Program Planning

Pakistan now has elaborate machinery for planning and increasing numbers of personnel in the Planning Commission of the central government and in the planning departments of the two provinces. The general plans they prepare are perhaps technically as good as can be constructed.³² At the same time, as one might expect, this general agricultural planning has often failed to isolate the conditions that must be changed and the precise action to be taken, if output is to increase. Setting overall physical targets, as the Five-Year Plans have done, leaves many important questions unanswered. Are the goals to be achieved at the expense of other long-range agricultural benefits? Should the total increase in production be accomplished on a few acres or on all farms? Should farmers participate in the added national wealth or should increased production be accompanied by lower prices? Answers to these and other questions are often conceived in completely different forms by technical experts, planners, administrative officials, and by other persons who share in the decision-making processes. Is the desired end product a single family farm of a few acres, a commercial mechanized farm employing villagers as workers, a cooperative network of small holdings with central purchasing and marketing, or some combination of these alternatives? Without a clear conception of units of production, neither planners, program operators, nor farmers are able to relate what they do to anything but their own immediate situations.

Only when planning reaches the stage where operational goals are recognized by action agencies can programs be designed to produce dependable results. At some stage national plans need to be related directly to the problems of the individual cultivators, and this would seem to be the challenge to the provincial secretariats and particularly their agriculture personnel. That effective planning is possible in Pakistan is attested to by the Rural Public Works Pro-

³² National planning machinery and processes are described in Albert Waterston, *Planning in Pakistan* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).

gram that has grown rapidly from a quiet beginning at the Comilla Academy for Rural Development. In this program the end products are clearly visualized and defined in terms of roads, canals, and numbers of workers for each village area. The goals are realistic because the villagers occupy a place in the planning process. Assignments and responsibilities for government officials and farmers alike are carefully established before work begins, and training sessions are held to make certain that everyone in a supervisory capacity knows his job. Coordination among all units, from the village councils to the provincial departments of basic democracies and local government, has been relatively very effective.

Indeed, for all purposes ways do exist in agriculture departments to develop and propose plans and projects to work toward national goals. By and large, however, direction and purpose are still lacking. The weakest link in agricultural planning is within the community of agriculture itself. It exists at the ministerial and secretarial level where, with the exception of the recent Food and Agriculture Commission, there has been little evidence of creative thinking and planning. It also exists at the level of operations where deputy directors in charge of programs like extension and marketing, those heading regional offices, and those directing research and experiment stations have not evidenced vision, ideas, and leadership. Where men with such characteristics have appeared, their activities have often been compartmentalized or have been suppressed as infringing on the prerogatives of senior policy-makers.

The agricultural departments are commonly criticized for their failure to carry through or coordinate component parts of a program. After a campaign to introduce the use of fertilizer or a new seed variety, for example, supplies may arrive in the locality long after the proper moment—or no storage facilities may be available. Such difficulties of course result in part from decisions that have been made at high levels without bringing the local representative, near the spot, into the picture. The individual farmers also may at best have a limited concept of the total of activities in the agricultural scene. Up to this time, therefore, and even today the interchange of ideas between farmers and government by necessity has been virtually a one-way process. The rural works program has shown that key people in each village can be consulted and can occasionally be enlisted in program operation. The Thana Develop-

ment Center concept now includes a means of relating the work of villagers to a larger framework. Thus the village organizer who comes to the Center weekly has proved to be a useful link in getting practical work done within the outlines of wider plans.

Specialists for Agriculture

The shortage of trained and experienced specialists is a serious handicap to agricultural development in Pakistan. The specialists who do work for the government face a complex series of relationships with the generalists in administration. Thus problems of personnel are crucial to agricultural development efforts. Much has been written about the deficiencies of Pakistan's personnel system, and that ground will not be covered again here. There is space to note that Pakistan inherited, and has since sharpened, a great differentiation between the generalist administrator and the professional agriculturalist, placing the latter at a disadvantage in terms of program influence, pay, and prestige. Two detrimental results have been difficulty in recruiting competent young men for careers in agriculture and an impairment in the morale of agriculturalists. Limitations in pay, prestige, and prospects for advancement have worked against the upgrading of the quality of men in the agricultural services. In its 1962 report the Pay and Services Commission of the central government recognized these adverse circumstances, but its recommendations as yet have had little or no effect. Removing class distinctions within government services is no less a problem than inducing changes among the farmers!

These and other conditions have resulted in a bureaucratic situation where originality and initiative do not pay off, and too few career men are willing to be identified with a big program change. A program failure will injure a man's chances for promotion, but on the other hand the *status quo* in a program almost provides a screen to hide behind. Supervision more often takes the forms of inspection and accounting rather than those of direction and guidance. Personal security is an exceedingly strong drive for most public employees—in this society government service offers perhaps the more attractive possibility for employment.

The top decision-makers have turned to the creation of public corporations as a means of getting around these longstanding personnel blockages, real and psychological. The two water and power

development authorities reflect the problem, because the hope of avoiding the personnel difficulties of the irrigation departments was paramount in their establishment. As of 1965 the WAPDAs offered more attractive career potentialities to young graduates than did the new agricultural development corporations, but the opportunities were there for the latter to compete along these lines. It may be heresy to conclude that corporations must be created in order to reform or reshape the personnel practices in traditional governmental organizations. But it may be the only way.

The role of the specialist and that of the generalist are necessary, but it is foolish to contend that certain jobs above the level of researcher or technician *must* be assigned to either. Indeed the distinction between specialist and generalist all too often is based on education which may be ten, twenty, or even thirty years out of date. Nor is it sensible to argue in the abstract that a minister, a secretary, or a director of an agricultural program must be a specialist, a political appointee, or a career generalist. Experience seems to indicate that the person who performs best at the top level will possess some characteristics of all three of these stereotypes. What is important is placing competent, trained men in charge of agricultural programs and then allowing them freedom to apply their full abilities to the whole job.

Competent, trained individuals may of course develop by pursuing the career of the generalist or one of the numerous specialist career lines in agriculture. Several suggestions can be made about steps which will help to produce men with the kinds of qualifications that appear to be needed. First, the generalist administrator needs much more knowledge and understanding about a variety of rural problems, ranging all the way from research and marketing to the sociology of village life. He must be able to communicate with specialists on matters of fertilizers and row planting, and he must understand the broader economic and social consequences of projects designed to change basic village patterns. To reach this degree of sophistication, he usually needs a personal commitment to a career in activities related to rural Pakistan. This would suggest that members of the Civil Service of Pakistan and the provincial services who are to be posted in village-oriented agencies should identify their careers, or at least long stretches of them, with some of the many agricultural operations of government. The academies

for rural development are already equipped to provide specialized training. Implicit here is the concept that the effectiveness of a young generalist administrator is limited if, as is currently the practice, he is frequently shifted among a variety of substantive programs.

Planning and administration might improve if more persons who have worked in technical programs, as specialists, were moved into positions of policy responsibility. That is, more job mobility is a desirable goal for men who enter service as agriculturalists. If members of these agriculture-related services need additional administrative training when they take on more general responsibilities, already the national institutes of public administration and the Administrative Staff College exist for that very purpose. Formerly, the agricultural services did not contain enough men with the potential ability for higher posts, but this condition is changing and might be changed even more. A primary goal of agricultural development might therefore be personnel development—attracting capable young men into the services, continuing their education, and upgrading and broadening the scope of the agricultural universities to produce rural social scientists as well as rural physical scientists. Cooperation between the agricultural universities, colleges, and other training institutions is formal and somewhat superficial at present. If a unified effort by all government agencies involved in village level operations is the ultimate objective, closer ties among institutions with training and research responsibilities would seem to be in order.

In addition to moving some agriculturalists into decision-making positions in higher levels of administration, others need to be freed of routine office duties and moved into rural areas where they can work directly with farmers. Members of the agricultural services, however, contend that pay and living conditions are inadequate and that capable young men move to positions in city offices as soon as possible. Higher salaries for specialists at all levels are a primary need.

It has been reiterated in this essay that manipulation of organizational structure has long been considered the key to successful agricultural development in Pakistan. Agriculture departments, irrigation departments, semiautonomous corporations, community development, cooperatives, and cooperative banks have held the

spotlight at various times. This almost nomadic restlessness has stemmed from a natural frustration at the slow rate of increase in food supplies. At times it has seemed to reflect an unreasoning belief that a miracle will come, that productivity will double overnight, if only the right organization at the central and provincial levels is found. Yet the basic weakness of all the approaches described here is surely not that they were delegated to the wrong box on an organizational chart. Under otherwise favorable conditions a variety of structural arrangements could be vehicles for change.

As this new nation moves into its third decade, it seems clear that past efforts may not have paid off because a common conception of the end product on the village level, in the behavior of the farmer, was not visualized. The real barriers to production were not identified. Now the encouraging factor in agricultural development in Pakistan is that the end product is coming into focus. A conceptual framework and operating procedures to attack the heart of agricultural inadequacies are moving out of the experimental stage.

V. Government by Corporations: The Case of West Pakistan WAPDA

Public corporations and authorities "are expected to handle around 55 per cent of the total public sector allocation under the Third Plan," as announced three months before the conflict with India in 1965. Of the nine areas among which allocations of public expenditures were projected in the Third Plan, public corporations will play a major role in at least four: industry, fuels and minerals; transport and communication, agriculture; and water and power. In that order, these also happen to be the four sectors for which the greatest outlay is projected. In noting this point, the authors of the new Plan remark that "satisfactory and efficient functioning" of the corporations is "a matter of crucial importance . . . to the entire economy."¹

Pakistan inherited a few government corporations with its independence. There were urban improvement corporations in Karachi and Lahore. The railways in the East and West Wings, split off from those of what is now India, have partaken all along of some of the characteristics of corporations. In the past three years, however, their autonomy has been closer circumscribed by increasing surveillance by the provincial governments. The old, established banking institutions remained with India at partition, and the State Bank of Pakistan, a central banking corporation, was created in 1948. A Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was created that same year, and a commercial bank, the National Bank of Pakistan, was established in 1949 with the government owning one-quarter of the capital.

¹ Government of Pakistan, *The Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70)*, May, 1965, p. 169, Table 1, p. 41.

Corporations were plunged squarely in the development business in 1952 when the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was activated with the function of founding new industrial enterprises. Before the 1958 martial law regime about thirteen corporations were set up, and an even greater push has come since that time. In 1958 and 1959 water and power development authorities were established in either wing. In 1958 an Inland Water Transport Authority was initiated in East Pakistan. In 1962 agricultural development corporations were created in each provincial area, and the Industrial Development Corporation was bifurcated also. Other such corporations have been established to the tune of almost four dozen in the country at the present time, and nearly all are involved in development activities.² Twelve of these operate throughout all of Pakistan, twelve are confined to the East, six to the West, and twelve are local in jurisdiction.

Judging from the sources and content of official reports on the subject, the creation of corporations throughout Pakistan's nineteen years has been the work of administrators, and the legislative branch has seemingly played no role at all.³ A report of the Planning Board in the mid-fifties called for the creation of an "Indus Basin Authority" to unify water and power functions in West Pakistan. A similar agency for East Pakistan also was suggested. Again, in his report to the Planning Board in 1955, B. L. Gladieux discussed at length the problems of using corporations to foster economic development. He discussed the government's control of such agencies, how to find adequate leadership for them, and he laid down certain rules for the managing of corporations.⁴ Subsequently, in the *First Five-Year Plan*, the corporate form was strongly recommended in several places. "Public corporations and authorities

² See G. Ahmed, "Changes in the Administrative Organization of the Government of Pakistan since 1953," *Public Administration* (Spring, 1961), pp. 355-56; K. M. Zaman, "Public Corporations," a paper written during Session 5, Pakistan Administrative Staff College [PASC] (Lahore, 1962); H. Haider, "Public Corporations in Pakistan," a paper written during Session 10, PASC (Lahore, 1965). Professor Platt comments on the agricultural development corporations in Chapter IV. The six universities might be added to the above totals.

³ See, e.g., Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963, 2d ed.), p. 101.

⁴ "Reorganization of Pakistan Government for National Development" (Karachi, 1955), paragraph 49.

should be established freely to manage commercial undertakings as well as for large multipurpose schemes which require a high degree of co-ordination in planning and execution, such as the co-ordinated development of water resources.”⁵

By the time of the martial law regime, therefore, adequate justification for the employment of this form of organization existed in the official literature. Not only did that regime proceed to use corporations rather “freely,” but it also continued to discuss them. A 1959 pamphlet displays the government’s stand down to 1965:

The normal system of government followed by the economically advanced countries is not always compatible with the requirements of developing countries. These countries have to formulate plans and implement policies which are at once dynamic and well-conceived to maintain progress and at the same time avoid reckless investment and wastage. The creation of a proper machinery best suited for the development needs of each country recognizing the inadequacy of resources and technical know-how is, therefore, the first essential. Too elaborate a machinery burdened with checks and counter-checks tends to retard progress while a mere go-ahead policy, over simplifications of procedures and transfer of responsibility to a handful of experts increases the element of risk.⁶

By the time the Third Plan appeared in the spring of 1965, there had developed a continuing discussion, at least among government servants, on the use and misuse of these semiautonomous public agencies:

In overall terms, the implementation of public sector programmes has been accelerated markedly as a result of the operations of the autonomous agencies. Their performance has not, however, been of a uniform quality. There is also evidence of inadequate appreciation, both within and outside the agencies, of their important role in the process of capital formation and of the need for sound pricing policies and economic efficiency.

It is commonly believed that public undertakings as a rule lack the vigour and resourcefulness associated with private enterprise, that a business enterprise undertaken by the Government will be subject to too much departmentalism and red tape. The actual

⁵ Karachi, December 1957, p. 87. See p. 37 for another example.

⁶ Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs Division, “Government Sponsored Corporations” (Karachi, 1959), p. 1. See also M. Ayub, “Public Industrial Enterprises in Pakistan” Paper prepared for the United Nations Seminar on Management of Public Industrial Enterprises, New Delhi, December 1–11, 1959 (Karachi, 1960).

operation of certain public enterprises would suggest that this belief is by no means without foundation. It is difficult to see, however, why productive inefficiency should be inherent in public enterprises. If public corporations are in some instances lacking in vigour and initiative, the fault will perhaps very often be found to lie in operational arrangements. It is a commonplace, and like all commonplaces it is apt to be forgotten, that public corporations must be run on business lines, that they should as far as possible be independent of detailed bureaucratic control, and that a way should be found for encouraging and sustaining a competitive spirit in them.

The Planning Commission called for a study of the problems of controlling corporations and for bringing managers of the different corporations together to talk over common difficulties from time to time. The Commission asked serious consideration of the short supply of managers for corporations and authorities.⁷ It seems likely that in the next few years studies like those demanded by the Commission will occur.

Pakistan therefore is committed to the heavy use of corporations, as indeed the major organizational feature of its development drive. This fact has been accompanied by the raising in public debate of the same questions posed concerning corporations in other countries, developed and developing. When is the corporate form appropriate? How may corporations be fitted into the policy and organizational structure? How much "control" is necessary? How many corporations are "too many?"

It is evident that Pakistan's official statements have not advanced our understanding of public corporations. "Answers" to the above questions take the form of policy decisions, in any country, to fit the leaders' perceptions of their practical situation. They are normative questions, and they have been explored by Hanson, Friedmann, Goldberg and Seidman, and Gulick, among other scholars.⁸ In this chapter these hoary problems are viewed in the context of

⁷ *The Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70)* (Karachi, May, 1965), pp. 169-70. *The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65)* (Karachi, 1960) at paragraphs 44-45 notes and endorses the use of corporations.

⁸ A. H. Hanson, *Public Enterprise and Economic Development* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959); W. Friedmann, ed., *The Public Corporation* (Toronto: The Carswell Company, 1954); S. D. Goldberg and H. Seidman, *The Government Corporation: Elements of a Model Charter* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1953); and L. Gulick, "'Authorities' and How to Use Them," *The Tax Review* (November, 1947).

Pakistan and with special reference to the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, a corporation with programs that represent the principal thrust in the field of water resources development.

The chairman of WAPDA, Mr. Ghulam Ishaq, a member of the Civil Service of Pakistan, is one of the most persuasive spokesmen for the corporate form:

What I believe forced the Government in this country to select this tool was the realization that a government department was inherently inappropriate as an institutional framework in which to conduct an efficient service of a commercial or industrial nature. The government department partakes of the character of the Government as a whole and is, therefore, largely impersonal. Impersonal administration means low motivation of employees which, coupled with the large measure of in-built service security, makes it ideally suited for routine, repetitive operations in which there is a precedent for every situation and a rule for every action, but hardly for anything more. A government department must also aim at perfection; there must be uniformity of treatment of problems and of individuals; the exercise of discretion in individual judgment to be kept at its minimum, risks are out of the question and nothing is to be left to chance. In short, nothing should be done which would upset the established system or order. This pre-occupation with order and system, conformity, and perfection as also with playing it safe succeeds in loading a government department with such a mass of rules and regulations, codes and practices and manuals and charts, that inevitably keeps it, by and large, effectively in check and balanced, but at the same time, makes its movement so rigid, so ponderous as practically to incapacitate it for undertaking a large, business type venture ⁹

This remarkable statement illustrates the level of sophistication at which this discussion is proceeding, and it tells a good bit about the condition of regular administration in the country. Mr. Ishaq has aptly characterized the syndrome that most apostles of "development administration" hope to correct. He and his fellow proponents of the corporation as an antidote were winning the discussion, while the Second Plan period closed on a strong note of economic optimism.

⁹ "Public Corporation as an Organizational Device for Development in Pakistan," an address delivered to members of PASC, Lahore, October 25, 1962. It was reported in February, 1966, that Mr. Ishaq has been appointed central Finance Secretary.

WEST PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (WAPDA)

This agency ranges over the field of water resource functions, a fact that lends it immense importance with relation to the economy and even with direct relation to the lives of most residents of dry, dusty West Pakistan. Its basic law gives WAPDA these functions:

- (1) The Authority shall prepare, for the approval of the Government, a comprehensive plan for the development and utilization of the water and power resources of West Pakistan on a unified and multipurpose basis
- (2) The Authority may frame a scheme or schemes for the Province or any part thereof providing for all or any of the following matters, namely—
 - (i) irrigation, water-supply and drainage, and recreational use of water resources,
 - (ii) the generation, transmission and distribution of power, and the construction, maintenance and operation of power houses and grids,
 - (iii) flood control,
 - (iv) the prevention of waterlogging and reclamation of waterlogged and salted lands;
 - (v) inland navigation, and
 - (vi) the prevention of any ill-effects on public health resulting from the operations of the Authority.

Further, WAPDA carries out any such "schemes" authorized by the government which have been prepared by WAPDA itself or by any other agency in the government. There is authority for the agency to make studies in pursuance of these functions. Finally, the law gives WAPDA "control" over "underground water resources of any region in West Pakistan" plus wide powers over generation and supply of electricity throughout the province¹⁰

The Authority consists of a Chairman appointed by the government for a five-year term and not more than two members appointed for three-year terms. One member has ordinarily been designated as Member Finance to handle the financial affairs of the Authority. The organization is divided into three main parts which correspond to the functions they perform. The Water Wing administers the planning, construction, and operation of the preponderance

¹⁰ West Pakistan Act No XXXI of 1958 as amended by West Pakistan Notification No Leg 3 (13)/59, 27 March 1959, Chap III.

of water projects throughout the Province. All generation and distribution of electricity throughout West Pakistan, with some exceptions, is managed by the Power Wing. Finally, an Administration and Coordination Wing includes the headquarters units, supply and staff agencies. One of the four divisions of the Water Wing is the Indus Basin Project Division, headed by a chief engineer, which is directly involved with the immense projects stemming from the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty with India and the subsequent financing arrangements with Western countries. The Authority in formal organizational terms is attached to and responsible to the Irrigation Department of the government of West Pakistan, but for purposes of the Indus Basin Project the Authority is considered to be an agent of the central government.¹¹

Program

WAPDA supplies about 70 per cent of the total electric power available in West Pakistan today. An additional 23 per cent is supplied by the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, while smaller concerns provide the rest. The installed capacity of approximately 596,000 kw (474,000 kw firm) represents over fourfold increase in the five years of WAPDA's existence. By 1964 WAPDA had thirty power stations. Total electricity generated has increased at a somewhat slower rate, from 723 million kwh in 1959-60 to an estimated 2400 million kwh in 1964-65. But in this and other respects progress in the field of power has been substantial. In terms of transmission lines installed, substations, increase in consumers of various types and in villages electrified, the WAPDA record looks very impressive at the present time.¹² WAPDA estimates that its total capital investment in the same period has quadrupled.

On the irrigation, reclamation, and flood control side, achievements in the first five years of WAPDA's existence have been equally impressive. West Pakistan today already has the largest irrigation works in the world. Between 23 and 27 million acres of land are irrigated from canals that were begun in 1861. It is esti-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, sec 9A

¹² See Ghulam Ishaq, "Five Years of WAPDA" in *Indus* (July, 1964), pp. 4-9; L. K. Mubashir, "An Appraisal of WAPDA Projects—Power Sector," in *Indus* (October, 1964), pp. 7-29, and *WAPDA Miscellany*, *op cit*, pp. 77-104. *Indus* is a monthly publication of the Authority.

mated that these works use about 60 MAF (million acre feet) of surface water and about 7 MAF of ground water. Large supplies both of surface and ground water remain to be used. In addition to maintenance and augmentation of the irrigation, and resulting from it in part, is a widespread and serious drainage problem. Waterlogging and accretion of salt are taking 100,000 acres of land out of cultivation each year. It is on this twin problem of irrigation and reclamation that WAPDA concentrates a major portion of its attention. The division of work roughly is that WAPDA is charged with constructing all of the new, major irrigation and reclamation works, while the older Irrigation Department is involved in the operation and maintenance of the existing system. As new works come into operation it is usually a high policy decision whether they will be assigned for maintenance and operation to the Irrigation Department or the Agricultural Development Corporation. The recently completed Gudu Barrage now is managed by Irrigation. That barrage and the Warsak Dam (operated by WAPDA) on the Kabul River are the two largest projects outside the Indus Basin Plan yet completed by WAPDA. At this writing, however, a number of large irrigation and power projects are underway and will be completed in the next few years.

The first function listed for WAPDA in its organic law is the long-range and expensive task of planning comprehensively for the unified, multipurpose development of water and power resources. In the early years of the Authority's existence, taking over the power network, expanding it, starting new irrigation works and the Indus Basin projects—practical work—had obvious priority. A consultant engineering firm, Harza International, began a comprehensive look at the entire province some years back. In January, 1964, the chairman of WAPDA announced that a "general study of the water and power resources of West Pakistan . . . with a view to framing a comprehensive plan for the exploitation of these resources" was being started by the World Bank at WAPDA's request. "The comprehensive plan . . . would take into account the entire economy of the province, and particular stress would be laid on requirements up to 1975."¹³ By the summer of 1965 consultants working on this study had completed what was termed the first

¹³ *Indus* (January, 1964), pp. 3-4.

phase of data collection and analysis for the comprehensive plan. The major emphasis in this first stage was examination of the technical and economic feasibility of Tarbela Dam, the largest dam proposed in the original Indus Basin scheme. It seemed fairly evident that the Tarbela construction was justified in terms of data collected to that point. Thus the comprehensive planners could push ahead for further and more complete information throughout the province, on which to base the eventual comprehensive plan.

Any such plan, to be sure, requires long years of data collection in order for the many, interrelated aspects of natural resources to be pinpointed. There must be exact and extensive data on surface and ground water quantity and quality, rainfall and snowfall, sediment load in rivers and lakes, flood levels, low water requirements for canals and irrigation, domestic water supply requirements, all for a number of years. In effect, what is now happening in Pakistan is that plans previously made for major water structures are being tested continuously against the new information that is being collected with the purpose of eventually writing a detailed, well-grounded, comprehensive plan for the entire province.

Unfortunately, in Pakistan comprehensive water planning for water and power will inevitably be handicapped by two basic conditions. One of these is of course the simple inadequacy of basic resource data. The other is the inescapable fact that Pakistan does not have an entire major river basin within its boundaries. The lack of basic data can be corrected with time.¹⁴ Because of the rapid action necessary on the Indus Basin works, the collection of data in the basin has been speeded up substantially since 1960. In the construction of Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River, engineers have not been faced with any serious problems because of data shortages. Doubtless some big decisions about eventual operation of Mangla, especially in terms of downstream effects, have yet to be made. This dam will affect only part of the basin. On the other hand, comprehensive planning of a basin requires far more extensive information than does simply the building of one dam, however large. And in parts of the province outside the Indus Valley, information is deficient on quantity and quality of surface and ground water.

¹⁴ The United Nations commented on the problems of basic data shortages in Pakistan in 1956. United Nations, "Water Resource Development in Burma, India, and Pakistan," Flood Control Series No. 11, 1956, p. 115.

The Five-Year Plans have called for massive data collection programs.¹⁵ Other students of these problems have similarly called for better data on soil, fish and wild life, mineral, and other resources and resource problems that inevitably would be important parts of any comprehensive plan. The Revelle Report, an American report made to President Ayub at President Kennedy's request, concerning the problems of soil and water reclamation in the province, most recently provided illustrations of the deficiencies of information on all these matters.¹⁶

Some basic data are being collected by many agencies of the Pakistan government today, in the course of their current operation. There are broad programs of data collection in the fields of soil, topographical and geologic mapping, forests, and so on. Yet the broad range of data that must provide the base for any realistic planning will take years to collect, collate, and analyze. Comprehensive planning by World Bank consultants under these conditions must necessarily be of a tentative nature to be filled in and substantiated by the slow process of data collection through the years.¹⁷

The elementary point that Pakistan does not have within its boundaries the entire basin for any of the major rivers in the country (both in the East and West Wings, incidentally) means that comprehensive planning in a true sense is on its face impossible. The Indus Water Treaty, signed in 1960 and providing the basis for the Indus Basin works, does arrange for the exchange of data. Only, however, when working arrangements can be made with India and other neighboring countries to provide full information over long periods of time can the foundation for a comprehensive plan be laid. Further, to effect such a plan their full cooperation would be mandatory. There are small streams in the coastal areas

¹⁵ Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, *The First Five-Year Plan, 1955-60* (Karachi, 1957), pp 333-34, Planning Commission, *The Second Five-Year Plan, 1960-65* (Karachi, 1960), pp 162, 205, 267, etc

¹⁶ U. S. White House-Department of Interior Panel on Waterlogging and Salinity in West Pakistan, "Report on Land and Water Development in the Indus Plain" (Washington, March 25, 1964), pp 9, 17, and Chap 8 See also Mukhtar Masood, *An Appraisal of Land Resource in West Pakistan* (Superintendent, Government Printing, West Pakistan, 1960), especially p 25

¹⁷ See *WAPDA Miscellany, op cit.*, pp 119-134.

and small closed basins in the southwest where comprehensive planning is possible. Although in these cases the amount and quality of information requisite to planning on an integrated basis are generally missing, there were intensive programs to make up the lack for several of them in 1965. In some of the small basins dams already are under construction

Finances and Personnel

Table 1 summarizes the financial situation of the Authority over its life.

TABLE 1
WEST PAKISTAN WAPDA RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES, 1959-65
(MILLION RUPEES)

Receipts		Expenditures	
Revenue (largely from sale of electricity)	848 95	Revenue expenditure (largely on electricity distribution)	601 07
Debentures	129.84		
Foreign loans	445 57	All construction except Gudu Barrage and Indus Basin Works	2165.74
Indus Basin Plan non-reimbursable costs received from Central Government	64 54	Gudu Barrage	386 55
For Gudu Barrage	367 85	Other	6 08
"Loans" (grants?) from Provincial Government	1196 94	Indus Basin Plan non-reimbursable expenditures	64 54
Other	273 37		
Totals*	3327.06		3223 98

SOURCE West Pakistan WAPDA, "Selected West Pakistan WAPDA Financial Statistics," P. and I Publication No. 41, April, 1965. Table 1B, pp 23-24

The figures exclude most of the costs of the Indus Basin works being paid by the World Bank and a consortium of Western countries. In recent years that sum annually has about equaled WAPDA's expenditures on all other activities.¹⁸ The amount shown as Indus Basin expenditures represents Pakistan's contribution to the works and will not be repaid by the consortium. For other than Indus Basin works, the principal source of revenue consists of grants, technically considered "loans," from the provincial govern-

¹⁸ Ghulam Ishaq, *loc cit.*

ment. A second source is the charges for electricity sold throughout the province except in Karachi and in two other cities, where smaller concerns perform this function. Foreign loans during the period yielded the third greatest amount of revenue and this of course was devoted mainly to the building of permanent water control structures, electrical generating and transmission facilities.

First on the expenditure side appears the costs of maintaining existing power network plus the few water projects today managed by WAPDA, the figure also including some replacement and expansion. The second and largest sum includes the many projects underway or now finished. In 1964 the chairman cited thirty-nine projects started and twelve completed—among them irrigation supplies to three million acres, drainage of 1.5 million acres, and Warsak multipurpose dam. This lump sum includes about Rs. 142 million spent on investigations, and about Rs. 135 million devoted to the first two big Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects whereby rich land in the Punjab is being restored to full use. A Machinery Pool Organization has been formed in WAPDA to handle machinery not only for the Authority itself but also for other agencies in the West Pakistan government. This Machinery Pool Organization levies charges for its services and so derives revenue from its operations.¹⁹ It will eventually be run from a revolving fund.

The Gudu Barrage, an irrigation dam on the Indus River, is listed separately because it is the object of considerable pride. Not only is Gudu a very large dam, but it was financed entirely by Pakistan, including foreign exchange costs. Further, only a very few expatriate engineers were associated with the building, and they were from the United Nations. Completed in 1965, the barrage commands about 2.7 million cultivable acres of land. It is a key part of the Second Plan and was finished on target.

These totals then give a broad idea as to the accents in WAPDA's ongoing programs, outside the Indus Basin works which will be described below. A breakdown on the foreign loans and aid received by 1965 shows that Rs. 412.44 million have come from the United States Development Loan Fund and Aid. West German credit provided Rs. 61.11 million Canadian aid through the

¹⁹ See Ghulam Ishaq, "Five Years of WAPDA" in *Indus* (July, 1964), p. 7, and "Selected West Pakistan WAPDA Financial Statistics," *loc. cit.*, Table 2B, p. 23.

Colombo Plan was Rs. 48.12 million, and Italian loans amounted to Rs 46 32 million. And there were other smaller sources of foreign assistance ²⁰

As a final indication of the crude dimensions of WAPDA's current program, Table 2 shows plans laid out for the most recent bien-nium, and it shows the same general accents that have already been discussed

TABLE 2
WEST PAKISTAN WAPDA BUDGETED RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
(MILLION RUPEES)

Receipts	Revised 1963-64	Budgeted 1964-65
1. Revenue	174 0	195.6
2. Capital		
a. Provincial Government	239.4	328.3
b. Foreign Loan	114.1	202 4
c. Debentures	25.1	12 5
d. Gudu Barrage	62.4	46.7
e Miscellaneous	6	.6
3. Indus Works non-reimbursable	14.3	40.3
Total	630.3	826 6
Expenditures		
1. Revenue	159.7	180.3
2 Capital		
a. Other than Gudu	380 5	547.0
b. Gudu	62 4	46.7
c Other	2 0	2 0
3. Indus Works non-reimbursable	14 3	40 3
Total	630 3	826.6

SOURCE: West Pakistan WAPDA, *The Budget 1964-1965*, pp. 2-3.

WAPDA is probably the second largest employer in Pakistan, behind the West Pakistan Railway. Table 3 breaks down the manpower situation as of December 1964. It largely speaks for itself. When, in this fashion, persons working for contracting and consulting engineering firms are included in the totals, WAPDA looks even bigger. It will be noted that the figures do not include Pakistanis working with consultants, thus even these totals are below the actual numbers in WAPDA's jurisdiction.

²⁰ *Ibid* Table 1C.

TABLE 3
WEST PAKISTAN WAPDA EMPLOYMENT TOTALS
JUNE 30, 1964

	Adminis- tration & Coordina- tion Wing	Power Wing	Water Wing Minus IBP	Indus Basin Project Division	Total	Con- trac- tors	Expatri- ates with Consult- ants	Grand Totals
Engineers	—	615	466	458	1,539	468	250	2,257
Officers (excluding engineers)	91	95	318	160	664	168	82	914
Establishment (office workers)	488	7,444	5,219	2,660	15,811	3,571	2	19,384
Laborers (skilled, unskilled, general utility)	341	24,938	18,337	4,530	48,146	27,220	—	75,366
Grand Totals	<u>920</u>	<u>33,092</u>	<u>24,340</u>	<u>7,808</u>	<u>66,160</u>	<u>31,427</u>	<u>334</u>	<u>97,921</u>

SOURCE: West Pakistan WAPDA, "West Pakistan WAPDA Manpower Employment Statistics as on 30-6-64" P. and I. Publication No 36, Lahore, December, 1964. Table 1.1.

Controls

The means by which WAPDA's organization and functions are geared into the national development effort closely resemble those employed in other countries. Generally speaking, the Authority operates within its organic law and in the general framework of central and provincial governmental organization. In the second place, the members of the Authority are appointed and may be discharged by the provincial government. Third, every WAPDA project ("scheme") must be submitted to the review of the regular coordinating machinery of government. It thus must direct all its activities in general at the goals laid down in the *Five-Year Plans*. The projects must be drawn up in the same manner that government requires for plans of every development agency. Such plans or schemes are reviewed and approved by an *ad hoc* committee selected according to the subject matter under review and known as a provincial development working party. When the projects are cleared to become part of the provincial plan, they are sent on to a similar, central committee—the central development working party. Eventually these schemes arrive at the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council. Every scheme must be provided for in the Annual Development Program as approved by the National Economic Council on the basis of recommendations coming to it from below, and in the annual budget as approved by the relevant legislature. In the case of WAPDA this last normally refers to the provincial assembly.

In general, WAPDA's personnel practices are regulated closely by the provincial government. It does have slightly more freedom here than do the ordinary departments of government. For example, its salary scales have been allowed to ascend somewhat higher than those of other government agencies, and there are a few advantageous fringe benefits. Many of its professionals, however, are deputed from Irrigation and other departments of the provincial government. Their terms of service, including their salaries, are regulated by that government.

A further check on WAPDA's activities is of course the audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General, as with all departments of government. Recently WAPDA has abandoned its former practice of employing a commercial auditing firm, in view of the expanding

scope of this government audit. Indus Basin projects still are subjected to very extensive audits by outside agencies. Yet another regular check on the agency's operation are the annual reports which must be submitted to the government. And, as a final general check, the government may require WAPDA to hand over any records or to render a special report on any matter under its jurisdiction.

The Authority imposes on itself other controls than those legally required. For example, it audits its accounts internally. All project plans are doublechecked after they are completed, by experts other than those who drew them up. Again, an arrangement is in use today for field surveillance of construction to test conformity with design specifications. And WAPDA issues a popularized annual report, *Miscellany*, and a monthly magazine, *Indus*, in recognition of its obligation to the public. Both publications meet the obligation only in part, inasmuch as they are addressed exclusively to English-speaking, well-educated readers. Many of the articles are technical in nature and serve partly as a professional medium of communication among the engineers and technicians in the readership.

Yet the sum is an impressive array of controls for the government to have over the operations of WAPDA. These controls have served the identical purpose well in other countries, and one would think them quite sufficient in Pakistan. Discussion, however, continues as to the need for other ways of checking WAPDA. In early 1963, for example, the government of West Pakistan issued a set of financial procedures that would subject all transactions of the ten major public corporations in the province to review and veto by provincial authorities.²¹ There was resistance to this notification by several corporations, including WAPDA, and in 1965 negotiations were still underway as to how they would be applied. WAPDA officials, like those in other agencies, e.g., WPIDC, hold that existing controls are sufficient, that in any event a corporation should primarily be judged by the results of its work and not checked in detail on its day-to-day business.

Finally, and much less easy to demonstrate, is the element of leadership for WAPDA. Both of its chairmen to date—Ghulam

²¹ Government of Pakistan, Finance Department, "Notification," Lahore, 27 February 1963, No. SOFR. II-14/63.

Faruque (who has chaired the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and served in other high posts) and Ghulam Ishaq, the chairman until 1966—have been exceptionally capable if measured by the criterion of results. It seems altogether likely that recognition of their talents by the President, governors, and principal administrators in the center and province has helped to cut them loose from the more cursory and mundane checks of regular government processes. Personal acquaintances and contacts seem to be very important in this case.

ORGANIZING FOR RESOURCE ADMINISTRATION

The story of how WAPDA fits into the formal structure of central and provincial administration illustrates also that Pakistan has organizing problems not unlike those of other countries. The management of water and related natural resources is always a complicated and geographically widespread series of activities. In Pakistan attention to resources is divided among numerous organizations in the three major governments. The Third Schedule to the Constitution of 1962 gives the National Assembly exclusive power in national economic planning and coordination, which covers broad planning attention to natural resources; fishing outside territorial waters, nuclear energy, including related mineral resources; oil and gas; topographic and geologic surveys; and meteorology. The executive authority of the center extends to this same subject matter. The provincial assemblies have powers with respect to any other matters, and provincial executive authority extends to that same subject matter. Initiative in natural resource issues, as in essentially all issues, rests with the executives today.

Water and power are primarily relegated to the provinces, although certain resources closely related to water and power are the first responsibilities of the center. Furthermore, foreign assistance negotiations are the exclusive concern of the center. In practice this has meant that virtually all water and power projects are closely controlled by the national government, by means of the planning and financial apparatuses.

In the central government, still divided physically between Rawalpindi and Karachi, natural resource responsibilities are further divided among several agencies. Foreign aid for resource purposes is negotiated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

Economic Affairs Division of the President's Secretariat. A Central Statistical Office for coordinating all statistical work is attached to the Economic Affairs Division. Planning, including preparation of the Five-Year Plan and the progressing of plan projects, is vested in the Planning Division, also in the President's Secretariat. The Planning Secretary is also the vice-chairman of the Planning Commission. The National Economic Council is the overall policy-making agency which approves of plans and programs. The Ministry of Industries and Natural Resources watches over mineral resources including oil and gas, nuclear energy, and water and power problems. Under the Secretary of this Ministry a Joint Secretary heads the Natural Resources Division, the major central organization for resource problems. The Secretary is assisted by a Chief Engineering Adviser who until mid-1964 enjoyed the status of ex officio joint secretary and served as Commissioner for Indus Water and Head of the Replacement Plan Wing in the Ministry. This Ministry also houses the Geological Survey, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Oil and Gas Commission. The Ministry of Agriculture, in addition to other functions, includes a Surveyor-General and an Inspector-General of Forests. Finally, the Meteorological Department is in the Ministry of Defense.

In the provincial government of West Pakistan matters of natural resources are nearly all vested in the Minister of Irrigation, Power, Food and Agriculture. Although the great span of control of this Minister may be questioned, some advantages may derive from the coordination theoretically possible among the departments under him. Two of these departments have resource functions: Agriculture, and Irrigation and Power. Within the Agriculture Department are a joint secretary for forests and section officers for fisheries and for game. Reporting directly to the governor of the province and not, as these lines are written, under any minister, there is a Department of Industries, Commerce and Mineral Resources.

One member of the Board of Revenue deals with land utilization. He heads a Land Utilization Department and is assisted by a Land Utilization Committee. Other committees under his jurisdiction handle flood and waterlogging problems. There is a Public Health Engineering Department under the Secretary of Health to deal with

problems of domestic water supply, drainage, and survey functions so far as they are related to public health. Last but not largest of all in the provincial galaxy comes the Water and Power Development Authority. The roster of natural resource agencies in both the center and the province is long indeed.

With regard to the immediate subject matter of this chapter, it may again be emphasized that for all WAPDA operations which are included in the provincial budget, the Authority generally reports to the provincial government through the Secretary of Irrigation and Power. Since, however, the chairman of WAPDA is an official of high status, dealing with matters of first importance, he has access to and indeed status equal to higher officials. For all matters concerned with the Indus Basin Replacement Plan, WAPDA is the agent of the central government, and thus these matters do not go through the provincial department at all.

THE INDUS BASIN PLAN

The Indus Basin Development Plan and the Indus Waters Treaty on which it is based comprise not only a landmark in relations between Pakistan and India but also the establishment of one of the great multipurpose water projects of the world. This is not to underestimate what was already there on the Indus. The British Colonial government, beginning with the opening of the first canal in 1861, built a tremendous system of irrigation for the lands of the Punjab. By the time of partition problems of waterlogging and salinity had appeared in the irrigated areas, which promise in the long run to be as serious a problem to Pakistan as the question of international boundaries.

This latter question was raised by partition itself. Virtually all of the irrigated land in northwest India went to Pakistan with independence, although most of the headwaters of the system and three of the six rivers were situated in India. Shortly after independence, in April, 1948, the government of the East Punjab state in India cut off the water fed to Pakistani canals from the three eastern rivers. Tempers immediately flared on the Pakistan side of the border. The flow of water was resumed for the time being, while the two countries sought a more permanent solution. Pakistan indicated its willingness to submit the issue to the International Court

of Justice, while India stated that Pakistan had sufficient water without that in the three eastern rivers and thus there was no need to go to the Court.

This was the impasse when former chairman of the TVA, David E. Lilienthal, toured the area in 1951 and suggested in a magazine article in the United States that there could be an engineering solution to the problem. Basically, he suggested that engineers from the two countries formulate a comprehensive plan for developing the entire Indus, a plan in which both countries would share.²² Subsequently and in part as a result of the interest aroused by that article, Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, offered to mediate in the dispute. Later in 1954 the Bank suggested that the three eastern rivers—Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas—go to India and the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—go to Pakistan.

There were six more years of investigation by engineering experts and of negotiations. On September 19, 1960, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed at Karachi by President Ayub, Premier Nehru, and W. A. B. Iliff of the Bank. In general terms, the treaty divided the rivers as originally had been suggested, but provided for a ten-to-thirteen-year period of transition before India gains exclusive use of the three eastern rivers. In that interim, Pakistan is to complete the building of a system of diversion and storage works that will enable water from the west to flow through the eastern parts of the Punjab to meet irrigation needs formerly met by water now belonging to India. Under the treaty, a Permanent Indus Commission of one man from each country watches over the arrangement.

The treaty was possible because of an Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement signed at the same time. Australia, Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the World Bank agreed to finance replacement works to furnish substitute water for that going to India. In general terms, the agreement described a system with two immense storage dams on the Jhelum and Indus Rivers in the north of Pakistan. Water stored at those dams would be rationed downstream through the three western rivers and via seven feeder canals to the lower reaches of the three eastern rivers in Pakistan. In effect the circulation of much

²² "Another 'Korea' in the Making?" *Collier's* (August 4, 1951).

of the surface water was to be revised. Tracts that formerly depended for agriculture on the water now allotted to India were to receive water from the west through the new canals.

The World Bank was administrator of the large sums necessary to carry out the construction. The treaty provided that India would pay 62 06 million pounds to Pakistan. The agreement provided that the following amounts would be contributed:

Pakistan	440,000 pounds in foreign currency
	9,850,000 pounds in rupees
Australia	6,965,000 Australian pounds
Canada	22,100,000 Canadian dollars
Germany	126,000,000 marks
New Zealand	1,000,000 New Zealand pounds
United Kingdom	20,860,000 pounds
United States	177,000,000 dollars

The United States also agreed to provide a loan of 70 million dollars while the World Bank agreed to a loan of 80 million dollars.

Thus in 1960, 900 million dollars was the expected cost of the replacement works. The agreement provided that the countries would consult and act by majority vote if that amount proved inadequate. The estimate, as all estimates have a habit of doing, soon proved to be far too small. By 1964 and 1965 the principal doubt seemed to hinge on the construction of a very large dam on the main stem of the Indus. By that time the estimate of total costs for all the replacement plan was set at about two billion dollars. Whether or not the contributing countries would give substantial assistance to the construction of the large dam (called Tarbela, after the site where it is expected to rise) depended on studies still going on in 1965. There seemed to be little doubt, until the summer events of 1965, that a large amount would eventually be provided.

The communication link between India and Pakistan on problems of the treaty today is the Permanent Indus Commission. On either side one representative, an engineer, "promotes cooperation" between the two countries by studying and reporting on local disputes, boundaries, and other questions, and making sure that the waters are shared according to treaty criteria. Apparently no serious problems have thus far arisen in the workings of the Commission. Annual reports have been unanimous, it is reported, al-

though copies have not been made available to the public. Ordinarily, the Commissioners deal with practical, workaday problems. At the detailed, technical level there seems little difficulty in arriving at friendly solutions for Indo-Pakistani problems. Pakistan's member on the Permanent Indus Commission reports back to the Joint Secretary for Natural Resources in the central government. His immediate superior, the Central Secretary of Industries and Natural Resources is the chairman of a body called the Indus Basin Development Board. This Board is the means of coordinating central departmental functions and central-provincial relationships on Indus Basin works. It consults on expediting the construction of these by WAPDA and other agencies. It considers manpower problems, creation of new industries to provide materials, and other general ways of coping with the impact of the huge building program. It serves, additionally, as the development working party for Indus Basin projects—that is, as the principal planning agency therefor. Its recommendations on Indus projects go directly to the Executive Committees of the National Economic Council and do not go through the Central Development Working Party as the other schemes and projects for WAPDA and other departments. This special status of WAPDA's Indus Basin Plan projects distinguishes them sharply therefore from other undertakings of the Authority. WAPDA's chairman of course serves as a member of the Indus Basin Development Board, and WAPDA is also represented by its chairman or by other key officials in reviewing at that high level the course of projects under the Indus Basin Plan.

WAPDA and the Indus Plan

WAPDA is Pakistan's agent to oversee the construction of the various projects comprising the Indus Basin Plan. two dams, seven canals linking the rivers together, four diversion barrages, a "syphon" to carry one canal under a river, and extensive remodeling of portions of the old irrigation system. By the middle of 1965 the first of two phases of construction in the plan was completed. Three of the canals, one barrage, the syphon, and over half of the construction of the first major dam, Mangla, were completed on schedule. It was confidently expected that the remainder of the works would be completed on schedule also, in time for the entire project to go into operation by the end of the ten-year time limit.

provided in the Indus Water Treaty. The chief doubt on this score concerned the construction of the second major dam, Tarbela, for which preliminary studies were still going on in 1965. It was expected that these studies would show that a dam is both physically and economically feasible. It remained primarily for Pakistan to complete negotiations with the friendly countries for underwriting the foreign exchange costs of the Tarbela Dam. In 1964 it was estimated that the total cost of this dam would be about 650.5 million dollars, including 329 million dollars in foreign exchange.²³ Negotiations were at a standstill in the fall of 1965.

These works are obviously of such a scale that Pakistan alone has not the technical, mechanical, or manpower resources to complete them without foreign assistance. The major part of the money expended for construction of Indus Basin projects is to go therefore to foreign consultants and contractors. There have been but one or two Pakistani firms which singly or in concert could meet the conditions necessary on projects of this size. One link canal has been contracted to a Pakistani firm, most of the planned remodeling of the existing system will be done by local contractors through the West Pakistan Irrigation Department, and of course a number of sizable subcontracts have gone and will go to local firms. The contract of Rs. 29.7 million for the link canal is the largest civil contract ever awarded to a Pakistani contractor.²⁴ Construction of Mangla Dam has gone to a consortium of American firms, one of the largest contracts in civil engineering history. One link canal is being built by an Italian firm. One of the barrages has been finished by a French concern, and so on. Thus is raised one of the important questions about the operation of WAPDA today. A very high proportion of the engineering work for its Indus Basin Plan and other projects is being carried out by foreign engineers and firms.

Mangla Dam

The case of Mangla Dam is instructive on these and other points. Pakistan's leadership did not have the opportunity to decide between building Mangla Dam with outside help and modern methods or building Mangla with resources and manpower available inside the country. The time limit imposed by the Indus Waters Treaty

²³ On these points see *WAPDA Miscellany*, June, 1964, pp. 34-48.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16

made it mandatory that outside help be sought, and the terms of the agreement were such that the World Bank also has insisted the country secure expert assistance in the shape of consulting and contracting firms. For Mangla Dam is a tremendous undertaking, as are most of the other parts of the Indus Basin Plan.²⁵

Three major structures will make up the dam. The main structure will be 11,000 feet long and 380 feet high, providing a storage capacity of approximately 4.75 MAF. This is indeed the main water supply to be shifted by the link canals from the western to the eastern rivers. But of course this is a multiple-purpose dam. Its hydroelectric generating capacity will be 300,000 kw and an ultimate 1,000,000 kw. Flood control features also have been built into the dam, although the precise way in which it will be operated is not yet known.

Early in 1962 the contract for building the dam was let to a group of American firms, in the amount of Rs. 1685.54 million. Work immediately started and subsequently other contracts were awarded for other components to two Japanese, one Australian, and one German firm. By 1964 the contractors had almost 10,000 Pakistani and foreign workers at the site. In effect a complete city has been brought to the location. The 7600 skilled and unskilled laborers employed by the contractor are paid daily wages of a minimum of Rs. 2.75, currently a high minimum for this country. In addition they receive overtime for work over eight hours, health services, free quarters, and meals. Professional employees, both Pakistani and foreign, are provided with living facilities, recreation, and utilities on a commercial basis. Thus work can go on twenty-four hours per day on the project. The 190 or so employees of the consulting engineer are furnished the same facilities, by arrangement with the contractor. WAPDA employees, however, live in another location and are quite separate in their daily lives from other personnel on the project.

Mangla is being built with modern methods and machinery. The work has been programed by the "critical path" method, in the San

²⁵ See Guthrie S. Brkhead, ed., *Mangla Project Administration* (Lahore PASC, 1964), *WAPDA Miscellany* (June, 1964), pp. 42 ff.; West Pakistan WAPDA, "Brief Report and Project Estimate for the Construction of Mangla Dam," IBP Publication No. 89 (Lahore, June, 1963), E. C. Itschner, "Indus Basin Plan," *The Military Engineer* (March-April, 1963), pp. 106-9.

Francisco offices of the contractors. The huge quantities of earth and gravel that have been moved, the tremendous amount of concrete being poured, the speed with which the five large tunnels for the penstocks were drilled, in short every feature of the operation is a vivid contrast with the traditional modes of work in this part of the world. The skill of the engineering and the scale of the construction stagger the imagination, as always is the case on such large building projects. But this is new for Pakistan.

A number of questions are raised by the operations of WAPDA and other organizations at Mangla Dam. For example, in view of its complex commitments at this construction project, what kinds of lessons or what kinds of conclusions should WAPDA be drawing? A great deal of highly organized and technical work is going on, in only part of which is WAPDA completely involved. WAPDA is supervisor of the entire project in behalf of the government of Pakistan. There is, however, a four-way supervisory situation: first, there is the consulting engineer, an English firm hired by WAPDA and indirectly by the World Bank; second, WAPDA; third, the general consulting engineering firm that serves as WAPDA's consultant for all its work is involved in the observation and progress of Mangla, as of the other Indus Basin projects. Finally, the consultant engineering firm hired by the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development also observes the same operations as do the other three.

In addition to all this, there are four different auditing organizations involved in the inspection of financial transactions at the dam, as apparently at other Indus Basin projects. There is first of all the Comptroller and Auditor-General of Pakistan; two private firms retained by WAPDA, one for rupee expenditures and one for foreign currency expenditures; and finally an auditing firm retained by the World Bank. There is of course a rationale for each of these agencies' involvement in the supervision of construction at Mangla, but the result of the system is some kind of super-supervision.

When the contractor and the consultant certify completion of a feature or a quantity of work at the dam, the bill therefor is paid by the World Bank. WAPDA also inspects the work but can only apply to reverse the payments at a later date. Then again the World Bank makes the decision. This kind of arrangement for the consulting engineer, unusual in American practice, has caused little

trouble to date Construction has been able to proceed at a respectable pace without stoppages that could result from disputes over the amount or quality of work done. In final analysis, it is the World Bank as advised by its auditors that calls the turn where construction and payment for construction are concerned.

The major question arising from this situation again concerns the amount of experience and know-how WAPDA and thus Pakistan are deriving from the Mangla and other Indus Basin projects. It scarcely needs pointing out that the nature and quantity of work are unique to this section of the world. The experience and the information that might be derived from these operations could be of great assistance to the country in the coming years. As Tarbela Dam is built, Pakistani engineers trained and experienced on a Mangla Dam could play a crucial role. These questions are considerably more important than the problem of confused supervision.

Shortage of qualified engineers is a serious difficulty for Pakistan at Mangla and elsewhere, as for underdeveloped countries around the world. The contractor in a situation of this type has a great degree of independence in relations with his professional personnel and labor force. He must rely heavily on foreign engineers. Although in 1964 about 946 out of 1493 supervisory and technical employees at the Mangla site were Pakistani, most of these were junior professionals. This experience will endow these men with skills, know-how, and knowledge that may be of great use to the country later on. By terms of the contract the contractor is responsible for training numerous technicians who will also enter the national labor force when they leave Mangla. Pakistani engineers have actually observed and participated in most construction phases. Only in the planning and programming of operations in the San Francisco office of the contractor have they completely missed out. This is an important gap in the potentialities for development of manpower in a major building program such as that at Mangla.

The consulting engineer, from an English firm, has a large number of Pakistanis on his staff, along with expatriates. The principal difficulty here has been that WAPDA has been required to enforce government salary scales on Pakistanis hired by the consulting engineer. Thus salaries are low compared with those of the foreigners paid by the consultant. One result is that the con-

sultant has had difficulty in maintaining an adequate supply of qualified Pakistani engineers and other technicians. No doubt the essential problem is that the country has very few well-trained and experienced engineers, and some of them are continually lured abroad by better salaries. Industry in Pakistan can always win in competition with the government for the services of good engineers. Government salary levels are low enough that they serve as little competition for the enterprising industrialist.

On this score the central questions appear to be: How many men with high engineering and construction management skills as well as technicians such as tractor or dragline operators will remain after Mangla Dam and other foreign-managed projects are completed? Is the country getting more than simply concrete and earth works? Are the numerous difficulties in establishing relations with and supervising consulting engineers and contractors being compared and contrasted? Is the next project—the new link canals or Tarbela—going to be better managed because of experiences at Mangla? Are the difficulties with maintaining an adequate supply of well-trained and educated engineers being assessed and are the conclusions being made available to other projects in other years? Is this opportunity being well used?

There are also labor problems at Mangla, although they have not assumed important dimensions to date. Labor conditions are excellent compared with those elsewhere in the country, but this fact alone means that there will be a continuing observation of conditions at Mangla by labor leaders. Laborers at the dam site are not well organized. Arrangements there resemble what are known as company unions in other parts of the world, for WAPDA management stays in close touch with labor leaders. Workers are not participating actively in union activities. Morale problems or potential conflict at some future date are always possibilities.

Yet another variety of difficulty is suggested by what is going on at Mangla Dam. Mangla will serve to replace the water to be given to India after the interim period has elapsed. It seems obvious that new benefits will accrue. There will be a more dependable supply of irrigation water for the areas irrigated before partition, there will eventually be one million kw of electric power; flood control benefits; fishing and other recreational opportunities for northern Pakistan.

No study of these potential benefits had been made by 1964, so far as could be determined. There had also been no allocation of cost to the various purposes to be served by the project, at least not for public consumption. The amount of space in the reservoir for different purposes—flood control, power generation, irrigation, low flow, dead storage—had not been specified. In short, there was no available evidence that project economics had been worked out. In these circumstances only arbitrary or at best rough assignments of repayment obligations by beneficiaries are possible. As one example, how can electricity rates be set if costs incurred for hydropower features of the dam are unknown?²⁶

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to place the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority in perspective and thus to cast some light on the use of the public corporation in Pakistan's development efforts. Among the countries depending most heavily on this organizational device Pakistan stands high and by some measures may even be first—e.g., in percentage of development expenditures entrusted to such corporations.

The central role of corporations in Pakistan's development activities has been demonstrated. The country's leadership has become committed to the intensive use of the device, particularly since the 1958 Revolution. The ostensible and presumably true reason for this turn of events may be put in a word—disenchantment with the frustrations and delays of the traditional kinds of governmental organizations. Yet whatever the justification, there now are in each wing corporations with these functions: industrial development, agricultural development, transport, water and power development, and others. Only with the 1962 Constitution have some of these been removed in formal organizational terms from the center, while of course other corporations remain with direct connections to the central government today. Among these are about eight banking and finance organizations, Pakistan International Airways, and the Capital Development Authority (building

²⁶ See Guthrie S. Birkhead, ed., *op cit.*, pp 9–10 *Trade and Industry*, September, 1963, a Pakistan publication, estimated that the "ratio of direct benefits to cost" at Mangla Dam would be "about 15 to 1." There was no evidence adduced in support of this estimate.

the new capital at Islamabad). To list all these is to indicate again their leadership in those economic sectors expected to receive the most attention in the Third Plan as they did in the Second Plan.

As might be expected, Pakistanis have debated the wisdom of cutting such enterprises loose from the regular machinery of government. Even more, however, has the debate focused on how best to use corporations. The arguments "seesaw" through the years, as in other countries. A main source of criticism has been numerous career officers in the central and provincial secretariats who have been concerned with the specter of corporations uncontrolled, running riot and squandering the admittedly meager finances of the country. By 1965 and the start of the Third Plan the Planning Commission, however, displayed little interest in this old question of control. In the Plan document the Commission is primarily interested in how to inject more vigor and imagination into corporations, how to improve their managers and internal organization.

West Pakistan WAPDA has provided evidence of the key nature of the authority device in the field of resource development. In the provincial budget for 1964-65 Rs. 727.7 million were allocated to water and power out of a total of Rs. 2104.5 million for development.²⁷ The lion's share of this will be spent by WAPDA, and the figures do not include Indus Basin Plan costs for the year. These latter have averaged nearly the amount of WAPDA's other expenditures in recent years.

And WAPDA has also provided some strong evidence that at least one corporation lives with an abundance of controls, being wielded over all it does. If WAPDA is at all typical in this regard, then the debate over "controls" is scarcely as important as some critics apparently believe. And indeed a quick inspection of the charters of several other corporations shows they are generally subject to the same checks as WAPDA.²⁸

WAPDA's total record, as documented and recorded extensively by the Authority itself, looks good. Time will, to be sure, unfold the

²⁷ Government of Pakistan, Economic Adviser (Dr. A. I. Qureshi), *Pakistan Budgets, 1964-65* (Rawalpindi, 1964), pp. 91, 102.

²⁸ See, for East Pakistan WAPDA, *The Dacca Gazette Extraordinary*, Thursday, January, 1959, Part IIIA; for Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Act No. XIX of 1956, April 18, 1956; for West Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation, West Pakistan Ordinance No. XXV of 1961, September 20, 1961.

whole record Until some future evidence may be adduced, a number of assertions about the Water and Power Development Authority seem viable.

Among government organizations in West Pakistan, WAPDA is leading in the development effort, as measured in terms of expenditures, construction of actual works, energy, drive, spirit, or morale Further, one may guess that a large part of WAPDA's record is attributable to about four factors. First is the physical, visible nature of its work—in concrete, steel, earth, and water. People and especially workers at all levels can see the results of their work immediately, and they work harder because of it. Obviously this is true of many development-oriented organizations.

The quality of WAPDA's leaders—among them Mr. Ghulam Faruque and Mr. Ghulam Ishaq—has been a second factor, of imponderable weight, in placing the Authority in the forefront of development. These leaders and others have been well known and trusted by the martial law regime and its successor constitutional government. Other top administrators and political officials have therefore allowed WAPDA to operate with less personal interference and detailed guidance than is true of other organizations, including old-line departments, and other high administrators.

Yet a third element in WAPDA's accomplishments thus far has been the general belief among persons in authoritative roles that the corporate form allows a certain amount of freedom to exercise initiative and imagination. It is believed that these qualities are more difficult to exercise and thus to find in the regular governmental hierarchy The corporate form is particularly useful, they say, where large-scale and complex enterprises are concerned. That many people in authority believe thus in the corporation's usefulness, adaptability, and versatility is as important a fact as is any objective reality The behavior of many persons is affected by this belief and thus the outputs of the West Pakistan WAPDA and presumably other corporations are affected.

Finally comes the undoubted influence stemming from the immense amount of money—rupees and foreign exchange—which has been paid out by WAPDA for its work Thus it may be argued that the sheer size of its budget accounts for the successful image projected by the Authority in 1965. It cannot be known whether other expenditures or expenditures for the same purposes by other agen-

cies would have brought quicker and better development to Pakistan.

We do know that WAPDA has several challenges in its operations today. It is in direct confrontation with one major problem of every underdeveloped nation: that of finding qualified personnel, in terms of managerial and technical ability. If we may judge from this example, controlling corporations is not so important a problem as is pushing the corporations to get the best available people and keep them going ahead toward economic and administrative development.

Apparently a planned economy may operate as easily through the public corporation as through traditional organizations like departments. Where the corporations are new, vigorous, well led, and well financed they may indeed operate better than the old hierarchy—may, because no comparative studies of corporations and old-line departments have yet been made. Nor is there yet available a competent study of the specific management practices of a corporation.

In the case under examination here, economic and administrative vigor in the programs of WAPDA have not seemed to be closely associated with mere organizational order in the provincial government, the unit formally "in charge of" the Authority. If public corporations are to be abandoned, they must be found guilty of more concrete sins than have yet been proved. Under many circumstances, such corporations seem to be exactly what is needed.

VI. The Karachi Port Trust

The Karachi Port Trust (KPT) is the principal governmental force in the administration of Pakistan's largest port facilities, indeed the sole deep-sea port for West Pakistan, a hinterland of 310,236 square miles with over 46 million people. KPT directs a vital part of the economic infrastructure. Its importance in the modernizing process is evident, although it is a localized operation, relatively small and self-contained when compared with other government agencies engaged in development activities. And it is an old corporation—sixty-one years old at the time of partition.

We are dealing here with micro-administrative questions which have a demonstrable connection with provincial and national policies. At both of these levels Pakistan is depending more heavily than ever before upon the public corporation as an organizational device. In a sense, this discussion highlights the contrasts between an old public enterprise and a new one, WAPDA, described in Chapter V. In the case of KPT we find perhaps more evident the influence of cultural traits, the drag on everyday work that comes from long-established interagency relations, from old quarrels unresolved, from regulations piled on regulations. The argument is not that the Trust is unique in this regard but rather that it is somewhat more representative of traditional administration than are the newly created corporations. Under such circumstances leaders find initiative more difficult to exercise and imaginative decisions time and again stymied by old ties and outworn precedents. External influences, however, operate to offset in a measure the effects of old age on KPT.

HISTORY

Today, Karachi is the biggest city and the busiest port in the sixth most populous nation in the world. Yet by Asian standards it is a young city, for it was founded by merchants less than 250 years ago, about 1729. Karachi's history as a deep-water port is even shorter. Before 1850 it served merely as an anchorage where oceangoing ships could safely be sheltered between the sandy banks of the Manora peninsula and Keamari Island. Extensive harbor works were completed in 1873, after much controversy as to hydraulic features. The first berth for oceangoing vessels was constructed in 1882.

Port development took place under British auspices, for the Union Jack had been flying over the mud-and-wood fort on Manora since 1843. The increasing number of deep-water berths on the east side of the channel were named after British Commissioners of Sind, the geographical area in which Karachi is located. The names were characteristically British: Merewether, Erskine, James, Giles, and Younghusband. By World War I there were seventeen berths built to handle wheat exports. Karachi quickly became the port exporting the largest amount of wheat in the British Empire, reaching a peak volume of 1,380,000 tons in 1912-13.

As long ago as 1870, when the port was managed by the government of Bombay, the establishment of a Karachi Port Trust was proposed. Five years later the trust proposal was again submitted along with a request for greater revenue sources. The revenue request was granted by the Karachi Landing and Wharfage Fees Act of 1875. Then in 1880 the government of Bombay appointed a Karachi Harbour Board. The board was initially composed of five members, although two more were added later so that the Railway and the Chamber of Commerce could be represented. The Collector of Karachi became president of the board, but the board's operations were hampered by lack of statutory authority. Finally, in 1886, the Karachi Port Trust Act was passed, and a corporate board of eight trustees assumed full managerial responsibility in March, 1887.

This 1886 enactment, amended many times, remains the legal basis of the Karachi Port Trust. The KPT is a public corporation with the legal characteristics usually associated with such bodies.

perpetuity, a common seal, the right to enter into contracts, and the right to sue and be sued. The Board of Trustees has the power to raise money through various fees and charges as well as through borrowing. The trustees can acquire, lease, sell, or transfer property. They can construct port works which are defined in the KPT Act. They determine personnel standards, including pay schedules, and hire the necessary employees accordingly.

When the trustees first assumed these responsibilities, the Collector of Karachi continued as chief executive. This arrangement was strongly criticized by the Chamber of Commerce, because the Collector had to divide his time among many duties, including tours out of the city. The chamber argued that the port required a full-time chairman. Fifteen years later (1909) that change was made, and the first chairman, Sir Charles Mules, held the position for ten years.

During the 1920's four new berths were built on the west side of the channel, bringing the port total to twenty-one, while at the same time cotton replaced wheat as the major export. The twenties witnessed changes on the labor front as well. Efforts at unionization began as early as 1911, but recognition was not given to unions until after the passage of the Trade Union Act of 1926 and a violent strike in 1927.

At the time of partition, the war-weary port's wharf and rail facilities were essentially the same export-oriented ones that existed in 1930. The KPT was at that time characterized by highly competent senior staff and an experienced labor force. After the communal riots, however, 90 per cent of the port laborers, who were Hindus, migrated to India.

Virtually overnight Karachi became the only seaport for all of West Pakistan, the political capital of a new country, the business and financial center of the national economy, and the major destination of refugees emigrating from India. Trade composition and direction shifted dramatically, straining the resources of the port and the railroad. In 1938-39, exports comprised 61 per cent of the total tonnage, but by 1954-55 imports had reached 71 per cent of the total. The growth is demonstrated in Table 1 through a comparison of population and trade changes from 1941 to 1961.

Pakistan is a new country, and Karachi's role and significance

have expanded tremendously since independence, but it must be remembered that the Port Trust is not a new operation. Some of the senior officers have been working at the port in positions of responsibility for over thirty years. There are current issues that

TABLE 1
KARACHI POPULATION AND TRADE TONNAGES, 1941-1961

Year	Population (thousands)	Increase (%)	Tonnage (millions)	Increase (%)
1941	436	—	1.9	—
1951	1,065	144	3.5	84
1961	1,913	78	5.7	63

SOURCES: 1961 Census, Bulletin No. 2, Ministry of Home Affairs, Karachi, 1961, Introduction; and *Port of Karachi Magazine*, April-July 1963, p. 57.

have remained unresolved for over half a century. For instance, the construction of a grain elevator has been discussed periodically since 1907. Users of the port were complaining about the inadequacies of the railways even before the turn of the century, and they were still expressing dissatisfaction in the early 1960's.

The World Bank has recognized both the problem of inadequate facilities and the basic soundness of the port's performance by granting two major loans. The first loan agreement for 14,800,000 dollars was signed in 1955. Reconstruction of the east wharves had been discussed as early as 1920. With the assistance of the World Bank, berths five through seventeen were reconstructed and remodeled. Now the east wharves are designed to handle a heavy import volume and to allow truck clearance of goods instead of sole reliance on the railway. In 1964 a second loan agreement for 17 million dollars was concluded. The resulting project includes the construction of three additional berths on the west wharves, the first new berths in thirty-five years, a period in which the volume of trade has increased nearly 250 per cent.

Besides being cognizant of the historical continuity of the port as an operating organization, one should also be aware of the significantly different evaluation feedback which the port receives. The port is a commercial enterprise serving not only domestic users but also foreign shippers. Therefore its efficiency is subject to the critical review of users who are familiar with ports in neighboring countries as well as in advanced economies. On the other hand, the

technology of operations, still largely manual, does not insulate the port from the influence of traditional cultural factors to the extent that, for instance, the technology of Pakistan International Airlines does for that enterprise.

ORGANIZATION

The port's formal organization is not unique. The Board of Trustees has overall managerial responsibility. Since 1886 the board's actual membership has fluctuated from eight to seventeen. As a result of a 1960 "streamlining" amendment to the 1886 charter, supposedly increasing the powers of the board and its chairman, the number of trustees was reduced to eleven. Each of the following organizations elects one member for a two-year term: Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Karachi; Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (comprising primarily foreign firms); Karachi Cotton Association; Pakistan Shipowners Association; and Karachi Municipal Corporation. The central government appoints five members, one of whom must be associated with the KPT labor unions. Customarily these five also include the Divisional Superintendent of the Railway, the Collector of Customs, and the Com-modore-in-Charge of the Pakistan Navy in Karachi.

The chairman of the board, who is usually appointed for three years by the central government, serves also as the chief executive officer of the port. Ten department heads report directly to him as there is no deputy or general manager; there is a secretariat. The officers in charge of these departments are the Chief Engineer, the Chief Mechanical Engineer, the Traffic Manager, the Chief Accounts Officer, the Deputy Conservator (Port Department), the Chief Storekeeper, the Chief Medical Officer, the Civil Defense Officer, the Labor Welfare Officer, and the Superintendent Watch and Ward. In 1960 the 9,400 employees were divided among the departments in the manner shown in Table 2.

Since 1957, however, there have been eleven departments, because of the formation, seemingly at the urging of the World Bank, of a separate organization under an Engineer-in-Chief to handle construction projects. The first officers to hold this post were on deputation from the Railway, but when the last one left in 1961 the KPT Chief Engineer assumed responsibility for this department, Reconstruction East Wharves (REW). On July 1, 1964,

with the completion of the project, the REW Department was abolished as a separate entity; but two months later a new Construction Department was created, presumably to concentrate on the second construction project to be financed by the World Bank.

TABLE 2
KARACHI PORT TRUST PERSONNEL TOTALS, 1960

Department	Permanent	Daily (average)	Temporary	Totals	%
Engineering*	849	1,505	159	2,513	27
Traffic	1,250	815	—	2,065	22
Accounts	159	86	—	245	3
Port	757	—	—	757	8
Mechanical Engineering	1,664	746	—	2,410	26
Secretariat	97	—	4	101	1
Stores	97	38	148	283	3
Medical	40	40	15	95	1
Labor Welfare	59	—	—	59	1
Civil Defense	6	—	—	6	—
Watch and Ward	543	305	14	862	9
Total	5,521	3,535	340	9,396	

*Includes 1,402 employees working on the East Wharves Reconstruction Project.

SOURCE: Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, KPT, quoted by Mahfooz Khan, *Labor Welfare Facilities Provided in Karachi Port Trust* (unpublished master's thesis, University of Karachi, 1961), p. 9.

However, because the Civil Defense Department exists in name only and its head is also the Labor Welfare Officer, there are really ten subordinate officers plus the Secretary who report directly to the chairman.

This is a straightforward line organization, but a few additional comments are germane. The Chief Engineer, besides the civil engineering functions, manages the KPT property. A separate Estate Department previously existed for this purpose, but it was absorbed under the Chief Engineer in 1958. The Mechanical Engineering Department was separated from the Chief Engineer in 1957, and with the increasing use of mechanical equipment its size and importance have continued to grow. It has already experienced one major reorganization. The Accounts Department is unusual in that it combines the treasury, accounting, and statistics functions

with those of auditing and establishment. In other words, outside of the required biannual external audit, the department audits its own accounts, although the separation of these functions is under consideration. Personnel records are maintained in the Establishment Section of the Accounts Department, while recruitment and hiring are handled by the individual departments. Thus the Labor Welfare Department could not be labeled a personnel department as that term is generally understood in the United States. It grew out of labor unrest during World War II and was made permanent in 1947. The major concern is to keep employees "satisfied, cooperative, and productive" by aiding in the settlement of grievances and providing extensive social services.

With these few departments and the small number of administrators involved, interdepartmental relations are rather simple and seemed satisfactory to the author in 1962. There are points of financial friction, detailed below, and there have been problems with security arrangements. A separate Watch and Ward Department since 1954 has had full charge of watchmen. The Traffic Department, however, was still held responsible for the cargo in its area. Thus investigations of theft have frequently degenerated into accusations, especially between these two departments. Ordinarily the chairman convenes a meeting of all department heads weekly, to expedite coordination.

GOVERNMENTAL CONTROLS

Activities of the trustees are limited by a series of legal restraints, somewhat liberalized by the 1960 amendment but still considerable. For example, government approval must be received before the board can change any rates, borrow money, enter into any contract for ordinary expenditures exceeding Rs. 25,000 (\$5,250), engage in any expenditure to be charged to capital, or take any action with regard to employees whose posts command a pay scale with a monthly maximum over Rs. 1,100 (\$230). The 1960 amendment added a section to the Act, with severe implications for the Trust's autonomy: "All acts and proceedings of the Board shall be subject to the control of the Central Government and the Central Government may cancel, suspend or modify any such acts or proceedings" (Section 79A).

The central government ministry with direct supervision over

ports is the Ministry of Railways and Communications. The downward chain of command, before the Navy recommended reorganization in 1961, was from the Minister to the Secretary of the Communications and Transport Division to the Deputy Secretary of Ports and Shipping to the Port Trusts. The Deputy Secretary and his staff were nontechnical persons, and, as one shipping representative described them, "They didn't know the difference between a lighter and a tug."

In December, 1961, the position of Deputy Secretary of Ports and Shipping was abolished and replaced by that of Director General of Ports and Shipping. The Director General was to be a commodore of the Pakistan Navy, with a civil rank of joint secretary. Under him were two Navy commanders, the Director of Ports and the Director of Shipping, and two principal officers of the Mercantile Marine Department, the Chief Nautical Surveyor and the Chief Engineer and Ship Surveyor. The KPT was to "continue to function, for the time being, as hitherto under their . . . Act."

The KPT officers were ambivalent in their reaction to the new directorate. They were pleased with the technical qualifications of their new superiors but fearful of even greater control, and they questioned the Navy personnel's comprehension of commercial port operations. The Navy's role was not supposed to be one of final control, because the Director General reported to a civilian minister. But the Director General was expected to derive "maximum assistance" from the Navy, and a direct telephone line on his desk was to Naval Headquarters.

Besides the Railways and Communications Ministry, the board (as with other agencies) is also subject to the "sanctioning authority" of the Finance Ministry and the Planning Commission. Parts replacement, especially that involving foreign exchange, has been the most severely affected by slow, cumbersome, and often economically illogical procedures of the powerful Finance Ministry. The Planning Commission has further complicated the process of obtaining approval for new projects, because not only must the expenditure for new works be sanctioned by Finance but the particular project must also be included in the Plan. In practice, according to several senior port officers, this increased control has been accompanied by little, if any, consultation with them, at least for the First and Second Five-Year Plans.

FINANCE PROBLEMS

The Karachi Port Trust has been financially sound, from a yearly balance-sheet point of view, since independence. Revenue receipts have consistently exceeded regular expenditures from 1947-48 to 1963-64. The surpluses, as reported in each successive *KPT Year Book of Information*, have averaged over Rs 5 million per year in that seventeen-year period. In recent years these surpluses plus some of the accumulated balances from previous revenue surpluses have been applied to two accounts, the reconstruction scheme and the revenue reserve fund, which must contain at least two-thirds of the average income of the previous three years. A fairly accurate picture of KPT revenue sources and the division of expenditures for 1961-62 can be obtained from the breakdown in Table 3.

On the other hand the department of the KPT which received the most criticism, from outside and within on the occasion of the present study, was Accounts. The financial procedures were characterized as "nepotistic," "inefficient," "overbearing," "petty," and "inconsistent." As was the Finance Ministry in the central government, the Accounts Department of the KPT was considered the major reservoir of traditionalism and inertia. The senior officers of the port were generally resentful of the degree of financial control over their activities and the way in which it was exercised. The pay system was particularly criticized. Incorrect computations were said to be common, and the individual receipt method produced long waiting lines during working hours. Accounting procedures were labeled archaic. Discrepancies between the totals and supporting ledgers were continuously found by government auditors. A United States advisory team recently succeeded in introducing a "rational depreciation and replacement policy," but in other efforts at innovation they were unsuccessful.

The rigid, doublechecking control system of the Accounts Department is apparently similar in kind to that utilized by most public finance sections in the subcontinent. These draconian systems, which are often poorly and inconsistently enforced, can be partially traced, like many other government practices, to the lingering influence of the colonial administration. More importantly, they are a function of administrative overcompensation by the finance sections for their own inability to control transactions.

TABLE 3
KARACHI PORT TRUST INCOME AND EXPENDITURES, 1961-62*

INCOME		
Revenue Categories	Amounts (000 Rs)	Percentage
Dock and wharfage dues on goods	20,800	42
Storage fees	8,552	17
Land and building rentals	4,420	9
Craneage	3,704	7
Port dues	2,507	5
Hired plant and gear	2,151	4
Interest earnings	1,966	4
Berth fees	1,536	3
Pilot fees	1,333	3
Water supply	1,080	2
Miscellaneous	1,701	3
Total	49,750	

EXPENDITURES		
Expenditure categories	Amounts (000 Rs)	Percentage
Contributions to funds (capital, depreciation and replacement, provident, etc.)	17,402	37
Repairs, maintenance and working	10,589	23
Pay and allowances	8,543	18
Debt charges (sinking fund—World Bank loan)	5,446	12
Payment for services (stevedores, railway, etc.)	3,243	7
Miscellaneous	1,802	4
Total	47,025	

*Because the above figures are computed from accounts with rather different headings, they are only approximate.

SOURCE: *Administration Report of the Karachi Port Trust for the Year 1961-62.*

effectively plus the strong incentives for the public to utilize extra-legal and extraordinary methods to obtain service and for the poorly paid public servants to supplement their inadequate incomes. As a result no one seems to be expected to follow the regulations faithfully. One can imagine an informal system with some degree of consistency in expectations developing outside of the formal, legal structure. Unfortunately, a peasant society under the impact of early modernization is rife with uncertainties. In such societies

an attitude of distrust, both toward and among government officials is not only created but is also aggravated by the interaction between public (and private) officials trying to get as much as they can for themselves and other officials trying to erect barriers and control systems.¹

PORT INVESTMENT

When the Planning Commission makes its investment sanctioning decisions, should the aforementioned financial record be the basis for allocating capital funds to the port? Even if the port is treated as a commercial operation and the unrealistic assumption is made that actual costs sufficiently approximate true opportunity costs, the answer is negative. The prices which users would be willing to pay are unreliable indicators of value to the economy because of three factors: (1) rate structure, (2) artificial profits, and (3) unrecoverable gains.

The KPT accounting system in 1961 was not on a function-cost basis and therefore it was not possible to identify the cost of any particular service. The rate structure in that year was arbitrarily determined, resulting in a number of anomalies, such as charging the same fee for a place at a berth or at a mooring.² Until a cost-accounting system is instituted, a rational, profit-maximizing rate structure cannot be established.

Even if this problem could be solved, however, the price merchants would be willing to pay would reflect the artificial profitability of imports more than the value of lower transportation costs to them. The combination of an official exchange rate and a license system to control imports has led to an average profit margin on imported commodities of 60 per cent (1964).³

Third, many of the parties who would benefit from the savings in transportation costs could not or would not be directly charged by the port. New jobs, new opportunities, better profit prospects—all may accrue in industries which are not direct users but are indirectly affected by the port investment. These are the external

¹ The best theoretical development of a similar argument can be found in Fred Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries—The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1964).

² This situation was changed in 1962.

³ Mati Lal Pal, "The Determinants of the Domestic Price of Imports," *Pakistan Development Review* (Winter, 1964), p. 607.

effects which are usually not recoverable through prices charged to direct users. Thus the economy may benefit in ways which the profit figures would not reflect.

Whether because of arbitrary revenue-cost relationships, overpricing, or underpricing, financial profit records are not reliable indicators of contribution to the economy. A more reliable evaluation is benefit-cost analysis (B-C). The recommended B-C approach is one which

- 1) includes both direct (net savings in transportation costs to users) and indirect (external effects) benefits;
- 2) uses accounting prices to reflect
 - a) better approximations of real opportunity costs than the prices of underdeveloped economies, and
 - b) objectives other than economic efficiency, such as a satisfactory rate of economic growth, reducing regional disparities, etc.; and
- 3) seeks the maximization of present worth, computed by employing a social time preference discount rate.⁴

Savings in transportation costs can be realized from (1) improvement in channels and terminals; (2) provision of modern, more efficient terminal facilities; and (3) provision of an adequate number of berths. The savings would result from the expected reduction of congestion, increased speed of berthing and cargo handling, lower maintenance costs, better sheltered and protected cargo, and fewer accidents. The United States Army Corps of Engineers estimated that from congestion caused by an inadequate number of berths at Karachi, the Pakistan economy in 1960-61 lost about 4 million dollars in extra shipping costs alone at the official exchange rate.⁵ The commonly accepted undervaluation (50 per cent) of foreign exchange brings the total accounting loss to 6 million dollars.

In addition to these savings, ports can make other positive contributions to the economy and its development. The ports act as the receiving funnel for capital and raw material imports. In 1962,

⁴ Gary Fromm, ed., *Transport Investment and Economic Development* (Washington, D C : Brookings Institution, 1965); and M. S. Feldstein, "The Social Time Preference Discount Rate in Cost Benefit Analysis," *The Economic Journal* (June, 1964), pp 360-79.

⁵ *Transportation Survey of West Pakistan*, Vol. II (Washington, D C : Chief of Engineers, 1962), pp 74 and 82

capital goods accounted for 31.7 per cent of Pakistan's imports, while 35.5 per cent were industrial raw materials. It has been estimated that in 1960 over 20 per cent of the required raw material input in West Pakistan's industries was imported. Some industries, such as transport equipment and rubber products, imported over 80 per cent of their raw materials. Because of import requirements a number of industries locate at the port. Certainly there are other reasons but, nevertheless, two-thirds of all value added by manufacturing in West Pakistan (1959-60) originated in the port city of Karachi. A small study conducted while the author was in Pakistan came to the conclusion that in 1960 over 25 per cent of the daily employment and nearly one-third of the monthly wage bill in Karachi was derived either directly or indirectly from the port and port-oriented industries. In 1960-61, 31 per cent of the total ordinary revenue of the central government came from taxes levied at the port of Karachi.

United States surplus commodities imported mostly through Karachi during 1955-61 saved approximately 7 per cent of the average annual export earnings during that period (taking into account price and demand differentials). Besides saving foreign exchange while maintaining minimum consumption levels, particularly in the cities, surplus food imports also enabled the government to counteract inflation effectively. Not only were supplies adequate to fulfill effective demand, but also the local currency accumulated through commodity sales in United States-owned accounts during 1955-60 was expended at a much slower rate than acquired, depleting the money supply.⁶

Not all of the contributions are quantifiable. For instance, there is the port's central role in the diffusion of industrial ways. Almost invariably port cities serve as the reception centers for foreign persons and foreign ideas. This intangible and unmeasurable dynamic role in cultural change may be more important than many of the quantifiable contributions. Certainly no benefit-cost analysis evaluating the investment returns from ports should overlook the secondary development impacts, both measurable and unmeasurable.

⁶ Christoph Beringer, *The Use of Agricultural Surplus Commodities for Economic Development in Pakistan* (Karachi: The Institute of Development Economics, 1964), pp. 19-20.

THE WORKERS

Despite the great benefits from port investment, it should not be a substitute for realizable improvements in administrative proficiency and labor productivity. On a worldwide basis the tactics of labor unions and inefficient administration are considered the major deterrents to maritime progress.⁷ In the past at the KPT, poor labor relations have been responsible for performance curtailment. But since the last major strike in 1954 and especially since the appointment of a union president to the Board of Trustees in 1957, labor relations have been described by most observers as "cordial," with possible exceptions during contract negotiation time every eighteen months. There are infrequent work stoppages, usually one-day protests, but the union relies more on the slowdown to obtain its objectives. The Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1959 indeed prohibits strikes by employees of public utilities such as the Port Trust. Both conciliation and arbitration before an industrial court are compulsory, the latter becoming necessary if the former fails. The administration encouraged the formation of works committees in order to provide an institutional means of hearing worker grievances and suggestions, but in only one department has the device thus far been successful.

A combination of casual status and the threat of mechanization has produced feelings of job insecurity among the dockworkers. In 1962, 70 per cent of the dockworkers were hired on a casual basis. Forty-two per cent of the KPT staff and all of the labor force of the stevedoring companies who work under contract to the KPT were casual. The dock laborers were hired by use of the traditional call (only those possessing union identification cards could be hired), and the call was a binding contract which meant that the worker was paid whether he worked or not.

In Pakistan the casual worker does not receive the paternalistic protection given to the permanent employee. In recognition of that fact the KPT has attempted to lower the percentage of casual employees. The chairman maintained that the Port Trust could not do much more about decasualization because of fluctuations in its demand for labor, because it did not control other employers such as the stevedores, and because of KPT's concern for efficiency.

⁷ *A Survey of Factors Which Affect Transportation Cost* (Washington, D C : Organization of American States, 1964), pp. 3-4.

He cited the case of Bombay, where decasualization of port workers had resulted in drastic declines in efficiency. In response the Bombay port management introduced piece-rate incentives, which did increase output. The negative consequences from the management's point of view, however, were higher labor costs and higher rates of damage from careless handling.⁸

Some of the efficiency problems of the Port Trust can be traced to a simple but basic source: wage differentials. In many occupational categories the KPT salary ranges were significantly below those prevailing elsewhere in Karachi (though they were higher than in some other public utilities). For example, carpenters at the Fish Harbor in 1962 earned Rs. 15 a day, but carpenters at the KPT received only Rs. 4. Some KPT stenographers earned Rs. 150 per month, while many private companies paid Rs. 450.⁹ Such discrepancies might very well account for the reported 75 per cent yearly turnover rate among KPT stenographers.

The private contracting stevedores' minimum wage rates for dockworkers were two to three times higher than the basic rates of the KPT, and it was generally believed that labor productivity closely paralleled this differential. However, two other factors contributed to this efficiency gap, namely, the casual and therefore uncertain employment status of all workers hired by the stevedores and their closer supervision. For about 50 per cent of the KPT dockworkers, who were permanent employees, actual wage differentials were much smaller because of the number of allowances and amenities that supplemented their basic wage. The union attempted to eliminate this wage differential, but in the judicial tribunal the Port Trust successfully defended its contention that the duties performed were sufficiently diverse—that is, the work on the ships and wharves performed by the stevedores' gangs required greater skill than the handling by the KPT employees in the sheds and storage areas. Actually, the controlling of cargo handling on both ship and shore by one contractor, rather than being divided between two, was considered by both shipowners and union leaders a major factor in the better performance of Karachi in comparison with reports of other South Asian ports.

⁸ I. A. Abbasi, Chairman, KPT, mimeographed memorandum to the Administrative Staff College, March, 1962, p. 9.

⁹ Iqbal Quraishi, Labor Welfare Officer, KPT, interview, January 25, 1962.

In 1961-62 there were 96 officers, 641 skilled, 486 semiskilled and 3,077 unskilled permanent workers employed by the Port Trust. Thus 72 per cent of 4,300 permanent employees were unskilled, and most of them were illiterate. As in other government agencies the wage structure included four classes: class I, senior officers; class II, junior officers; class III, supervisors and clerks; and class IV, tradesmen, semiskilled and unskilled labor. Table 4 is a summary (unrevised) of the new 1959 pay schedule for classes III and IV.

It will be noted, first, that the skilled tradesmen have an average salary approximately twice that of manual, unskilled labor. This differential confirms the common generalization that the average pay of skilled manual workers exceeds that of the unskilled by much greater proportions in underdeveloped economies than in developed ones, where the difference is only 20 to 30 per cent.¹⁰ Considering the difficulties that the Port Trust has in hiring skilled workers, the differential should perhaps be much greater in order to attract this scarce resource. Second, the influence of education and the white-collar prestige which is associated with it, especially in government agencies in modernizing societies, provides a plausible explanation for the striking disparity in wages enjoyed by the clerks over most manual laborers. In order to see more clearly the wage differentials among major occupational groups and how they compare with similar categories in an advanced economy, the index data are presented in Table 5.

Table 5 conveys dramatically the tremendous differentials in remuneration at the Port Trust and how they compare with similar relationships in the United States. The senior officers are certainly in another world, socially, educationally, and financially. No wonder they consider themselves members of the elite, and no wonder the lower classes behave with awe, deference, and submission toward them. Upward mobility is hardly a conceivable alternative among the poorly paid who compose over three-fourths of the port's employees.

In Pakistan the basic wage does not include dearness or cost-of-living allowances, which in the lower categories in Table 5 would

¹⁰ Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick Harbison and Charles Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 210-11.

TABLE 4
CLASS III AND IV WAGES, KARACHI PORT TRUST, 1959 SCHEDULE

Class IV	Monthly Wage Range (Rupees)	Average	No of Posts	Major Occupational Groups
Grade 6	40-54	43	1,335	Peons, mazdoors, chowkidars
Grade 5	40-65	51	430	Khalases
Grade 4	45-80	61	624	Lascars (sailors)
Grade 3	60-100	79	233	Carpenters, fitters
Grade 2	65-120	91	294	Cranesmen, tindals
Grade 1	70-125	92	73	Tradesmen
Total			<u>2,989</u>	
Class III				
Grade 6	80-145	111	922	Junior clerks
Grade 5	90-175	132	21	—
Grade 4	100-225	157	242	Senior clerks
Grade 3	150-275	207	85	Administrative assistants
Grade 2-B	175-325	—	44	Traffic supervisors, stenographers
Grade 2-A	200-375	280	35	Chargemen
Grade 1-B	240-440	—	17	—
Grade 1-A	300-500	400	44	Foremen
Total			<u>1,410</u>	
Total Classes III & IV			4,399	

TABLE 5

BASIC WAGE STRUCTURE RELATIONSHIP OF SELECTED OCCUPATIONS TO JANITOR/SWEEPER BASE—UNITED STATES AND KARACHI PORT TRUST*

Occupation	United States	KPT
Janitor/sweeper	100	100
Watchman/chowkidar	100	100
Laborer/mazdoor	109	100
Carpenter	122	184
Cranesman	131	212
Junior clerk	117	258
Senior clerk	131	342
Senior draftsman	145	384
Head draftsman	184	930
Foreman	152	930
Accountant	174	651
Engineer, mechanical	214	930
Chief accountant	280	3,953
Chief engineer	457	5,349

*Because of a number of comparability problems, the figures portray approximate relationships only

SOURCES U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No 1387, *National Survey of Professional, Administrative, Technical, and Clerical Pay, February-March 1963*, Table 1, pp 12-13; *ibid.*, Bulletin No 1345-83, *Wages and Related Benefits—Part II. Metropolitan Areas, United States and Regional Summaries, 1962-63*, "Occupational Wage Relationships, Public Utilities," pp 47, 50-51, U.S., Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population 1960*, Vol. I, Part 1, *United States Summary*, Table 208, "Earnings in 1959 of Persons in the Experienced Civilian Labor Force by Occupation, Color, and Sex," pp 553-54; Karachi Port Trust, "1959 Pay Structure and Position Classification of Classes III and IV"; and other data collected from Chief Accounts Officer, KPT, Fall 1961.

have been a substantial proportion of the basic wage. Since 1963 the KPT has been following the lead of the central government in absorbing this allowance into the basic pay structure. There are also a number of other allowances for permanent employees such as those for uniform, medical, housing, and transportation expenses, so that in 1962 the actual minimum for a permanent employee was not Rs. 40 per month but Rs. 87.

Welfare amenities provided KPT permanent employees are extensive, although not untypical of large public and private enterprises in this country. The KPT chairman in 1963 proudly stated, "Presumably there is hardly any public institution which does as

much for its employees as the KPT in different directions such as housing, medical attention, educational and recreational facilities, canteens, cooperative societies, employees welfare funds, sports, and literary activities."¹¹ Approximately half of the permanent employees live in KPT housing, ranging from bachelor dormitories to officer bungalows. In 1962 over six hundred children of employees were attending schools, both primary and secondary, operated by the KPT. About fifty adults were attending literacy classes. Three dispensaries, a maternity clinic, and a hospital serve the employees and their families. The Labor Welfare Department organizes and sponsors a large variety of social and sporting events, one of the recent examples being a "beautiful baby" contest

These welfare programs are not frivolous or superfluous. Karachi suffers from a severe housing shortage. Very few of the KPT children would be getting an education if there were no KPT schools. The social and sports activities provide diversion and aid in breaking down suspicions between provincial groupings. Even the baby contest encouraged parents to keep their children clean and well cared for. There were unsuccessful attempts in the early sixties to integrate recreation and improvement schemes, such as interspersing job-training films with entertainment movies, although films on sanitation and cooking were well received.

The major criticism of these welfare benefits that one hears is of their paternalistic nature. They have no clear relationship to productivity, and a few observers argued that they contributed to apathy both on and off the job. The KPT Labor Welfare Officer spoke with keen disappointment of the lack of motivation on the part of the workers who "expected KPT to take care of everything." Only religious projects could draw voluntary community participation in terms of time and money. But the alternative of tying basic subsistence benefits such as housing and medical care to job performance would be at least equally open to criticism.

Caste and Supervision

Most observers agree that the senior officers of the KPT are efficient and conscientious. All are well educated (many in England), experienced, and considered competent by the major users

¹¹ I. A. Abbasi, Chairman, KPT, address, December 21, 1963

of the port. The senior officers think of themselves as members of the elite of Pakistani society, and by most social and economic measures they qualify for that distinction. People of lower positions treat them with deference and awe. There is considerable social distance between the officers and their work force.

In Pakistan much of this social and educational gap is a reflection of what may be termed caste structure. One may argue that caste distinctions do not exist in this Muslim country, but this contention is a confusion of ideals and observable reality. There is more social intercourse across class boundaries in Pakistan than in India, but centuries of Hindu diffusion and Muslim factional disputes have resulted in a recognizable caste structure which pervades Pakistani society today. Iqbal, the famous Muslim poet, remarked, "Surely we have out-Hindu'd the Hindu himself. We are suffering from a double caste system: the religious caste system of sectarianism, and a social caste system."¹²

Outside of senior administrative and professional positions, another high-status occupation, probably because of its educational prerequisites, is that of clerks. The clerks at the KPT in 1960-61 were attempting to organize their own union so that they could separate themselves from the illiterate manual workers, some of whom earned more money than junior clerks. But the union was having difficulty because many of the clerks thought that unions were for workers—a sentiment not unique to Pakistani white-collar workers.

One of the consequences of the gap between the elite and the workers is the absence of an effective middle management. The Traffic Manager of the port in 1962 considered the junior officer level the weakest link in the chain of command. What they needed was "junior officers, not senior subordinates." Men hired at the junior officer level (a rather small number compared with the usual pyramidal organization of Western firms) attempted to identify with their superiors rather than to supervise. They appeared to the observer to be desk bound and aloof from their subordinates.

Part of this status detachment and lack of vertical communication has been traced to the assimilation of British colonial adminis-

¹² Quoted in John Edlefsen and Jamila Akhtar, "Caste Differentials among the Muslims of West Pakistan," *The Academy Quarterly* (I, 1961), pp. 29-37.

trative behavior. Other factors include the relative lack of achieved as contrasted with ascribed characteristics in higher officials and the social distances endemic in the caste system. A German economist who was Deputy Manager of the newly constructed shipyard located adjacent to the port tried to attack both this problem and the "privileged position" of the clerks. In 1961 he tried to take away the desks and offices of petty supervisors in order to force them into contact with the men they were supposed to supervise. The Deputy Manager said that he ran into a "stone wall of resistance from the senior officers." He had even less success with the clerks, who worked six hours per week less than shop personnel (forty-two hours instead of forty-eight). Such an arrangement was just the reverse of what it should be, in the German-conditioned mind of the Deputy Manager, but his proposals for a change got absolutely nowhere. He believed that his attempts at innovation were blocked by the "pervading nepotism, tight caste system which exists despite any religious dictates to the contrary, their view of supervisory behavior, and the British legacy."

The Deputy Manager was critical of the British colonial administration because it had perpetuated and reinforced the view that manual work was inferior and that any supervisory position meant an office and a desk and no more manual work. Presumably he included continuous contact with the workers in the category of manual work, for he also observed that the officers were unsuccessful in their infrequent attempts to direct laborers because they did not know how to motivate, "when to praise nor when to damn." The Labor Welfare Officer of the KPT generally agreed, remarking that this power consciousness, this trying to play the British *sahib*, has led to overcentralization in decision-making and the disappearance of the "intense" supervision which existed prior to independence. "People used to this kind of supervision don't work unless told to do so."¹³

The supervision problem was frequently commented upon by outside observation teams, whether foreign or Pakistani. An American team stated in 1961 that "supervision throughout the Karachi Port Trust was generally far below that to be expected. Specifically, it was noted that there was a lack of punctuality, sense of responsi-

¹³ Iqbal Quraishi, interview, February 15, 1962

bility, issuance of proper instructions to employees and attentiveness to the numerous details which are the mark of a good supervisor." The most disturbing consequences of this supervisory inattention were pilferage and extensive damage to freight. When this author toured the west wharves in 1962, evidence of destructive handling was widespread. Gangs of workers were observed, some carrying heavy loads without mechanical aids, while some sat doing nothing and others were haphazardly and carelessly unloading and dropping cargo.

Inadequate supervision, however, is not peculiar to the Karachi Port Trust or to Pakistan, for it exists in most societies just breaking out of a nonindustrial social structure. While the supervisors are trying to identify with an upper-class role that they perceive as requiring limited contact with manual tasks and members of the lower class, the lower-class workers with their illiteracy and conditioned submissive responses are expected to perform tasks for which they have little training or material incentive. Neither the supervisors nor the workers have a highly developed ethic of responsibility to get the job done well. The supervisors seem to consider it sufficient to issue orders, and the workers consider it sufficient to make their daily appearance.

Two of the consequences of poor training and poor motivation are substantial material wastage and indifferent equipment maintenance. These complaints were shared by the superintendent of the KPT workshop and the production manager of the adjacent shipyard. Both organizations have recently initiated training programs, with limited success. The most lauded KPT training operation in 1962 was the four-year trade apprentice and marine engineering apprentice school which graduates about twenty men per year. Because of external pressures and needs, however, the certificate holders are not required to work for the KPT.

There are exceptions to such criticisms of the KPT, but it is important to emphasize that the basic difficulty lies in the incentives attached to the various roles in the social structure. Foreign "experts" who argue that KPT laborers are so illiterate they "cannot even read arrows" miss the point. The laborers probably would behave in a manner more workmanlike from a Western viewpoint, if the organization were so structured and material and morale in-

centives so supplied as to make sure that they "cared." Yet the cultural barriers to providing such conditions are tremendous

Working Conditions

It is the author's reluctant observation that many of the human beings involved in KPT activities, officials and consumers, are suffering from a rather severe case of social distrust. Professor Myron Weiner has argued that this condition was the basic cause of the collapse of the parliamentary experiment in Pakistan.¹⁴ A recent analysis by Professors Almond and Verba of "civic culture" concluded that attitudes of social trust and cooperation are highly correlated with viable democratic societies and that the more educated the populace the more likely it is to possess these attitudes.¹⁵ Since the capacity to provide mass education in turn depends on the productive strength of the economy, economic modernization becomes a necessary element in the solution. Here again is evidence of the "vicious circle" in which Pakistan and similar societies are caught.

The practice of speed money or incentive gratuities known as *baksheesh* permeates Pakistani society. The Port Trust is no exception. The cranesmen, who can control the speed of cargo handling, have long been known to receive "incentive bonuses." Clearing and forwarding agents regularly tip numerous officials in order to expedite the clearance of cargo. In justification, some Muslims point out their religious obligations to be charitable.

Several foreign consultants have reacted with moral indignation to these corrupt practices, which are said to undermine efficiency and the moral fiber of the people. Such righteous proclamations overlook two factors. That corruption, even ethnocentrically defined, is not confined to the underdeveloped countries; and that there are compelling environmental conditions which produce widespread recourse to financial bribes outside of regular channels. In

¹⁴ "The Politics of South Asia," in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 198.

¹⁵ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

fact, it may be hypothesized that modernization creates (as a functional requirement) not only an economic middle class but also a middle-class ethic. As the middle-class ethic transforms (some might say reforms) the social norms, the level of public honesty and trust, both expectation and performance, perhaps increases.

Religious beliefs and practices do not present insuperable obstacles to economic development, as the history of Western Europe demonstrates, but they can make development more difficult. For example, several senior officers at the port and the shipyard complained that the workers gave the injunction to pray five times a day as the excuse for avoiding work. And on other occasions religious obligations have conflicted with job performance. One unusual controversy raised the question of priority between firefighting and religious duties. In this case fighting fires won, but sacred concerns frequently override any secular interest in efficiency. The most significant case, *Ramazan*, of course affects not only the port but all of Pakistan. *Ramazan* is the Muslim month of fasting. During this period Muslims are not supposed to drink or eat from a half hour before sunrise to a half hour after sunset. Most KPT workers adhered to the fast faithfully. At the port during 1962 *Ramazan*, effective working hours per shift were cut from seven to six. Officials further pointed out that efficiency was noticeably reduced as fasting workers conserved their energy by avoiding any strenuous effort. The weather is usually warm, if not hot, the workers undernourished to begin with, and the tasks generally manual, requiring substantial physical exertion. Thus religious practices encounter modernity in Pakistan.

Another source of disruption among laborers at the port is village and tribal rivalry. Nearly all KPT laborers were hired after partition when the predominantly Hindu dockworkers went to India. At present workers come from all over West Pakistan. They range from Pathans to Makranis, from Panjabis to Sindis. Approximately 60 per cent are in a migratory status and many will eventually return to their home village. In the living quarters the men segregate themselves by village, tribal, language, and regional identification. There is suspicion of alien groups, and hostility breaks out every now and then. On one occasion a tribal group surrounded one of their own members as he lay injured on the dock and refused medical help from "foreign" sources. The worker died.

HORIZONTAL LINKAGES

The Karachi Port Trust deals with a number of governmental agencies besides those which supervise and sanction its work and finances. Some of these coordinate agencies provide services essential to the performance of port operations, such as Railways and Customs. Other governmental units provide supplementary services, for example, the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works. Some have overlapping jurisdictions, such as the Karachi Municipal Corporation and the military, whereas others are simply neighbors in the port area.

The coordination problems between these agencies are illustrated by the port's 1959-60 traffic jam, primarily caused by the "bunching" of wheat ship arrivals. The Ministry of Food, through the Washington Embassy, chartered ships to carry United States surplus wheat to Karachi. At that time, before the completion of the reconstruction project, all imported goods on the east wharves were cleared by rail. In order to expedite that function, both the Ministry of Food and the KPT supplied information to the Railway, not always consistent or correct, as to the needs for rail wagons. The Railway had nowhere near the necessary line capacity to clear the peak volume of arriving imports. Communications frequently broke down, accusations flowed back and forth, and the result was a transportation snarl which in peak periods saw twenty vessels waiting off port—some longer than a month.

The flood of criticism was directed mainly at the Pakistan Western Railway, possibly because it was the ostensible bottleneck. On some days 3,000 wagons could have been utilized but only 500 were supplied. The Railway officers were correct in pointing out that in any case they could not have cleared more than 650 wagons daily out of the port since that was the capacity. On the other hand, some unusable, dirty wagons were sent to the wharves, a few derailments occurred, and wagons were not always in the right place at the right time. But the zealous defense of the Railway officers of their organization was extraordinary, and their *esprit de corps* was exceptional. Even the chairman of the KPT, who was formerly a Railway executive, defended the Railway against the criticisms of his own officers.

The "bunching mess" in 1960 led to the establishment of a Transport Coordination and Allocation Board, composed of repre-

sentatives of all relevant departments. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports provided information on the private sector. The board accumulated forecasts of probable demands, both public and private, on all transport facilities and allocated the available capacity between the expected users. The board also advised the Planning Commission on transport investment allocation. A subcommittee of this board, known as the Port Coordination Committee, composed of representatives of the KPT, the Food Ministry, and the stevedores, focused directly on the wheat ship problem.

The related case of the automatic baggers further illustrates the coordination problem. In 1960-61 wheat was being bagged manually either in the ships' holds or, as open plinths became available, on the wharf. Waste and pilferage were common. The weighing and uniformity standards of the Food Ministry required redoing many of the hand-sewn bags. Then the Food Ministry purchased three automatic baggers from a Swiss firm with United States aid. They arrived in late summer, 1961, and were assembled by Swiss engineers in the early fall. Each bagger had a capacity of 150 tons per hour in comparison with the manual rate of 75 tons. Unfortunately, the Food Ministry was unable to recruit trained personnel to operate them (partially, it was reported, because of the low salaries sanctioned by the Finance Ministry for the posts). The port engineers who thought they could learn to operate the machines had to stand by frustrated. In March, 1962, the automatic baggers were still idle, though the Food Ministry seemed close to finally putting them into operation.

For the provision of the standard public services such as streets, schools, and health, there are four major jurisdictions in Karachi: the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC), the Karachi Development Authority (KDA), the Cantonment Boards (military), and the KPT. All of these governmental units are in Karachi District, while the Karachi District plus the Lasbela District form the Karachi Division. The division is one of twelve comprising the province of West Pakistan. The KMC and the KDA operate largely through this regular field machinery of government. The KPT and the Cantonment Boards report direct to central government departments without formal regard for district or division.

The chairman of the KPT in 1962 was a member of the Karachi Municipal Corporation, and one KMC member was on the trust board. There were no KPT representatives on either the district

or divisional councils. The Deputy Commissioner of Karachi expressed the need for a KPT representative on the district council, inasmuch as the council's deliberations were frequently hindered by lack of technical information on the port. The need seems obvious.

The Karachi Municipal Corporation does not collect taxes on KPT property. In fact, the KPT and the KMC have a revenue-sharing arrangement. But the revenue sharing frequently leads to disputes. In 1962, for example, they were in court contesting which one should collect the sanitation taxes, each claiming that they provided the service. The KMC collects a terminal tax on port users. A few of the main roads in the port area are maintained by the KMC, and its labor commissioner is responsible for union recognition, registration, and "labor peace" throughout Karachi.

The Karachi Development Authority is a newer agency with concerns that are more dynamic and related to development—the comprehensive building or rebuilding of selected parts of the metropolitan area. It was established in 1957 by a President's Order amalgamating and expanding the functions of the Karachi Improvement Trust and the Karachi Joint Water Board. The KDA can assume complete jurisdiction over an improvement project area, providing all the services and collecting the taxes, if the government gives its approval. The chairman of the KDA complained in 1962 that the government never had given this kind of approval, and as a result considerable duplication existed between the KDA and the KMC.

The KDA and the KPT were competing for land in the port area with virtually no formal communication between them. The KDA could expropriate KPT land for improvement schemes, but the Port Trust could challenge the compensation or the scheme through established legal and government channels. The director of the KDA criticized the KPT for providing municipal services and engaging in residential and industrial estate development, because in so doing they were exceeding the boundaries of their "reasonable functions."¹⁰ The port officers in return criticized the inability of the KDA to satisfy the water supply needs of the port.

¹⁰ In this connection it should be indicated that in Pakistan it is common for government departments and corporations to provide housing for some of their employees.

The military provides all public services in certain of the areas it controls in Karachi. A Cantonment Board has jurisdiction over the harbor-protecting peninsula of Manora. Several naval installations are located on Manora, but so also are a variety of KPT facilities, including the office of the Harbor Master, a workshop, drydock, schools, and employee housing. The Military Engineering Service was interminably slow in providing electricity to the peninsula. Years elapsed, buildings were not connected, and in 1962 the Port Trust was planning to set up its own electric generator. It seems that the KPT, the military, and the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation could not agree on a formula for sharing the costs of a new underwater cable.

The presence of the military is felt in a number of other ways in the port area. The two most prominent are the Naval Dockyard and Embarkation Headquarters. The Naval Dockyard is relatively independent—its major relationship with the Port Trust is simply in its location. It occupies land precisely where the KPT would like to expand. The Embarkation Headquarters serves as the clearing agent for all ocean-transported Pakistani military traffic, personnel, and materials, except for some stores cleared directly by the Navy. Since the military has "absolute priority" on port facilities and ships carrying military cargo occupy on the average two to three berths, cooperation between the headquarters and the KPT is quite important. Fortunately, at the time of this study all the parties involved were satisfied with their working relationships.

Undoubtedly, the major criticism of military activities in the port area was that regarding the handling of explosives. Military explosives were unloaded directly at Berth 21, in the center of the port. Military authorities state that they will pay for damages in case of an explosion, but if the port were to be reduced to ruins by a munitions accident, such a gesture would be meaningless. Karachi experienced a close call in January, 1962, when a ship carrying explosives blew up only two hundred miles from its Karachi destination. Many of the older port officers recalled the great Bombay explosion of 1944. In that disaster five hundred people were killed, over two thousand injured, three hundred acres of docks devastated, twelve ships reduced to scrap iron, three thousand people lost all they owned, fifty thousand people were thrown

out of work, and the overall loss was estimated at 20 million pounds ¹⁷

After independence the only drydock in Pakistan was a small one owned by the KPT. In 1953 the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation began building the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) on land rented from the KPT. The drydock, completed in 1958, can accommodate a ship of twenty thousand tons deadweight with a twenty-five-foot draft. The shipyard's repair facilities have been heavily utilized. The KPT aids the shipyard by providing tugs, pilots, and positive encouragement to shipowners to use the available facilities. The KSEW in turn assists the KPT by building new ships for harbor use and handling major repairs. Both organizations consider their cooperation highly satisfactory. Their relationship in 1962 was further eased by close personal contacts between the general manager of the shipyard and friends and relatives of his who worked for the KPT.

Finally, the movement of goods through the port is affected by the speed of clearance through customs. The administrative entanglements which one confronts in the customs procedures are explained to some extent by the situation of a poor country engaged in development planning. First, strict governmental control over imports is required so that scarce foreign exchange may be allocated according to public priorities. Second, the proportion of central government revenue derived from foreign trade taxes is usually greater than that received from any other single source. As a matter of fact, revenue collected at the Port of Karachi alone accounted for 31 per cent of the ordinary revenue of the central government in 1960-1961.

An investigating committee inquiring into clearance delays in the ports came to the conclusion that the major source of delays were various customs and import trade control formalities. Assessment was the principal bottleneck. About 50 per cent of all items examined by the customs officials for assessment purposes in 1961 (around 10 per cent of consignments) were delayed beyond the free period (seven days after 51 per cent of cargo is unloaded). Items on which there were questions were not cleared for months and even years, accumulating storage costs much greater than their

¹⁷ John Ennis, *Bombay Explosion* (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1959).

original value. In 1961 the average number of days for clearing consignments varied from six to fifteen to thirty depending on which clearing agent one used as a source of information.

The reasons for these delays were many, but the major factor was the cumbersome and intricate clearance procedures. One clearing agent walked a shipment through, and he counted fifty-two different stages, coming back to the same man several times. There was no automatic progression, so that expedition required a clearing agent to carry the bill of entry from one step to the next, paying the appropriate *baksheesh* where necessary. These elaborate cross-checks were instituted by Customs after independence because of a lack of trust in the honesty and competence of each other, their employees, and the clearing agents.

SUMMARY

It is interesting to reflect on the performance of this eighty-year-old public corporation. Its work by no means arouses complaints in the press about the need for more controls on corporations or about "reckless autonomy" the way that operations of the larger, province- or nation-wide corporations seem to do. That may be as much a reflection of the local nature of the Trust and the low visibility of its tasks as it is of the quality of its workings. On the other hand, this is not to denigrate the quality of KPT operations, as compared with other agencies in the Pakistan public sector.

Furthermore, many of the characteristics and problems of the Karachi Port Trust resemble those of similar organizations not only in Pakistan but also in other developing countries. It shares certain of its peculiarities with governmental agencies in more developed parts of the world, like the United States. Supposedly one of the most rationalized industrial societies, the United States still manifests coordination problems as extensive as those centering on KPT, in the intergovernmental dimensions of dozens of metropolitan areas and even in some ports.

KPT's dual problem of poorly motivated and inadequately supervised workers is probably shared by most underdeveloped countries, even though they may be significantly different from Pakistan in cultural terms. "Speed money" seems to be an attribute of prismatic societies where salaries are low, bureaucratic controls weak, influence and bribery widespread, and rules more often

broken than followed. Other traits common to the underdeveloped world have also been noted here.

To be sure, every culture has a unique "mix" of customs, traditions, and views of life. In the Pakistan case one is struck with the rigidity of the class structure in administration. This particular fusion between a caste system and British colonial authoritarianism has resulted in a system characterized more by great social distance than by mobility or equality of opportunity. This has come about despite the egalitarian influences of Islam, Christianity, and British liberal political philosophy. Finally, among developing nations Pakistan's origin in a single religion is even more unique. There are obviously tensions between orthodox religious conventions and the demands of industrial modernization, and we have seen examples in the port at Karachi. Whether these add up to a significant difference in administration as compared with other Muslim countries has not been tested here.

The author, of course, throughout this essay, has used standards based on bureaucratic and maximization ideals of an urban, industrial society. These ideals are only approximated in the advanced nations, and it may seem inappropriate to apply them to institutions and people struggling to determine what "efficiency" means. Yet foreign aid consultants, however mistakenly, are continually engaged in this process. Many of those "experts" perceive their jobs as prescribing transformation and not accommodation.

A pertinent example is provided by the team of United States experts who made a management survey of the Naval Dockyard. They discovered appalling inefficiency. Work that would take thirteen days in the United States required six to eight weeks in Karachi. It took 4,500 Pakistanis to care for 14 ships, whereas in the United States 9,000 men were sufficient for 120 ships. The team blamed this inefficiency on "lack of supervision at the work levels, lack of systematic planning for material and manpower needs, and lack of clear-cut delineations of authority and responsibility." They were baffled by the omnipotent controls of the Finance Ministry and the complicated pay system containing all sorts of allowances unrelated to productivity. The members of the team could not understand this paternalism. "It appears that, in lieu of the government entering so much into personal aspects of an employee's life, it would be more economical and would develop a

more responsive type of citizen if an employee is paid a suitable wage on a straight pay scale and allowed to run his own affairs."¹⁸

The paradox of such an ethnocentric valuation is that from a long-run point of view the Navy team is probably correct, but in the short run their recommendations are so irrelevant to the existing power structure and administrative environment that they will undoubtedly be put on the shelf to gather dust like so many other consultants' reports. An entire library could be filled with similar foreign studies of the Karachi Port Trust.

Finally, the comparatively efficient performance of the port merits reiteration. Shippers considered Karachi one of the most efficient South Asian ports, all of which use predominantly manual labor. If measures of productive efficiency were available for Pakistani enterprises, the author suspects the Port Trust would be among the top performers. There are several reasons why this would be the case. First is its constant touch with many aspects of the outside world. This has several consequences. The port is continuously forced to respond to the demands of foreign shippers, the majority of them British and American. Furthermore, port efficiency is compared worldwide with certain basic measurements, e.g., turn-around time of ships in ports. If efficiency were to drop below a certain level, costs in foreign exchange and surcharges would be immediately incurred. In the fourth place, the senior officers in charge of KPT operations are primarily influenced by role models from industrial societies, notably the United Kingdom.

Any efficiency at KPT also stems from certain special conditions and practices. The majority of dockworkers are hired on a casual basis, and therefore have greater incentive to maintain minimum levels of productivity. They are not beneficiaries of the paternalism experienced by permanent employees. And the marginal minority group membership of some of the senior port officers who are Goans and of most of the stevedores who are Parsees has facilitated their acceptance of alien standards in their work. Again, the technology and level of mechanization has not been drastically altered. Thus one does not find the kind of bewilderment and

¹⁸ Interview with U. S. military aid adviser in Karachi. Also, U. S. Navy, Bureau of Ships, Management Office, "Report of Management and Industrial Engineering Survey of the Pakistan Naval Dockyard Karachi," August, 1961. (Mimeo.)

wastage which exists in more complicated, modernized enterprises like the Shipyard.

Last of all, some explanation of the Trust's comparatively good performance may lie in the fact that port operations have a pre-independence continuity most other Pakistani organizations do not have. Not only did KPT avoid the agonizing problems of building an organization from the ground up after partition; it also benefited positively in some respects. For example, the chief locus of influence and of procedural entanglements in port administration is the Customs. This alone has diverted much public and shipper attention from KPT work and has allowed it to develop in a relatively healthy atmosphere that perhaps agencies like Customs have never experienced

VII. Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change

Interest in administration and administrative reorganization is long-standing in Pakistan. Special commissions were frequently employed under the British Raj to examine administrative problems. Recommendations made by these early groups were usually directed toward achieving the organizational forms and administrative systems required for the maintenance of law and order. Some commissions, however, did understand the need to shift the emphasis to economic and political development.¹

After independence development became the clear, major objective. Pakistan's new leaders quickly realized that better administration was a crucial factor, a realization common throughout the developing world, but particularly evident in Pakistan. Moreover, with the Ayub Khan Revolution in 1958, this interest became a veritable obsession, as that government attempted to extend its revolution by administrative reform.² Administrative study commissions abounded.

This strong concern with administrative reform allows the student of Pakistan an excellent opportunity to study the process of administrative change. Social scientists have developed a number

¹ For example, see the *Rowlands Committee Report*, 1944-45, reprinted in 1962 by the Dacca National Institute of Public Administration, pp. 11-12, 38-39, *passim*. Other such reports from before independence have been reprinted. For example the *Chapman's Report*, 1938, reprinted in 1963 at Dacca, and the *Tottenham Report*, 1945-46, reprinted in 1963 by the Karachi National Institute of Public Administration.

² See Albert Gorvine, "The Role of the Civil Service Under the Revolutionary Government," *The Middle East Journal* (Summer, 1965), *passim*.

of theories concerning the nature of the development process. Indeed, each of the social science disciplines tends to consider its own approach to the problem as the crucial one. Political scientists on occasion describe political development as central. Economists stress savings, technological change, and development of infrastructure. Sociologists talk of social and cultural change as prerequisites to development. Public administrators in their turn have too often claimed the key role for the bureaucracy. It is not the purpose of this chapter to settle all the questions raised by these pretensions. One aspect of the usual public administration claim, however, does concern us: the central importance attributed to the bureaucracy in the process of administrative reform.

Pakistan's experience seems to indicate that administrative reform is successful only when associated with major social, political, or economic reform. It is doomed to failure when undertaken for its own sake, for the traditional rationale of efficiency or economy. Administrative reform indeed is ordinarily fraught with political implications. It may be accepted because administrators see reform either as a means of increasing their power or as neutral vis-à-vis their existing roles. Otherwise, reform must be brought about from outside the administration as ancillary to major political, social, or economic reform. The two dozen or more study commissions mentioned in Chapter I³ obviously had nothing approaching the effect that the Ayub Khan martial law regime produced on Pakistani administration. Indeed, many of those commissions were themselves the product of the first vigorous months of martial law. The commissions which longest delayed their reporting after the inception of martial law were the least successful.

To repeat, administrative change of any importance rarely precedes political and economic reforms. Rather, it follows from them. Administrators are implementors, not innovators. If this is the lesson, it seems remarkably like what has been learned in the course of administrative reorganization attempts in the United States and other western nations in this century. It is, however, important for developing nations to find it in their own experience.

This chapter examines the course of administrative reform in Pakistan since independence. The hypothesis is that administrative

³ See page 4n.

reform, to be successful, must be associated with a significant political, social, or economic reform which in effect "cracks the power structure" of the bureaucracy.

REORGANIZATION EFFORTS, 1947-58

The early years of independence were marked by violent political struggle, while economic development suffered. Administrative institutions established to preserve law and order and collect taxes were not reoriented to a development approach. More fundamentally, political and economic institutions were not geared to promote the goals of social and economic change. No strong, constructive political leadership emerged after the untimely deaths of Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. It was no surprise, therefore, that Pakistan's administrative system remained substantially as it had been under the British. Its strength lay, perhaps, in the small bureaucracy, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), which consisted of approximately one hundred competent and dedicated men. It was a colonial bureaucracy, still very much in the British style. Thus there is some truth in Tarzie Vittachi's opinion that "Brown *Sahibs*" had been substituted for white ones.⁴ Clearly, however, Pakistan derived advantages from the situation. Of particular benefit was the aim of many of these highly placed career administrators to attack problems of administration at home

American Advice

In the absence of top political direction, leadership in this field of administrative reform was taken by the newly formed Planning Commission. The Commission emulated the established patterns of organizational study. In 1953 and 1955 respectively Professor Rowland Egger and Mr. Bernard Gladieux, two American experts on public administration, were called in to study Pakistan's administrative system. Their reports, never released to the public in Pakistan, apparently had little impact on the fast-changing governments before 1958. A decade later, however, several of the ideas they advanced were still being debated actively.⁵

⁴ See his *The Brown Sahib* (London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1962).

⁵ Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in J. LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 372.

Professor Egger was brought from the University of Virginia by the Ford Foundation at the request of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali (Bogra), a former Ambassador to the United States. Professor Egger was given a secretariat office, rank equivalent to secretary to government, and a direct telephone line to the Prime Minister. Operating at this high level, within months he produced a report that greatly antagonized the bureaucracy. It was labeled secret and printed in only a few hundred copies.⁶

Professor Egger leveled serious criticism at Pakistan's secretariat system which separated policy-making from policy-implementation. In Pakistan as in Great Britain, small secretariats operated in both central and provincial ministries with attached functional or technical departments. Major decision-making power rested in the secretariats, which in the British tradition were staffed by generalists. Thus recommendations of technical and scientific departments were often cleared through superintendents at the lowest secretariat level. Numerous communications related to final approval of high policy matters were handled by generalists with no background, experience, or competence in the technical areas. Quickly seeing the problems this created, Egger suggested that the highest technical posts in the secretariat be opened to men from technical service cadres—engineering, agriculture, medicine. In summary Professor Egger stated

The deficiencies in the public administration of Pakistan are not deficiencies of intelligence or understanding, but are deficiencies inherent in an administrative system designed for a day that has gone by. Both the political leaders and the civil service are fully aware of these defects, but the acute shortages of personnel, both in political and administrative circles, and the overwhelming burdens of day-to-day administration falling upon a corps that is too small in number, have prevented the adjustment of administrative organization and procedures to changing conditions.⁷

Egger's recommendations did not fail for lack of insight into the Pakistan administrative system. Rather, the fatal difficulties concerned Professor Egger's sponsorship, the Planning Commission,

⁶ Government of Pakistan, "The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan" (Karachi, 1953). The report was released in 1962 for Professor Egger to publish it abroad.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. x-xi.

and the *ad hoc* nature of his work. Unable to maintain sufficient contact with the administrative or political elite, he perhaps considered too lightly that his recommendations directly threatened officials with status and power in the administrative structure. For instance, concerning change in secretariats, Egger spoke from no real base of power. The Prime Minister was in no position to support his ideas strongly against the bureaucracy, although he is said to have been generally in agreement with Egger.

On the invitation of David Bell, chief of the Harvard University group assigned to the Planning Commission, Bernard Gladieux arrived in 1955 to undertake a more detailed study of the organization of Pakistan government with particular reference to the provinces. Mr. Gladieux, now a management consultant, had been a high-ranking career civil servant in the United States government. Gladieux went first to East Pakistan, where the Chief Secretary stated in polite but no uncertain terms that his study had not been requested and that the governmental system as then constituted was perfectly satisfactory. His reception on returning to West Pakistan was equally chilly. The attitudes he encountered can be attributed at least in part to the backwash of the Egger report. The only high official in Gladieux's memory who gave any support to his study was Zahid Hussain, head of the Planning Commission and former head of the State Bank of Pakistan.

Gladieux nevertheless completed his study and presented a report even more critical than Egger's of the Pakistan bureaucracy. Employing what can only be called an American set of values, he criticized both the organizational and personnel system.⁸ Like Egger, he found fault with the secretariat system, of which the politicians and technicians were the prisoners. Reliance on precedents and on the overflowing files gave clerks tremendous powers in decision-making processes. As a remedy Gladieux recommended the decentralization of development activities from the headquarters staff and the pinpointing of power to coordinate development in the field in the hands of the deputy commissioner.

Gladieux's most important recommendations related to personnel. He stated that the existing personnel system was designed for

⁸ Government of Pakistan, "Reorganization of Pakistan Government for National Development" (Karachi, May, 1955)

another era, was self-perpetuating; relied excessively on academic standards, was inflexible with respect to services, cadres, and classes; and gave disproportionate weight to seniority. Technical personnel were relegated to inferior status and depended excessively on promotion from within the service to fill vacancies. The service structure was characterized by ineffective procedures for disciplinary action and too wide a salary spread. Although not unusual comments in the lexicon of American public administration, these were viewed as devastating by the Pakistanis

Gladieux recommended a new philosophy and approach to public service management. He recommended creation of a Pakistan Public Service Board with new and broader power than the old Public Service Commission. It would take on the personnel functions then handled by the Establishment Division, thus assuming charge of recruitment, promotions, transfers—in short all activities relating to personnel management in standard American practice. Its operations should be decentralized, leaving much to departments but retaining power of final review and approval. Gladieux also recommended that the new Pakistan Public Service Board unify and broaden the public services. He thought that all groups of employees in the “central superior services,” together with all other professional officers such as engineers, doctors, or agriculturalists, should be placed in a single new Civil Service of Pakistan. The board should undertake a systematic program of job analysis, review compensation levels, and assume jurisdiction over disciplinary cases, training, education, research, and welfare.

Gladieux's report may be summarized in his version of the old complaint:

The basic problems surrounding present day administration in Pakistan arise largely from the fact that an administrative system born as an instrument of colonial policy has been carried over with but few modifications and utilized as the machinery for democracy. . . . The major weaknesses of the present administrative system with respect to national development stem largely from the fact that the government is still substantially directed to the law and order function in its organizational, procedural, personnel and fiscal aspects⁹

There were no significant disagreements between Egger's and Gladieux's reports. Both leveled their major criticisms at the tradi-

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 4

tional nature of the bureaucracy. Although both reports laid the ground work for future studies and some of their recommendations were even adopted, at the time they were made they did not see the light of day. Both reports were restricted in distribution to a select few within the administration, yet it may be that the secrecy served to give the ideas wider distribution and more attention than they might otherwise have had. Security measures for such reports have a habit of being circumvented. Egger and Gladieux were officially ignored, but their ideas were not

It was not that Pakistan was unconcerned with difficulties in administration. Official government planners continually referred to administrative troubles and needs. The Planning Board in the plan document did not state the sources of the information on which its recommendations were based, but the nature of the ideas indicates that the Egger and Gladieux reports were the basis for many of them. Chapter VII of *The First Five-Year Plan*, December, 1957, was devoted to the subject of "public administration":

We are of the view that in the period immediately ahead the inadequacies of Pakistan's administrative machinery will operate as the most serious single impediment to the maximum economical use of the country's financial and material resources. The popular belief is that the rate of progress will be primarily regulated by the magnitude of resources, in terms of internal finance and foreign exchange. This is true, but only partly true. In actual fact, the pace of the implementation of economic and social programs is likely to be governed even more by the capabilities of the Nation's administrative and technical organization¹⁰

The Plan specified "public administration requisites for development." Most of these were organizational needs—for example, improved planning organization and reorganized public corporations, districts, and local governments. The most space was devoted to the problems of personnel and the public services.¹¹ Nevertheless, Chapter VI of the First Plan, which discusses implementing the new development program, is hortatory in tone and prescribes little of a concrete nature. This First Plan has been criticized for lacking

¹⁰ Pp. 91-92

¹¹ The draft of this Plan suggested a series of personnel and organizational reforms. These proposals evoked such strong reactions from the central and provincial secretariats that they had to be dropped from the final Plan.

a solid research foundation as well as inadequate statistical information. Its influence has been debated. At any rate national development to 1960 fell short of the targets it set.

In retrospect, it is plain that Egger and Gladieux experienced one other basic difficulty. Foreign advisers have enough of a problem making major recommendations which will completely alter an existing structure of bureaucratic power, but when they come for a short term with insufficient time to grasp the social and political aspects of any recommendations, they are almost doomed to failure. The recommendations by these two advisers did not sufficiently take into account the existing culture and institutions and were indeed patterned too closely after American experiences. They were relatively unfamiliar with the cultural and environmental conditions which might have led them to make other suggestions entirely or to have given more time to problems of implementation.

One Unit

In contrast, where a political change such as the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit in 1955 was decided on, the necessary administrative reorganization got underway at once. The sheer weight of details in the administrative changeover was great. Eight secretariats had to be integrated. Panjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Baluchistan States Union, Karachi, and the Northwest Frontier. A number of provincial and state services with varying standards and differing terms and conditions of service had to be consolidated. For purposes of recruitment to the central superior services and the new West Pakistan Provincial Civil Service, the old units were recast within a quota system to apply to all applicants. These personnel details of consolidation were still being juggled in 1964. The old states had to be recognized in the creation of regional organization for administration, in regrouping field offices in some departments, and in the divisional and district lines for general field administration. In brief, these reorganizational dilemmas presented delicate political and human relations problems. The apprehensions of people in the smaller units had to be minimized while the antagonisms of people in the larger units (particularly the Panjab) had to be avoided.¹²

¹² Unpublished manuscript of Professor Faqir Muhammad, 1965, p. 218.

The consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit was a major step toward integrating Pakistan into a modern nation-state. This was a political action shot through with risks to the entire fabric of the nation. It was accomplished on high policy grounds. More or less open support came even from figures in the bureaucracy whose power and positions were enhanced by it. Any administrative obstacles were deemed minor or perhaps not considered fully at the time. Rather, administrative reform followed and was patterned so as to achieve the political objective of the consolidation of the nation.

REFORMS OF THE MARTIAL LAW REGIME

Upon assuming office, President Ayub Khan "made a cautious and well publicized effort to modernize the social, economic and political life of the country."¹³ The initial thrusts of the martial law regime at first appeared political in emphasis. They included abolition of party politics, creation of Basic Democracies, and reform of land holdings. The President himself initially stated, "My authority was revolution."¹⁴ It gradually became clear over the course of time that administrative reform was also to be a major method for bringing about that "revolution."¹⁵ Organization and personnel practices were high priority items for attention, considered apart from major program matters.

Plans and Studies

The Planning Commission continued to press its views on administrative reform. In *The Second Five-Year Plan* an early assertion was made that a factor in the shortfalls encountered during the First Plan period was administrative in nature. "Deficient advanced planning, shortages of key personnel, equipment and materials, and ineffective coordination between government agencies. Above all, there was failure to observe the discipline of the Plan."¹⁶

¹³ Wayne Ayres Wilcox, *Pakistan, The Consolidation of a Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 208.

¹⁴ Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan, A Political Analysis* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 84.

¹⁵ See Albert Gorvine, *op cit*, 321-36.

¹⁶ Page 3. See also G. Ahmed, "Changes in the Administrative Organization of the Government of Pakistan since 1953," *Public Administration* (Spring, 1961), pp. 355-56. Mr. Ahmed, now Ambassador to the United States, was then Deputy Chairman of the Commission.

Chapter V of this Second Plan is given over to public administration, and the emphasis is similar to the First Plan. Human factors, however, are brought to the fore just a little more explicitly.

The problem of implementation is a question partly of motivation and partly of administrative mechanics. . . . The role of the Government is crucial, but the Plan will fail completely if it is assumed that this is a Government Plan, in which the people are to play a passive role. In fact the spirit of the Plan is quite different. In many diverse ways it assumes the mobilization of the people's imagination and energies.¹⁷

The Commission obviously had administrative problems in mind in setting forth plan programs and goals. Planning machinery (i.e., organization), local government, personnel administration, and public corporations are all treated. Administration was examined critically, but again there was no precise factual underpinning.

As the Second Plan was drafted and published, the martial law government set up a number of study commissions to examine different functional areas. There were commissions on land ownership, education, finance, police, law, food and agriculture, medical services, prices, and a new constitution. Reports subsequently were rendered on these topics. Most reports (as with the five-year plans) were apparently prepared on the basis of some hearings and discussions (often with prominent private individuals), but not derived from any extensive, detailed research. In most cases administrative aspects of the problem area were discussed and a few foreign experts were brought in. These commissions nevertheless demonstrate the relative seriousness with which the Ayub regime approached the problems of government administration.

An Administrative Reorganization Committee of career civil servants was established as a part of this general reform drive. A number of structural and procedural changes, which the Administrative Reorganization Committee considered unprecedented, were proposed in its 1961 report and accepted by the government. The committee broke new ground in the following four reform areas:

- 1) A sweeping reform was the introduction of the Section Officer System in the Secretariat replacing several layers of subordinate staff (the Lower Division Clerk, the Assistant, the Superintendent, the Assistant Secretary and the Under Secretary) by a

single officer of Under Secretary's status assisted by a stenotypist and an Assistant.

- 2) Radical changes were made in the system of financial control, budgeting and accounting. Administrative Ministries were entrusted with wide financial powers; the dilatory system of multiple clearances prescribed for incurring expenditure against appropriate funds was abolished; and a system of financial advice was built into the Ministries to ensure efficient management of funds.
- 3) The scope of the Finance and Commerce Pool (constituted but not fully developed in prepartition India) was widened through the creation of an Economic Pool intended to include officers selected to serve the Ministry of Industries as well.
- 4) The scope of the responsibilities of officers of the Foreign Service of Pakistan was substantially enlarged as a result of the recommendation that commercial and public relations functions performed abroad by representatives of the Ministries of Commerce and Information respectively, should be taken over by officers of the Foreign Service and form a normal part of their functions¹⁸

The Standing Organization Committee continued through 1964 to function and to implement the recommendations of the Administrative Reorganization Committee. Unlike previous reform attempts, this body seems to have pursued on a continuing basis ideas that were first expressed by career officers, so chances for success were greater than in some other reform efforts. The purposes of these reforms were many. The "section officers scheme" was designed to speed the flow of work through the secretariat. Senior technical officers resented having to submit their programs for review by clerical personnel in the secretariat. The new scheme called for a single office in a given secretariat to receive such files. The change at first may have speeded some of the routine papers through the secretariat, but the technical services remained unhappy with the secretariat system, in which they had no access to decision-making. In agriculture and education technical personnel have presumably had more ready access to secretariat positions since 1964. If some change is occurring and a more acceptable relationship between the technical departments and the secretariats in the Center and the provinces can be found, tensions within the bureaucracy

¹⁸ Government of Pakistan, *The Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee* (Karachi, 1961), p. iv.

will relax appreciably. The degree to which such adjustments had occurred by 1965 was minimal, however.

The decentralization of financial controls to the operating departments has proceeded somewhat superficially in line with the Reorganization Committee's 1961 report. Financial advisers have been assigned to the departments in East Pakistan and the Center. Relationships between these financial advisers, the finance ministries, and the host departments were still being clarified in 1964. The system apparently remained very much dependent for smooth operation on the personal relationships among the three or four individuals directly involved in each case.

The Economic Pool was created, as a result of the Administrative Reorganization Committee's findings, to provide flexibility in the assignment of top personnel.¹⁹ The pool gives officers from the finance and customs services opportunities to move out of their specialized assignments. For example, a customs officer could enter the pool, if qualified by education and experience in economic matters. He might then be assigned to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry or other agencies where his expertise would be relevant. This reform in no way challenged the primacy of the CSP, among the services, since a certain percentage of posts in the Economic Pool was reserved for its members. In fact, the Comptroller and Auditor General opposed the reform, since it gave the CSP further access to finance posts. The pool is nonetheless noteworthy as broadening the career possibilities for some officers in specialized services.

Numerous reports came out after 1960. A 1960 report by the Provincial Administration Commission on administrative problems in West Pakistan dealt with field problems at length and pointed to a very sore spot in the Pakistani administrative system. It stated, "The irony of it [delay, duplication, and waste] is that over centralization exists side by side with inadequate supervision and control by the higher levels of administration in matters of real importance."²⁰ The report recommended a series of moves: revision of division and district administration, reconstitution of the adminis-

¹⁹ First recommended by the Cabinet in 1950, this change was delayed by bureaucratic opposition until 1958, after the Revolution.

²⁰ Government of West Pakistan, *Provincial Administration Commission Report* (Lahore, February, 1960), p. 3.

trative division, establishment of clear lines of authority and responsibility from department to field, delegation of a number of powers to division and district officers, decentralization of administrative and financial controls, and simplification of administrative procedures. These recommendations show in their terminology that the Commission drew heavily on the thinking of Egger and Gladieux and on Western commentary. It should be noted that the recommendations generally would buttress, even increase, the power of CSP officers who hold most of the district officer posts. What specifically has happened to these ideas has not yet been studied. One may assume they will be carried out, since they enhance rather than threaten the status of members of the senior service.

The preceding, brief outline of attempts at formal organizational reform in Pakistan highlights an awareness of the importance of administration in development. These reform attempts were conscious efforts to change. Many official claims to the contrary notwithstanding, their success has been extremely limited. The major bastions of power remain largely unaffected by what has with few exceptions turned out to be mere administrative tinkering.

The *Third Five-Year Plan* of June, 1965, carried on the recognition of administration as crucial to Pakistan's development efforts despite the difficulties involved in implementing recommendations for administrative reform. Avoiding specific recommendations, the Plan lists the areas in which action is required:

- 1) adaptation to decentralization of developmental functions resulting from the new Constitution;
- 2) improving the working of semi-autonomous public corporations and authorities,
- 3) ensuring a continued supply of qualified and trained personnel at all levels, in the light of carefully assessed requirements,
- 4) modernization of personnel practices and public service policies, to secure improved per capita performance,
- 5) strengthening the machinery for preparation of projects, their progressing and evaluation, and for research and statistics,
- 6) strengthening the institutions of Basic Democracies as instruments of local government, and continually increasing their developmental responsibilities,
- 7) modernization of financial administration and budgeting, and streamlining of accounting system,

- 8) improved coordination between different agencies and levels of government; and
- 9) improvement of systems, procedures, and forms in use in government offices; codification of rules and regulations, and preparation of organization charts, and manuals; and mechanization of repetitive operations where economically feasible.²¹

Points 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 are singled out as "strategic areas" where concentrated attention offers the promise of quick returns in improved performance.

In general, over the ten-year period covered by the three plans and a variety of reports and recommendations the tenor of comment on administration has remained constant. There is agreement that important organizational troubles exist. There is, especially in the plans but also elsewhere, an increasing recognition that changes by law or regulation must be supplemented by attitudinal and motivational changes. However, there is little awareness of how these changes are to be brought about. The Planning Commission reports seem oblivious to why their recommendations have not been carried out. Essentially the same general problems are treated, but there are few workable, specific solutions. This condition directly reflects the power of the CSP in the bureaucracy and its proclivity to weigh any suggested administrative changes in terms of their effects on its own status and prestige.²²

Reforming "The Services"

Pakistan's public servants and especially the CSP have recently received as much attention in and out of Pakistan as any other aspect of her government or administration.²³ Discussion of this subject still fills the air in Pakistan. In addition to harping on the dominance of the CSP, disturbing to virtually everyone but the CSP members themselves, critics deplore the fractionalization of the services. Indeed, complexity is the chief characteristic of personnel organization. There are Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 services, central and provincial services, gazetted and nongazetted officers, technical

²¹ Government of Pakistan, *The Third Five-Year Plan* (1965-70) (Karachi, May, 1965), pp. 162-63.

²² See Gorvine, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

²³ See, for recent examples, Ralph Braibanti's second article on the subject, cited above in footnote 5; Henry Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Muneer Ahmad, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964).

officers in technical services and technical officers in nontechnical services. Each service has its own pay scales, benefits, and special posts reserved for its members.

A major distinction is that between the all-Pakistan services, the central superior services, and the provincial services. The all-Pakistan services, centrally organized and administered, include only the CSP and the Police Service, which rank in public esteem far above the others. The central superior services are the Foreign Service, Audit and Accounts Service, Military Accounts Service, Income Tax Service, Customs Service, Military Lands and Cantonments Service, Postal Service, Postal Superintendent Service, Survey of Pakistan Service, and, until 1963, several railway services. Provincial civil services (PCS) are organized separately in each wing. In both wings the PCS includes generalist officers who serve both in field and secretariat positions (in this respect like members of the CSP) and in specialized services like the recently bifurcated railway service, the education service, agricultural service, and others. In addition to their official standing, many of these services have parallel employee associations which serve, to a limited extent, the purposes that, for example, Americans are familiar with in "white collar unions."²⁴

In the central administration two organizations are vested with the bulk of personnel matters involved in administering the all-Pakistan services: the Establishment Division and the Federal Public Service Commission. This Commission is subordinate to the Establishments Division for management purposes but operates separately from it to recruit for the all-Pakistan services and to administer and grade examinations. Previously three separate examinations were involved: a first for the CSP and Foreign Service, a second for the Police Service (PSP), and a third for the remaining higher services. In 1963 these were consolidated into a single examination. A rank list of eligibles for the services is prepared on the basis of examination grades and quotas established in Commission regulations for the various geographic sections of the country. The system is designed to draw into the public services the young people from less developed regions to an extent greater than would otherwise be the case. The Establishment Division in turn

²⁴ Goodnow, *op. cit.*, p. 186. Among these is, for instance, a CSP Association.

appoints from these lists, and the young men proceed to their post-entry training in the Civil Service Academy at Lahore, the Police Academy at Sarda, and so on.

Of these two agencies the Establishment Division, organizationally a part of the President's Secretariat, is by all odds the most influential and powerful. The Commission is involved only in recruiting and examining. The Establishment Division not only appoints to the various services, but it also administers all matters of training, promotion, and posting for the CSP and the PSP, the two premier services (the Foreign Service is handled on these matters primarily through the Foreign Ministry). Furthermore, the Division is and has been a citadel for the CSP. Ever since independence it has been headed by a succession of high-ranking CSP officers whose principal aides (joint secretaries) also have been CSP. And the officials who occupied these chairs during the first fourteen years were usually Englishmen. In some sense, therefore, the CSP was under direct British control until very recently, and it clearly bore the hallmark of that control in 1965.²⁵

Some few reforms in personnel practices have aimed at both the fractionalization of the services and the CSP's privileged status. In February, 1960, an Administrative Training Council was established and soon thereafter promulgated an elaborate training scheme for services through the entire country. It placed the Establishment Division and its secretary at the apex of the new system. The plan included training programs for officers at various levels:

- 1) The Administrative Staff College in Lahore conducts classes for senior government officers, joint secretaries, commissioners, and officers of equivalent status with more than fourteen years of service. Officials from private firms have, in addition, accounted for about one-fifth or one-sixth of the total in each class.
- 2) National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPAs) were located in Karachi, Lahore, and Dacca for management and development training of middle-level officers of the central and provincial governments and autonomous agencies. Officers who have attended have been deputy secretaries, deputy commissioners, and officers of equivalent status with from seven to fourteen years of service.

²⁵ See Braibanti, *op. cit.*, p. 393; and Goodnow, *op. cit.*, chap. 7. Organization and staffing of the Establishments Division were slightly altered in mid-1965.

- 3) Academies for Rural Development at Peshawar and Comilla train supervisory personnel for the nation-building departments, as well as for subsidiary training of CSP and PCS officers for village development programs. (Village AID officers were included before that program ended.)
- 4) The existing Civil Service Academy in Lahore continued, with only minor changes in curriculum, as the postentry training ground for the Civil Service of Pakistan.
- 5) A Secretariat Training Institute was established in Karachi to train ministerial (lower) personnel and the newly recruited section officers.

The heads of the Staff College, the NIPA, and the Civil Service Academy have been CSP officers, although trainees in the first two instances came from all of the services. In the programs, both substantive knowledge and changed motivations have been stressed. Particular emphasis has been placed on administrative theory and practice, economic development and administration, the importance of social change for political and economic development, and the examination of research problems in the field. Efforts were made to encourage government officers to think of themselves as servants of the people rather than masters. By 1965 there was little doubt that the training programs have been successful, in the sense that they have imparted considerable information to the government officers. Whether they have actually changed any attitudes is difficult to test or to prove.

Perhaps one of the most significant results of the training program especially in the Staff College and the NIPAs has been one that was unexpected and unrecognized at the outset. The bringing together of the men from the various services, the CSP, police, audit and accounts, PCS, education, agriculture, and the others has produced a certain sense of comradeship and understanding of the points of view and attitudes of one another. This may be the most significant accomplishment of the training program. The friendships which have been established in living and working together have carried over, enabling some of the officers subsequently to work together more closely. There has been profit from bringing together East and West Pakistanis in the Administrative Staff College—perhaps the only institution where this is regularly done.

Many of these benefits from the new training organizations are intangible. The formal organizational pattern for personnel ad-

ministration remained the same during the revolutionary period. Neither the Public Service Commission, the Establishment Division, nor the Civil Service Academy was affected in any significant way. The Administrative Training Council enhanced the power of the Establishment Division by putting the newly developed training program in its hands. This however only served to increase the power of the CSP. Any shift in the attitudes of government workers was relatively insignificant in the face of this formal power position. The divisiveness in the services may have been decreased by their exposure to one another in the Staff College and NIPA training programs. Still, none of this affected the basic authority of the Establishment Division.

The most frontal attempt to alter the power structure within the career services was led by the Pay and Services Commission which was chaired by the Chief Justice, the highest-ranking CSP member in the nation. It labored from 1960 to 1962. Its final report was judged too radical and the government released it only to a relatively few officials. Among several proposals, the Commission recommended the unification of the disparate services into a seven-tiered structure. A Pakistan Administrative Service was suggested to replace the CSP and admit men of the technical services. Such a proposal of course deeply threatened the elite status and exclusiveness of the CSP, particularly the attack on its privileged system of earmarked jobs. Finally its preferential salary and other benefit provisions would have been matched by adjustments in the other services' benefits.

Naturally enough, the CSP fought back. Two of the CSP members of the Commission wrote a dissent to the majority report:

We are of the opinion that the system which has stood the test of time, not only during the British regime but also during the tumultuous and important years since independence should be permitted to continue with such changes as experience has shown necessary.²⁶

No changes were recommended by the dissenters. Their position prevailed, however, and the report was shelved by the government.

The conflict over this report occurred out of public view, a struggle for power within the bureaucracy. Organizations of public

²⁶ Government of Pakistan, *Report of Pay and Services Commission* (Karachi, 1962), p. 447.

employees held meetings and in vain petitioned the government to release the report. The distinguished Chief Justice of Pakistan, Chairman of the Commission and sponsor of the report, was opposed by insiders who were simply too powerful. This attempt to establish a new balance between the services was blocked. In a speech to the CSP Association early in 1963 the President of Pakistan indicated there would be no major change in service relationships.

In fact, recently many more posts have been reserved for CSP officers than there are CSP members (see Table 1). The gap between officers and posts available widened between 1947 and 1961. CSP officers, therefore, enjoy the opportunity of a wide choice of administrative experiences with no competition from any of the other services.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF POSTS RESERVED AND NUMBERS OF CSP OFFICERS 1947-1961

Year	No. of Off.	No. of Posts	Difference
1947	158	244	86
1950	175	332	157
1954	258	519	261
1961	379	735	356

SOURCE: Government of Pakistan, *Report of Pay and Services Commission* (Karachi, 1962), Chap. VI.

Suppression of the Pay and Services Report will not solve these personnel problems. The CSP remains the object of envy and stronger emotions. For instance, the government has ruled that officers from the technical services may become joint secretaries or even secretaries. Implementation of this idea is the responsibility of the president, cabinet and governors first, but of course the Establishment Division is again in the vital administrative location. A very few secretaries have recently been drawn from the technical cadres. In addition, allowing technical officers the rank of joint secretary as advisers in the secretariat has virtually destroyed the concept of the attached department. Formerly technical service personnel could establish a base of functional authority in an attached department. Today such a technical head is merely an adviser to the generalist head of the department—the secretary. In practice it would appear that this reorganization has weakened the technical

services, strengthened the generalists, and further distorted the balance among the services.

From 1963 to 1965 there was serious discussion of broadening admission to the Civil Service Academy, the entrance academy for the CSP, to include trainees from the Foreign Service. Assigning new candidates to the key services only after successful completion of the Civil Service Academy course was also considered. These ideas have had no official endorsement, however.

Whatever hope there was for major reform of the services by the martial law regime has vanished. The CSP especially has emerged from the 1958 Revolution with no loss of its status and perhaps an increase. On the other hand, "The increase of its cadre strength, the improvement of its method of recruitment, training, posting and promotion, and most important of all, the reorientation of its outlook—has not kept pace with the enlargement of its responsibilities."²⁷ One guesses the CSP will slowly change under pressures from the other services and from the needs of fast development. This senior service is too small and "socially isolated" to have mass support.²⁸ With time, it is likely the CSP will become more and more elitist, cut off from the mainstream of the nation and, in the short run more crucial, from the rest of its administrative colleagues. Only the CSP itself can avoid that eventuality, by making more efforts to meet the growing criticism.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

To this point failure and frustration in efforts at administrative reform, both before and after the Ayub Khan Revolution, have been emphasized. Reports by Egger and Gladieux still float in an administrative limbo. The Administrative Reorganization Committee, the Provincial Reorganization Commissions of West and East Pakistan, and the Pay and Services Commission have largely failed to achieve the ambitious objectives of major administrative and personnel changes. But of course the picture is not all dark. Some administrative reforms have occurred. It is those changes and

²⁷ M. A. Choudhuri, *The Civil Service in Pakistan* (Dacca: National Institute of Public Administration, 1963), p. 376.

²⁸ Karl Von Vorys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 118.

their relationships to political or economic changes with which these concluding pages will deal.

Political Reform Implications

One of President Ayub's early political reforms with implications for administration was the Basic Democracy system. On the political side, one function of the new system is the election of provincial and national assemblies and the president by electors called Basic Democrats. It provides also for strengthened participation and leadership in local government. Basic Democracies are intended to be instruments of social mobilization. They help also to provide political support for the martial law regime and its successor under the 1962 Constitution. Patterned after older conceptions of village institutions in India, Basic Democracies are similar in several respects to Panchayati Raj in India today.

The Basic Democracies system of course created an administrative structure for local government based upon population units. Primary constituencies of approximately one thousand people on the basis of adult suffrage were established. Professor Lawrence Ziring explains in Chapter II how eight or ten of these primary constituencies were grouped together to form union councils in the rural sections, town committees in the smaller urban areas, and union committees in the cities. And successive levels are built from these blocks to make up the Basic Democracy hierarchy. The whole amounts to an institutionalized means by which elected officials may at least criticize the administration and individual administrators where specific projects are concerned.²⁹

Further, the government has used these local institutions to undertake rural works programs using American counterpart funds. Excellent administrative and technical support has come from the East Pakistan provincial government in the assignment of circle officers to support these activities. New posts are being created at lower administrative levels, e.g., engineers for small works. The existing cadres and recruitment levels will not meet these expanded

²⁹ See Abdul Qayyum, "The Deputy Commissioner and The Basic Democracies," in *Perspectives in Public Administration* (Lahore: Civil Service Academy, 1963).

requirements. Such leverage should sooner or later change the existing balance of power in the bureaucracy.

Thus a major political reform seems to be developing administrative capacity and skills to meet a political need. The Comilla Academy has served as an invaluable adjunct or catalyst in this process. Uppermost, however, is the political character of the rural works program. President Ayub's support in the 1964 East Pakistan elections, for example, came from the rural areas, where the works program was the strongest. *The development of decentralized centers of technical and administrative skill* for the rural areas is apparently turning out to be a direct product of political reform.

Another political reform of the 1958 Revolution, second only to the Basic Democracies system, was the adoption of the new Constitution. It replaced the old parliamentary system with a presidential one and strengthened the existing modified federal system. The president appoints the governor of each of the provinces. Development funds are still allocated through the National Economic Council and associated agencies under the jurisdiction of the central government. The all-Pakistan and the central superior services of course remain with the central government as do the military, police, and taxing powers.

The 1962 Constitution ostensibly designs a political and administrative system which will permit economic development to continue along the lines laid out by the revolutionary government. Thus the Constitution strictly limits the power of the National Assembly over the development budget. The most significant administrative result of the new Constitution, however, has been the direct increase in the powers of the chief executive. Under the old parliamentary system, the legislative assembly was the major source of power in the country. The present, presidential system is closer to the De Gaulle than to the American pattern. Extensive powers over development activities are in the hands of President Ayub. Thus is sought the political stability which was lacking during the prerevolutionary period. The arrangement should also bring to the administrative system stronger political leadership over the long run, in the form of presidential and cabinet power—a condition rare in Pakistan.

The well-organized and strengthened Planning Commission with the President as chairman has also been a major channel both for

administrative support of the President and administrative control by presidential power, particularly in development schemes. The President can move forward unhampered by the harassment and indecision, so characteristic of the parliamentary regimes in Pakistan. In part through the Planning Commission, the President has been able to strengthen East Pakistan's capacity to utilize development funds, formerly the major excuse given for allotting the smaller amount of funds to East Pakistan.

In provincial administration the President also can exercise leadership through his appointees, the governors. The outward evidence in 1965 was that at least in West Pakistan, the current Governor had his finger on day-to-day decisions, assignments, and events throughout the provincial administration.

The Constitution delegates major power in economic development areas—agriculture, industrial development, water and power, and transport—to the provincial governments. Each province has broadened its departmental structure, and in addition there are public corporations in most development fields. The corporations are staffed largely by former provincial employees or by individuals directly recruited. When central superior services personnel are assigned to them, the appointments are made by the central government. In political terms, this allocation of functions helps to soften inter-wing rivalries. East Pakistan has clamored for parity with West Pakistan. The new Constitution in a sense allows the East more room to determine its own development course. However, the very basic and traditional powers—foreign affairs, defense, taxing and budgetary powers—are still retained in the hands of the central government.

Provincial administration has grown and will grow more in size and in power. The provincial services have gradually expanded in numbers and powers to compensate for the changeover of development program implementation into their hands. The expansion of technical assignments as a result of the development effort has also strengthened such technical services as the provincial engineering services.

The political demands of the East Pakistanis and the demands of the engineering and other technical services have brought East Pakistanis into senior provincial positions. East Pakistanis have replaced West Pakistanis in many posts in East Pakistan, and efforts

have been made to find East Pakistanis willing to leave Bengal to serve the central government in Rawalpindi. Although difficult to achieve, this effort is an indication of good faith and has been appreciated by responsible elements in East Pakistan.

Administrative Reform from Economic Reform

Before 1958 economic development foundered on the shoals of political controversy. In association with the substantive steps taken toward economic development in the seven years since, however, there is clear evidence of administrative consequences. Four broad categories of economic decisions will serve as brief examples: (1) development of an effective national planning and plan implementation system; (2) expansion of the physical infrastructure of the nation—irrigation, drainage, power, transport, and communications; (3) encouragement of private sector operations; and (4) stepping up the use of public corporations to supplement activities by private investors and to carry out some programs that are not normally considered governmental in character.

In what was a genuine desire to make the economy work, the martial law regime undertook to push the national planning effort. They reorganized and expanded the Planning Commission. Economic discussions were placed high on the national agenda, and economists were moved into newly created administrative positions. They became a force to be reckoned with in administration. CSP officers were of course not barred from participating in this movement, and indeed many of them proceeded to do so. M.A.'s in economics from years back were dusted off and refresher courses undergone. The Planning Commission and the economists and statisticians grew in bureaucratic power as the ideological spokesmen for economic growth. The Commission led in the effort to create strong planning departments in the provincial secretariats. By 1965 they were well along with a campaign to put a "planning cell" in each operating department in the three Pakistan governments. The Planning Commission staff helped to establish training programs at various levels, encouraging career employees to display more favorable attitudes toward development. The Commission recommended training and educational programs for technical skills needed in economic expansion—engineering, agriculture, education.

The Planning Commission has been associated with the continuing policy of heavy dependence upon the private sector in development, although there were signs in 1965 that individuals within the Commission were reexamining the policy. Private industry and commerce have expanded tremendously since 1958. This growth has attracted many bright young men, thereby bringing competition with the public services at the recruitment level. Such competition between public and private sectors for "Pakistan's best" has given critics another point of leverage against bureaucratic power. Finally, in the early sixties the government seemed to be posting some of their best officers in strategic jobs relating to the problems of private firms.

Public corporations have been used increasingly since 1958, especially to produce public works and other infrastructure. In a decision that apparently was based both on political and administrative considerations, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was split into two provincial enterprises by the martial law regime. Railways were also bifurcated. The water and power development authority and the agricultural development corporations were subsequently established also on provincial lines. These new enterprises were staffed with high-level officials, paid and otherwise dealt with more generously than are officials in the traditional departments. It may be argued that these officials in the corporations represent a counterforce that will in the long run oppose the CSP and other traditional administrative power centers. But the government delegated leadership in the new corporations to officers with proven abilities, loyal to most of the administrative traditions of the country. A high percentage of such leaders has indeed been drawn from CSP ranks.

Of course the corporations provide another series of channels through which engineers and other professionals may rise in the hierarchy. At higher levels generalists and specialists may develop closer ties than have previously been possible. In practice also, the high-ranking leaders of the corporations have been able to work directly with governors, the Planning Commission, and central secretaries. Provincial secretariats have not been able to prevent the informal communications process that has usually developed. The forces of functionalism thus continue to assert themselves.

SUMMARY

If quantity of studies and volume of organized attention to formal organization and to fiscal, personnel, and program questions are measures of the quality of public administration, then Pakistan's administration rates high. More than two dozen major studies have been made in recent years. Stemming largely from those studies, many directives and regulations have been promulgated in the name of improved administration. Powers have been formally delegated. Authority and responsibility have been ordered "coordinated." Reorganization has to some extent been institutionalized in agencies like the Standing Reorganization Committee and the "O and M" units or officials one finds in both provincial governments. Still, none of the reforms made solely in the name of administrative improvement has yet been effective. The most meaningful administrative changes have resulted from or gone hand in hand with political and economic reforms.

In the undifferentiated political systems of modernizing countries, politics and administration are even less separable than is the case in a Western nation like the United States. Any foreign expert, particularly in administration, therefore has a political dimension to his task that must be aligned alongside the cultural, legal, and other aspects. Even when he may be most perceptive in his personal relationships and his political "feel," however, he has little or no control over whether he is riding the crest of an economic or political reform. He can determine that he is receiving the highest political support, but that too may not be continuous or strong enough.

In these pages the central role of the Civil Service of Pakistan in implementing or blocking reform has been noted. CSP influence appears as control by its members of strategically located jobs throughout the administration. There is no denying the generally high caliber of administrators from the CSP. In many instances they simply are quicker mentally, better gamesmen, and better educated than the appointed or elected officials with whom they deal. Their heritage from the Indian Civil Service is an additional strong but intangible foundation for their prestige in every part of the society.

It is of course not uncommon for a group of bureaucrats to possess power in a developing country—power so important and

evident that it can only be termed political. The CSP is involved in the policy-making process all the time. CSP officers occupy the important secretarial and joint secretarial positions where daily contacts with the President, ministers, and other politically responsible persons give them a direct line to policy. In view of these advantages, it is no wonder that the majority of CSP officials are not anxious to work for reforms which may radically change their status and that of their service.

This is of course simply another way of stating that the process of administration is closely related to the process of politics, indeed may simply be considered as a subsystem thereof. Critics, foreign and domestic, who expect bureaucrats to take the lead in fundamental administrative reform in the interests of economic development, will usually be disappointed (if the Pakistani case is representative). Leaders of another type may bring about administrative changes in the wake of broader reforms. It should be said that in Pakistan members of the CSP have often enthusiastically supported changes of this nature, indeed in some cases have helped formulate and initiate them. When, however, the political power centers are behind a political or economic move, the administrative aspects of the change pose problems of a much lower order.

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